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ABSTRACT 
 
Organisational learning is essential for innovation and effectiveness (Franco & Almeida 2011); 
especially in healthcare where organisational learning can directly improve the quality of care 
provided to patients. Incident reporting is a common governance tool within healthcare 
(Mahajan 2010) and feedback from incident reporting has the potential to facilitate individual 
and organisational learning that could lead to enhanced practices (Levitt & March 1988). 
Furthermore, the identification and resolution of problems encountered in the course of one’s 
work is a method for achieving organisational learning (Tucker & Edmondson 2003); in practical 
terms, incorporating lessons learnt into the organisation’s ‘memory’ by way of governance 
processes, policies and systems. However, little research has explicitly examined the potential 
for incident reporting to foster organisational learning or the mechanisms through which this 
might occur. 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine whether providing short cycle feedback through an 
incident reporting system produced organisational learning. Specifically, the study investigated 
whether the short cycle feedback system would facilitate single-loop organisational learning, 
which is defined as learning to identify errors and develop ameliorating strategies to prevent 
their recurrence (Argyris & Schon 1978). Single loop learning was measured as i) an 
improvement in incident reporting rates; ii) a decrease in actual incidents; and, iii) a decrease in 
the severity of incidents.  
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This research was conducted over 2 Stages. Stage 1 involved a longitudinal study conducted 
over 5 phases and undertaken in 2 wards (study and control) within a major metropolitan 
hospital in south-west Sydney. During Phase 1, a pre-intervention questionnaire was 
administered to staff in the control ward and study ward to evaluate staff members’ attitudes 
towards incident reporting and feedback. In Phase 2, verbal querying was used to collect data 
on observed and reported incidents in order to quantify incident underreporting. During Phase 
3, staff in the study ward received a short cycle feedback intervention that aimed to produce 
and provide feedback from an incident report to the reporting staff member within a 72 hour 
timeframe. A senior nurse provided feedback in a formative, consultative manner, which was 
delivered face-to-face to the incident reporter. During Phase 4, the short cycle feedback 
intervention was withdrawn and underreporting continued to be measured via verbal querying. 
During Phase 5, a post-intervention questionnaire was administered to staff in the control ward 
and study ward to evaluate staff members’ attitudes towards incident reporting and feedback.  
 
The feedback intervention and comparisons between pre-intervention and post-intervention 
questionnaires demonstrated an improvement in staff members’ perception regarding the 
utility of incident reporting systems and that short cycle feedback facilitated learning outcomes. 
Expected results, such as a reduction in incident severity and actual incidents, were equivocal. 
Consequently, during Stage 2 of the study a focus group was conducted with members of the 
hospital’s senior management team to critique the results and develop strategies to promote 
feedback mechanisms within the organisation. Focus group participants commented on the 
virtues of the study and recommended strategies to enhance medical staff participation and 
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expand the feedback specialist role to improve engagement of after-hours and weekend staff. 
The focus group determined that these strategies, in conjunction with a replication study at a 
larger Hospital and across multiple specialties, would strengthen the findings from Stage 1.  
 
The study concluded that short cycle feedback did facilitate single loop learning, evidenced by 
changes in staff attitudes, knowledge and behaviour regarding incident reporting and clinical 
practices. The study also found that short cycle feedback produced 3 additional forms of 
learning: double-loop organisational learning, triple-loop organisational learning, and vicarious 
learning. Double loop learning was evidenced by new values regarding incident reporting utility. 
Triple loop learning was observed by a further understanding of incident reporting as a tool 
within a learning continuum system. Vicarious learning was demonstrated via a change in skills 
and behaviours of participants that did not directly receive short cycle feedback but learnt 
vicariously about its value. Hence, the research demonstrated that short cycle feedback has 
greater potential for facilitating organisational learning than previously theorised. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
Incident reporting systems are commonly established within organisations to capture events 
that deviate from the expected course of action or outcome. In the NSW public health system, 
this is evidenced by the Incident Information Management System (IIMS), where incidents 
documented within IIMS capture events that feature sub-standard clinical practices, which at 
times can adversely affect the patient’s treatment and outcome. Thus, the management of 
incidents replicates an organisational inquiry (Argyris & Schon 1978), such as a Case Conference 
or Morbidity and Mortality review, to identify the cause of the problem and formulate 
corrective actions. Whilst the value of incident reporting is to derive lessons that could lead to 
improved practices and prevention of recurrent incidents, this ideology is not often reinforced 
by pragmatic operational practices (Lawton & Parker 2002). Incident reports can be used to 
rectify human error and lead to improvements in clinical practice (Croskerry 2000). As such, 
strategies to improve performance must be based upon non-punitive principles and formative 
feedback (Lake & Landau 2007) as a fear of professional and legal ramifications is a barrier to 
incident reporting (Davis et al. 2003). Disclosure to the incident reporter of how an incident is 
managed is often lacking, which promotes the perception that incident reporting lacks 
usefulness. This can lead to incidents being left unreported, which can compromise the 
organisation’s ability to learn from these incidents. There is often no feedback mechanism to 
the author of an incident report, which compounds the perception that incident reporting is 
meaningless and has no utility (Braithwaite et al. 2010).  
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The implementation of a feedback loop between the incident reporter and incident resolution 
can facilitate a learning outcome, which can support improvements in clinical practice. 
Additionally, the success of such a mechanism could overcome perceptions regarding lack of 
utility with incident reporting systems. Hence, the observation of learning outcomes, being the 
product of incident reporting feedback loops, could encourage incident reporting and could 
foster more positive attitudes about the value of doing so. Any presence of underreporting may 
decrease as feedback loops become implemented across an organisation. Members of an 
organisation may change the accepted norms and values they bestow upon incident reporting. 
Enhanced incident reporting efforts could result from potential incident reporters’ 
understanding that the effectiveness of feedback provided is influenced by the level of input 
into incident reports. Essentially, this enables the incident reporter to enhance their own 
understanding of an incident and even contribute strategies to prevent recurrence of the 
incident. This contribution, rather than dictation, of preventative strategies would enhance the 
overall educational potential of incident reporting systems (Anderson et al. 2013).   
 
Achieving such learning outcomes requires several changes to existing incident reporting 
practices. Learning is contingent on the incident reporting feedback loop to be embedded 
across the whole of the organisation (Warring et al. 2013). Learning and development 
opportunities can be extracted from incident reports, based on the aggregation of the 
experiences of practitioners in the field (Barach & Small 2000; Runciman 2002). Incident 
reporting systems can provide clinical staff with valuable information that leads to patient 
safety improvements. Therefore, it is imperative for a universal feedback loop to be devised 
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and implemented, in order to promote compliance with an established feedback mechanism 
and facilitate knowledge sharing. If members of an organisation are transferred to different 
units within the organisation, the feedback loop practices should remain the same, to prevent 
derivation of lessons from incident reporting being compromised. Considering that incident 
reporting systems within the healthcare industry, such as IIMS, are already embedded within an 
organisation, the onus shifts to the implementation of a complementary feedback mechanism. 
At present, the absence of feedback to an incident reporter impedes the individual’s and 
organisation’s capacity to learn from such incidents. The potential for learning becomes limited; 
thus, stifles clinical practice improvement in patient safety and outcomes.  
 
There is limited evidence regarding effective forms of feedback in healthcare (Benn et al. 2009). 
The timeliness of feedback is believed to be a contributing factor on whether the educational 
aspects of incident reporting systems are effective to the target audience. For example, short 
cycle feedback, or feedback provided within a short timeframe to the reporting staff member 
upon submission of an incident report, has been effectively employed in the acquisition of 
surgical skills by trainee surgeons (Porte et al. 2007). Timely provision of formative feedback is 
argued to foster a learning environment that will lead to performance improvements and 
enhanced patient safety systems. Delays in feedback can inhibit incident-based lessons 
reaching frontline staff, which limits the opportunity for improvements in patient safety 
(Mahajan 2010). The ability for local decision makers to address patient safety issues is 
impeded by a lag in feedback (Farley et al. 2008). A study by Tighe et al. (2006) indicates that 
the purposes of learning from incidents reported were compromised due to at least 1 month 
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lag time between reporting and resolution of the incident. A study by Evans et al. (2006) 
indicated that a lack of feedback was a significant deterrent to incident reporting amongst 
clinicians. Delayed feedback discourages incident reporting, resulting in a culture of 
underreporting, particularly by the medical profession (Mahajan 2010; Braithwaite et al. 2010). 
Active involvement of clinical staff in the incident reporting process will enhance the utility of 
improvements derived from incident reporting systems. The utility of incident reporting 
systems on clinical practice is enhanced when feedback is delivered at the time of decision 
making (Jamtvedt et al. 2006).  
 
It is common within a Hospital or Healthcare setting that lessons are commonly derived from 
negative experiences. This can be attributed to exhausted resources, increasing public 
expectations and broad media attention that such negative experiences can generate. 
Furthermore, these experiences often result in full-scale, acute inquiries, with the intention of 
leading to improved processes. An example of this is the Special Commission of Inquiry into 
New South Wales Acute Public Hospitals, led by Commissioner Peter Garling in 2008. The origin 
of this inquiry was in relation to the death of 16-year old Vanessa Anderson – a death 
considered avoidable, had it not been for the lack of robust systems that monitor the status of 
a deteriorating patient. Whilst such an outcome is not commonplace for the NSW Health 
system, it is acknowledged that an overwhelming majority of incidents entered into the NSW 
Health incident management system (e.g. IIMS) can be interpreted as having a negative patient 
event or unexpected consequence that deviated from the expected treatment of the patient. 
The severity of negative patient events fluctuates significantly, which then triggers varied 
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processes in response to the nature of the event. For example, an incident assessed at the 
highest possible severity will automatically initiate a formal investigative process. It is suggested 
that reported incidents on the lower spectrum of severity, are not routinely transformed into a 
learning outcome (Mahajan 2010). Thus, it can be argued that the learning component of 
incident reporting systems is not fully utilised regardless of the incident’s severity, which limits 
the organisation’s capacity to learn from incidents and impedes the ability to prevent 
recurrences. Arguably, latent factors within incidents of low severity should be addressed 
before they manifest into a high severity incident with catastrophic patient outcomes (Mattioli 
et al. 2012). 
 
Single Loop and Double Loop Learning Theories 
 
Improving incident reporting has the potential to substantially enhance organisational learning. 
Organisational learning is defined by the learning processes of individuals within an 
organisation and disseminating such lessons throughout the organisation, in order to achieve 
its objectives (Argyris & Schon 1978). Individual-level learning is a necessary prerequisite to 
organisational learning (Crossan, Lane & White 1999). Such learning can be derived from 
positive or negative experiences; however, the organisation’s ability to learn is measured by 
extracting lessons from these experiences and transforming them into the values and strategies 
that guide an organisation (Wang & Ahmed 2003). Additionally, organisational learning 
contributes to the adaptability of the organisation respective of external factors and 
environment; often achieved through internal inquiry and evaluation (Kim 1993).  
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Organisational learning is viewed as encoding lessons learnt from experiences into routines and 
systems that guide behaviours and cultures of an organisation (Levitt & March 1988). 
Organisational learning is supported by the learning process of individuals and dependent on 
knowledge sharing of such lessons throughout the organisation (Michailova & Sidorova 2011). 
In the context of healthcare organisations, organisational learning is an essential component in 
facilitating a patient safety culture (Anderson et al. 2013). In order to achieve an organisational 
learning culture, the organisation’s members such as clinicians, nurses, allied health 
professionals and administrators, must share their experiential knowledge on threats to patient 
safety so that active and latent factors can be identified and organisational-wide strategies and 
improvements can be realised (Warring et al. 2013). Wang and Ahmed (2003) describe 4 
components of the organisational learning process: knowledge acquisition, information 
distribution, information interpretation and organisational memory. The latter emphasises that 
the collective of individual learning experiences must be both shared across the organisation 
and incorporated into the operational practices of the organisation. Such a conversion and 
integration of individual learning to organisational learning can protect the organisation from 
knowledge loss due to key individuals leaving the organisation (Kim 1993). The process in which 
individual learning is achieved is facilitated via frequent, transparent feedback (Baker et al. 
2013). Lessons that emerge from feedback-loops are supported by single-loop and double-loop 
learning theories (Argyris & Schon 1978).  
 
Single-loop learning is the incremental improvement based upon the identification of an error 
and implementation of ameliorating strategies (Argyris & Schon 1978). Double loop learning 
P a g e | 6 of 245 
requires the organisation to reassess whether the norms and values of organisational systems 
are supportive of achieving the organisation’s objectives, which can potentially produce 
radically different solutions (Kim 1993). It is argued that the introduction of politically charged 
performance indicators imposed upon the Australian health system forces health organisations 
to utilise double loop learning, in order to enhance their performance to meet these new 
benchmarks. A recent example being the introduction of the National Emergency Access Target 
(NEAT) from the Council of Australian Government (COAG) agreements, which will see 
incremental performance indicators for all public Emergency Department to either admit or 
discharge patients within 4 hours; culminating in the 90% target on 1 January 2015. Therefore, 
in-scope health organisations must reassess their models of care in order to align their 
performance with NEAT. Changes to performance targets exemplify how external drivers can 
impact upon organisational learning. 
 
In contrast to the previously mentioned external drivers for single-loop and double-loop 
learning within the healthcare industry, it is the internal drivers that have the most significance 
and applicability in relation to this research study. Individual-level learning is essential for 
healthcare practitioners to improve upon their own clinical practices, which ideally translates 
into improved patient care and outcomes. Such incremental improvements in practice are 
fundamental to maintain a robust knowledge base and cultivate a continuous learning 
environment (Wang & Ahmed 2003). In order to facilitate this, the individual must call upon 
every resource available to them, with the objective being to achieve improved knowledge and 
skills as a result of single-loop learning (Levitt & March 1988). As such, the organisational 
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environment must establish learning and development as a strategic goal; both for the benefit 
of the individuals that form part of the organisational collective and for patient care. 
Additionally, in an industry that is challenged by an aging workforce, an organisation that values 
learning could strengthen their position as a preferred employer. Ultimately, the expected 
outcome of such a rich learning environment is improved patient care. Hence, in order to 
sustain the organisation as a reputable healthcare provider, it is in the organisation's interest to 
ensure staff are continually improving upon their clinical skills and competencies. From an 
ethical perspective, it can even be argued that it is the organisation's obligation to provide a 
robust educational environment for healthcare providers, for the purposes of safe patient care. 
 
Incidents captured by IIMS are considered predominantly first-order errors, that being errors 
identified which deviate from the expected or desired outcome (Fiol & Lyles 1985). Such errors 
are mismatched to the expected outcome, which within a hospital setting can take the form of 
incorrect medication or a patient fall. The short cycle feedback system of this research study 
primarily adopts a single-loop learning approach to addressing first-order errors. The 
presumption being that incidents within the scope of the short cycle feedback system have a 
first-order error, which when reviewed by the feedback specialist and in collaboration with the 
incident reporter, a learning outcome will be identified. This learning outcome would capture 
any action that deviated from the expected parameters of what is acceptable by the 
organisation. Alternatively, the short cycle feedback system may trigger a double-loop learning 
approach to a problem, if the course of action that led to the problem was consistent with 
defined practices and expectations of the organisation. In both circumstances, the individual 
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(presumably the same person that documented the incident) is able to benefit from the 
transformation of an incident into a learning outcome. As defined by Argyris and Schon (1978), 
organisational learning is only achieved once these lessons are shared throughout the 
organisation, which ultimately affects the decisions made and actions taken by the organisation 
as a collective. It is well established within the literature that organisational learning is not the 
sum of learning by individuals that compose the organisation (Kim 1993; Crossan, Lane & White 
1999), but rather embedding such practices into the processes and systems that govern an 
organisation (Argyris & Schon 1978).  
 
Whilst it is expected that the short cycle feedback system can produce organisational learning, 
this study emphasises the necessity for providing personalised feedback to the individual. 
Argyris and Schon (1978) state that organisational learning is dependent on the distribution of 
lessons learnt across the organisation. The potential for the short cycle feedback system, 
specifically the sum of all individual feedback experiences, to be embedded on an organisation-
wide basis satisfies the aforementioned definition. Additionally, it is suggested that the 
provision of feedback supports a learning environment for the individuals that form part of the 
organisation collective (Baker et al. 2013); whereas the absence of feedback is an impediment 
to fostering such an environment. 
 
Aim of the Study 
 
Feedback on routine clinical work can identify a broad range of errors, which can be used to 
improve patient safety (Ursprung et al. 2005). Timely feedback to clinicians can enhance their 
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learning and development (Jolley et al. 2007), and individual performance. A lack of clinician 
engagement is a barrier of incident reporting (Mahajan 2010), which has led to underreporting 
of incidents (Tamuz, Thomas & Franchois 2004). Other barriers such as lack of time (Mahajan 
2010), perceived lack of utility (Regenbogen et al. 2009), and definitional ambiguity (Stanhope 
et al. 1999) impede the utilisation of incident reporting systems. The provision of timely 
feedback demonstrates the utility of incident reporting systems, which may overcome the 
clinician engagement barrier in relation to incident reporting (Croskerry 2000).  
 
This study aims to determine whether a short cycle feedback system, used within a hospital 
setting, can produce organisational learning. Additionally, the study aims to explore individual 
behaviours, as non-compliance or lack of awareness, may be attributed to system failures; 
hence, an overlap between individual and system issues exists. Vincent (2004) describes the 
‘window on the system’, using an incident as a ‘window’ to undertake a systems analysis, which 
may eventually lead to incident prevention. Contributory events that lead to an incident may be 
prevented by utilising the learning potential of incident reporting systems. The focus of this 
study is the provision of timely feedback to clinical staff. The research questions of this study 
are:  
• Can a short cycle feedback incident reporting system 
i) improve reporting rates;  
ii) decrease actual incidents; and,  
iii) decrease the severity of incidents?  
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Specifically, the sub-objectives of the study explore whether frequency and severity of incidents 
decrease as a result of lessons learnt from the short cycle feedback system. From the 
comparison of pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaires, it is expected that the 
short cycle feedback system will encourage incident reporting by remediating the common 
barrier of perceived lack of utility.  
 
It is anticipated that this study would benefit Clinical Governance units within public health 
organisations and the NSW Clinical Excellence Commission (CEC), the NSW Health entity 
responsible for the overall management of IIMS, by demonstrating how timely feedback can 
address barriers to incident reporting. Greater utilisation of incident reporting will result in 
improved accuracy of incident reporting data, which has implications on the development of 
respective patient safety initiatives. Ultimately, an emphasis on the provision of timely 
feedback to clinical staff can promote an environment of patient safety. 
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation is structured across 7 chapters, which will detail the research scope, method, 
findings, focus group, recommendations and conclusions. Chapter 1 has outlined the area of 
research and the organisational learning theories that underpin the practical research study. 
Chapter 2 explores incident reporting systems literature and highlights the research 
opportunities that will be investigated in the research study. Furthermore, this Chapter 
describes the phenomenon of underreported incidents and how organisational learning can be 
derived from short cycle feedback, via the establishment of a learning continuum system (Baker 
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et al. 2013). Chapter 3 details the research method processes and individual phases that 
collectively form the longitudinal framework that defines the research study.  
 
Chapter 4 reports the results from the research study, respective of the research questions 
defined in previous chapters. Additionally, the results of the short cycle feedback intervention 
are described from organisational learning and staff satisfaction perspectives. Chapter 5 details 
how results from the research study led to the formulation of a focus group, in order to refine 
preliminary conclusions made.  
 
Chapter 6 chronicles the focus group design, participants and data. Revised recommendations 
from the research study are made based upon the discussion from the focus group session. 
Chapter 7 summarises the findings of the research study and makes comparisons with existing 
research. The practical implications for hospitals and health services are featured and 
opportunities for future research are explored. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A comprehensive literature review was undertaken to identify scholarly literature that explored 
incident reporting systems, which were utilised as a learning tool. Electronic databases used 
during the literature review included PubMed, ProQuest, Ovid, Ingenta, SAGE Journals, 
ScienceDirect, Wiley Online Library, EBSCO and PsycINFO. Key words searched, exclusively and 
in combination, included: ‘‘incident reporting”, ‘‘incident reporting systems‘‘, ‘‘feedback”, 
“feedback loop”, “personalised feedback”, “individual factors”, ‘‘organisational learning”, 
‘‘single loop learning’’ and ‘‘double loop learning’’ and ‘‘patient safety’’. These key words 
reflected the focus of the study on individual learning behaviours from incident reporting and 
whether the presence of feedback has a learning effect. Relevant journal articles referenced 
throughout the literature review and study acknowledge the contribution of system approaches 
to incident reporting. Such system-based arguments have not been rejected during the course 
of the literature review; simply, individualised behaviours regarding incident reporting, and any 
subsequent learning from incident reporting systems, bore greater relevance to the doctoral 
thesis. It is noted that emphasis was placed on articles that were published within the past 10 
years to ensure the most current literature in the field of study was recognised and considered.  
 
Incident Reporting in Healthcare 
 
Incident reporting systems are used as a tool to promote patient safety in the Australian 
healthcare industry. The Australian Incident Monitoring System (AIMS), more commonly known 
as the Incident Information Management System (IIMS), is the national incident reporting 
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system used by the Australian healthcare system. Generally, the underlying principles of 
incident reporting systems are for accountability, transparency, and to drive improvement 
(Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care 2009). The latter principle can be 
expanded to include knowledge sharing and professional development via learning 
opportunities and experiences; regardless whether patient harm is a feature of the incident. 
Incidents are documented in reporting systems, which equip clinical staff to prevent recurrence 
and improve clinical practices (Frey et al. 2009).  
 
Definitional Issues in Reporting 
According to NSW Health (2007) a clinical incident is any unplanned event which results in, or 
has the potential to result in harm to a patient. This definition suggests that either actual or 
potential harm must have occurred or have been established from an event. Furthermore, 
Section 20L of the Health Administration Act 1982 states that a reportable incident must have 
had serious or major clinical consequences and the probability of recurrence. The 
subjectiveness of defining an incident could have implications for what is in-scope in relation to 
an organisation’s incident reporting system, particularly in the interpretation of a clinical 
consequence. Incidents can have several unfavourable outcomes such as operational, 
economical and legal. Kessels-Habraken et al. (2010) argued that an incident does not require 
patient harm to justify the submission of an incident report, which supports the submission of 
an incident report that did not result in patient harm. Incidents that do not result in patient 
harm are defined as a near miss (NSW Health 2007). A near miss incident occurs more 
frequently than an incident that results in patient harm; also known as an adverse event 
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(Mahajan 2010). Wu, Pronovost and Morlock (2002) suggest that causation is similar for both 
adverse events and near misses, yet it is only the presence or absence of recovery mechanisms 
that determine the presence and severity of an actual outcome.  
 
It is imperative to clarify definitions used in incident reports as ambiguity could lead to 
underreporting. In an American study (Kaldjian et al. 2008) only 40% of doctors knew what kind 
of errors should be reported. This is consistent with barriers identified by Australian 
counterparts (Spigelman & Swan 2005). For the purposes of this study an error is defined as “all 
those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its 
intended outcome” (Reason 1990). Additionally, the term ‘medical error’ should be considered 
in by the same definition as described by Reason (1990). Whilst the literature has stated that it 
is culturally accepted that errors are inevitable in healthcare (Fischer et al. 2006) it is believed 
that the reporting of incidents can be utilised for training purposes that can reduce error rates 
(Franklin et al. 2007); although the effectiveness of this training is contingent upon the 
feedback provided to frontline staff, including the reporting staff member. A study by Leape 
(1994) suggests that at least 50% of errors that occur in healthcare are unreported. The 
Institute of Medicine’s (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson 1999) landmark report To Err is Human 
stated that 44,000 to 98,000 Americans are thought to be harmed as a result of medical errors. 
It is argued that the potential lessons learnt from incident reports can rectify the prevalence of 
patient harm caused by human error and system failure.  
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Table 1: Key Definitions 
Term Definition Reference Example 
Adverse Event An incident that results in patient harm Mahajan 2010 
Administration of 
vincristine intrathecally 
(Reason 2004) 
Clinical Incident 
Any unplanned event 
which results in, or has 
the potential to result in 
harm to a patient 
NSW Health 2007 
A clinician failing to 
read out the route of 
administration of a drug 
(Reason 2004) 
Error 
All those occasions in 
which a planned 
sequence of mental or 
physical activities fails 
to achieve its intended 
outcome 
Reason 1990 
Near Miss Incidents that do not result in patient harm NSW Health 2007 
“Time-out” process that 
identifies the incorrect 
surgical site, prior to the 
surgical procedural 
being undertaken, 
resulting in the 
procedure’s 
postponement (NSW 
Health 2007) 
Reportable 
Incident 
An incident relating to 
the provision of health 
services by a relevant 
health services 
organisation, being an 
incident of 
a type prescribed by the 
regulations or set out in 
a document adopted by 
the regulations 
Health Administration 
Act 1982 
Administration of 
vincristine intrathecally 
(Reason 2004) 
 
It can be difficult to draw comparisons between incident reporting systems due to the variance 
in definition of what constitutes an incident. Such ambiguity regarding definitions can 
compound incident reporting resistance amongst clinicians (Stanhope et al. 1999). The lack of 
incident reporting definitions and requirements can impede incident reporting utilisation. A 
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study by Kaldjian et al. (2008) devised hypothetical incidents of varying severity, which were 
used to measure how a clinician would respond. It was concluded that doctors who knew the 
definition of an incident and what constitutes a reportable incident were 2 or 3 times more 
likely to submit an incident report. The focus of incident reporting systems can vary from 
severity, cause, and occupation of the staff involved (Pham et al. 2010). Additionally, the 
definition of commonly used terms such as adverse event or near miss can influence the type of 
incidents reported. In a study by Tamuz, Thomas and Franchois (2004) an incident reporting 
system based locally within a pharmacy department of a hospital was used to capture near miss 
incidents. It was demonstrated that pharmacists had varying definitions of a near miss incident, 
with some staff disregarding common errors, accepting them as part of routine work. It was 
concluded that a standard interpretation of a near miss would enhance incident reporting, 
which could lead to improved data analysis and learning. Hence, the opportunities to learn 
from reported incidents can be affected by the definitions and requirements that support an 
incident reporting system (Wallace 2010).  
 
Incident Reporting Systems in Australian Healthcare 
Incident reporting systems in healthcare are generally non-punitive, voluntary and confidential. 
Incident reporting systems are varied worldwide, with information stratified based upon 
incident type, severity, setting, or outcome (Pham et al. 2010). As previously mentioned, IIMS is 
the primary incident reporting system within the Australian healthcare industry. IIMS was 
originally developed by the Australian Patient Safety Foundation in 1987 and has undergone a 
series of upgrades and revisions (Runciman 2002). The original version of IIMS was specialty 
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specific, with a focus on incidents related to anaesthesia. Data entered into the original version 
of IIMS culminated in a ground-breaking Australian study that deduced 18,000 patients would 
have died as a result of their healthcare due to adverse events, captured by incident reporting 
(Wilson et al. 1995). Subsequently, IIMS was expanded in 1993, to implement and trial a generic 
version. Thereafter, comparisons with similar incident reporting systems in the United States of 
America (USA) demonstrated a discrepancy that showed 16.6% of incidents in Australia were 
associated with an adverse event, compared to 3.5% in the USA (Wilson et al. 1995). A review 
of this discrepancy revealed that incidents which were minor in nature were incorrectly 
classified as being associated with an adverse event, and that the correct percentage of adverse 
events in IIMS was identical to the USA counterpart (Runciman 2002). The aforementioned 
discrepancy is consistent with the challenge of definitional ambiguity and potential 
misinterpretation of data. IIMS emerged as the preferred method for determining system 
failures as opposed to medical record review (Runciman 2002), although this belief is 
challenged by other studies within the patient safety literature (Nuckols et al. 2009). IIMS has 
formed part of a broader clinical risk management strategy to effectively manage patient safety 
processes (Spigelman & Swan 2005). The aggregation of incident data for analysis and action is 
reviewed at a national level, coordinated by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
(AIHW), the national body responsible for the collection of national health statistics (Runciman 
2002).  
 
In 2005, IIMS was implemented across the NSW Health system. IIMS is accessible via the local 
hospital or facility intranet, and incident forms can either by submitted via a dedicated website 
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or in hardcopy. The online version has mandatory fields that must be completed, which also 
requires the reporting staff member to assess the incident based upon a Severity Assessment 
Code (SAC) matrix. The SAC rating of the incident may trigger a management response that 
requires a submission of a Reportable Incident Brief (RIB) to the NSW Ministry of Health. 
Incidents that have a SAC 1 rating may have system wide implications, which would then 
require further investigation via a Root Cause Analysis (RCA). A NSW Health incident 
management report for the period January 2009 to June 2009 showed SAC 1 incidents 
represented 0.52% (327 / 62,369) of incidents reported (CEC 2009). A series of 
recommendations to prevent similar incidents from occurring are submitted to the NSW 
Ministry of Health and the RCA report is authorised by the Chief Executive of the Local Health 
District (NSW Health 2007). Further investigation via an RCA for SAC 1 incidents is consistent 
with the literature, as incidents with a serious outcome may not contain the required 
information, such as the explanation for undesirable patient outcomes not attributable to 
patient care, to determine preventative measures (Nuckols et al. 2009). Further investigations 
such as a RCA can potentially be resource and time intensive (Pronovost, Miller & Wachter 
2006a; Taitz et al. 2010), limiting the expediency of feedback to the frontline.  
 
The aggregation of IIMS data at a state level is collated and reviewed by the NSW Ministry of 
Health and the Clinical Excellence Commission (CEC). The latter organisation is 1 of 4 ‘pillars’ of 
the NSW Health System, who is primary objective is improving patient safety and quality. 
Additionally, the CEC analyses the IIMS data for emergent trends and responds with patient 
safety programs. An example of such a program is the recent ‘Between the Flags’ patient safety 
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initiative, which is aimed at recognising the signs of the deteriorating patient (CEC 2009). Per 
NSW Health policy, the focus of IIMS is on clinician accountability for working toward patient 
safety improvement, rather than accountability for individual mistakes (NSW Health 2007; Hor 
et al. 2010).  
 
A Productivity Commission (2009) report showed that 59 sentinel events occurred in NSW 
public hospitals in 2007-08. At the time, the NSW Government defended the figures, having 
stated that NSW had better systems for collecting and reporting incident data than other state 
counterparts (Sharp 2010). It is argued that this example is a demonstration of the necessity to 
analyse incident reporting systems in context. Increased incident reporting rates may give the 
illusion of ineffective patient safety initiatives, whereas the actual explanation could be 
attributed to improved incident reporting practices (Franklin et al. 2007). 
 
Whilst not the focus of this research study it must be acknowledged that controversy surrounds 
the validity of RCAs as a learning mechanism. Nicolini, Waring & Mengis (2011b) describe how 
RCAs is used as a governance tool and a means to restore organisational legitimacy following an 
incident – that being, the process is more important than the outcome. Furthermore, RCAs 
emphasise the details regarding the incident rather than focusing on preventative means 
(Nicolini, Waring & Mengis 2011b). Vincent (2004) states that RCAs are a gross 
oversimplification and that a chain of events typically leads to the eventual incident. 
Additionally, Carroll (1998) agrees that RCAs focus on a single cause approach rather than the 
exploration of multiple contributory factors. It is suggested that RCA investigators adopt the 
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approach as facilitator of organisational change rather than that of professional investigator 
(Nicolini, Waring & Mengis 2011b).  
 
Inter-Jurisdictional Comparison of Adverse Events 
In a 1995 Australian study it was reported that 16.6% of people admitted to hospitals 
experienced an adverse event associated with their care (Wilson et al. 1995). A subsequent 
review conducted in 2004 by the former Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care 
indicated that the Australian adverse event rate was closer to 10% of hospital admissions 
(Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care 2004). The Australian adverse event 
rate is comparable to other countries, such as Sweden, 12.3% (Soop et al. 2009) and the United 
Kingdom, 8.7% (Sari et al. 2007). According to The Commonwealth Fund (2006) the Australian 
rate of deaths due to medical error per 100,000 in 2004 is similar to the median rate for all 
other Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) nations. 
 
Importance of Reporting 
Incident reporting systems must be carefully reviewed in order to initiate the appropriate 
management response. For those incidents that involve negligent acts the individual(s) involved 
must be reported to the appropriate registration boards, which may result in de-registration. In 
Australia this is supported by legislation, namely the Practitioner Regulation (Adoption of 
National Law) Act 2009. Since October 2008, healthcare providers are legally obligated to 
report other providers if there is reasonable belief that unprofessional conduct, professional 
misconduct or notifiable conduct is present (Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency 
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2010). Whilst risk attributed to the offending individual is typically addressed via the 
appropriate registration board the risk exposure to the patient is addressed via the appropriate 
incident management response.  
 
Despite the abundance of patient safety literature, incident reporting systems in healthcare 
remain fragmented, isolated and relatively immature (Pham et al. 2010). The importance of 
understanding and correctly interpreting incident reports cannot be overstated as erroneous 
interpretations can have a detrimental effect on patient safety.  Additionally, the understanding 
of incident reports can be varied due to the diversity of professions between the reporting staff 
member and the staff member responsible for the management of the incident (Pham et al. 
2010). In the National Health Service (NHS) of the United Kingdom patients and their families 
have access to report safety incidents. The wide accessibility of incident reporting could 
potentially increase the number of incidents reported; however, the information entered must 
be articulated correctly by the incident reporter, otherwise this could affect the appropriate 
response mechanism (Franklin et al. 2007).  In a study by Pham et al. (2010) it was 
demonstrated that there was an increase in wrong site surgery reports after the 
implementation of a program to decrease such incidents. However, it was deduced that the 
increase was likely due to the promotion of reporting practices. Hence, due to the presence of 
underreporting, an increase must be carefully examined before declaring the success of a 
patient safety initiative. As previously mentioned, increases in reporting rates can be subject to 
the interpretation of a misinformed media and public (Pham et al. 2010), as it could be 
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concluded that the quality of patient safety is deteriorating and respective initiatives are 
ineffective.  
 
Management of Incident Reports 
Healthcare providers must understand their individual role in the incident reporting and 
management process. It has been demonstrated that incidents can be escalated to 
management in order to relinquish the incident management responsibility of local level 
providers (Hor et al. 2010). Furthermore, clinical staff that disengage from incident reporting 
practices believe that incident reporting is a time consuming process that decreases the time 
spent on direct patient care (Hor et al. 2010; Mahajan 2010). Whilst patient care remains the 
top priority, the time spent on incident reporting by clinical staff must be substantiated by 
feedback and patient safety improvement. The continued involvement of clinical staff is 
believed to have a training effect in relation to incident reporting practices, particularly on the 
report narratives and quality of data entered (Nuckols et al. 2009). Thus, a better understanding 
of incident reporting systems by frontline staff will result in improved quality of data for which 
patient safety initiatives are based upon (Frey et al. 2002). 
 
Patient safety initiatives can be impeded in the absence of systems that monitor the impact of 
actions implemented, derived from incidents reported (Wallace 2010). It is imperative to 
ensure frontline staff are involved in the management of incidents to encourage future 
reporting. By participating in the incident management process it is believed staff will be 
encouraged to report incidents, enabling direct observation of subsequent improvements to 
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patient safety (Wallace 2010). The measurement of success for incident reporting systems must 
be the prevention of incidents. The emphasis on prevention is supported by patients and 
families that have been the victims of medical error (Sorenson et al. 2009). Patient safety 
initiatives based upon incident reporting have successfully reduced the reoccurrence of 
reportable incidents. One of the most referenced examples in the literature is a study by 
Pronovost et al. (2006b), which showed that catheter-related bloodstream infections, 
documented via incident reporting systems, decreased by up to 66% over an 18 month study 
period following a series of evidence based interventions (e.g. hand washing, cleaning the skin 
with chlorhexidine) and an intensive care checklist protocol, preventing up to 1,500 hospital-
related deaths.  The weight of evidence seems to suggest that the credibility of incident 
reporting can be enhanced via effective patient safety initiatives that arise from the analysis of 
incident reporting data.  
 
There is debate amongst the literature as to whether patient safety initiatives should be 
focused on adverse events (Frey et al. 2009), near misses (Kessels-Habraken et al. 2010), or 
both (Mahajan 2010). In a study by Nuckols et al. (2009) 2,200 incident reports were grouped 
according to the type of event: outcome oriented or process oriented. This study showed that 
96% of outcome oriented events and 25% of process oriented events were determined to be 
preventable. The level of risk increases when patient care deviates from standardised 
processes, which demands that system improvements must be made, despite whether the 
outcome was patient harm (Nuckols et al. 2009). Although, Nuckols et al. (2009) acknowledged 
P a g e | 24 of 245 
that a limiting factor when determining preventability is the subjectivity associated with the 
perceived level of risk and incomplete incident reports.  
 
Catastrophic events can be transformed into learning opportunities. Madsen (2009) suggests 
that organisations learn differently in response to a disaster, as opposed to a minor incident (or 
near miss). Disasters often attract media interest and their subsequent investigation can take 
place in high-visibility forums such as a public inquiry (Nicolini, Waring & Mengis 2011b). 
Learning from disasters depreciate less rapidly than a minor incident (Madsen 2009) as 
disasters can yield rich insight into an organisation’s strengths and weaknesses, due to non-
routine event associated with a disaster (Lampel, Shamsie & Shapira 2009). Formal investigative 
processes are considered the norm during and after a disaster; however, there is value in 
informal communications, which can assist in achieving organisational effectiveness (Elliot 
2009). Feedback mechanisms such as that featured in this research study can be considered a 
version of informal communications. Furthermore, the occurrence of incidents and subsequent 
feedback can serve as a reminder to organisational participants of their responsibilities in 
relation to compliance with existing safety routines (Madsen 2009).  
 
In summary, it is believed that a value of incident reports, particularly those associated with 
near miss events, exposes latent system impediments that will ultimately escalate to active 
system failures, if ignored. Thus, an organisation’s culture that undervalues incident reporting, 
particularly near miss incidents, is a safety concern prevalent in most incident reporting 
systems of the OECD countries (Pham et al. 2010). In order to encourage incident reporting 
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there must be robust patient safety programs and tangible improvements which must be 
demonstrated to frontline staff in a timely manner (Tighe et al. 2006), which can be effectively 
achieved via feedback. 
 
The Value of Incident Reporting 
 
Incident Reporting and Feedback 
Incident reporting systems emphasise methods that encourage reporting, rather than the 
lessons and practice improvements that can be extracted from incidents (Wallace 2010). It is a 
concern that incident reporting systems do not provide feedback to staff, potentially resulting 
in missed opportunities to correct erroneous or substandard practices. An American study of 
338 participants shows that half of doctors surveyed indicated they would be more inclined to 
report errors if feedback was provided to them (Kaldjian et al. 2008). The consequence of no 
feedback provided to the reporting staff member can lead to the recurrence of the incident, 
which may result in patient harm. A study by Wallace (2010) showed that only two-thirds of 
trusts within the NHS provided feedback to the staff who reported an adverse incident, advising 
on how the incident is being managed. It is noted that this feedback system does not involve 
near miss incidents. Additionally, the same study by Wallace (2010) shows that one-third of 
NHS trusts did not analyse near miss incidents. This is in contrast to a study by Mahajan (2010), 
who argued that near miss reporting could produce valuable learning opportunities respective 
of patient safety, without the near miss incident having resulted in actual patient harm.  
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Underreporting incidents and lack of feedback can have economic ramifications. For example, 
the results of a study by Soop et al. (2009) showed that preventable adverse events led to a 
mean increased length of stay of 6 days. Similar studies show that adverse events can lead to a 
mean increased length of stay of 8 days (Sari et al. 2007), and even up to 4 weeks (Davis et al. 
2003). These studies indicated that preventable incidents could impose greater constraints on 
financial and staff resources. 
 
Incident Reporting and Patient Safety 
A national spotlight remains on the importance of incident reports and its potential 
contributions to patient safety. The Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care 
(ACSQHC) regularly promote the use of incident reporting systems, open-disclosure, and 
sentinel events reporting. This is exemplified by incident reporting being included as a priority 
in the proposed National Safety and Quality Framework (ACSQHC 2010). Disparity remains at 
state level incident reporting systems and the absence of a national repository of incident 
reporting data limits comparisons to hospital patient safety performance. The consistency 
across state, national and international jurisdictions is the lack of feedback or the perception 
that no action is driven by incident reporting, resulting in a disincentive to incorporate incident 
reporting as routine, established practice (Pham et al. 2010). Feedback is an essential, yet 
overlooked component of the incident reporting process, as it is not the reports themselves but 
their capacity to lead to the development of coordinated solutions and system-wide 
interventions (ACSQHC 2010). 
 
P a g e | 27 of 245 
Near Miss Reporting 
The literature shows that the absence of near miss incidents can result in missed opportunities 
for lessons to be provided to frontline staff, particularly since near misses occur more 
frequently than adverse events (Mahajan 2010). Both adverse events and near misses contain 
educational characteristics, as feedback from incident reports can correct errors made by staff 
(Tamuz, Thomas & Franchois 2004). Organisations that do not capitalise on the learning and 
development aspects of incident reports can impede potential patient safety improvements 
(Kingston et al. 2004). 
 
 
Lessons from Other Industries 
 
The aviation industry is renowned for its contributions to safety research and developing 
incident reporting systems. Wilson (2007) described the aviation industry as being a high 
reliability organisation. This is further explained by Reason (2000) as aviation organisations 
have a collective preoccupation with the possibility of failure. Since errors in the aviation 
industry can have catastrophic outcomes, coupled with heightened visibility of plane crashes to 
the public, aviation is dependent on its image and reputation of safety (Jimenez 2005). The 
foundation of aviation safety is crew resource management (CRM), developed in the late 1970s 
(Sax et al. 2009). CRM training focuses on situational awareness and team-based 
communication. This is exemplified by the extension of its original form of cockpit resource 
management, to now include flight attendants and engineers. The literature acknowledged that 
despite the success of CRM it has been met with resistance from some pilots (Helmreich, 
Merritt & Wilhelm 1999). This is most evident in cultures where respecting authority at the 
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expense of communication with sub-ordinates is entrenched, which impedes the effects of 
CRM. This is paralleled with the culture in healthcare, where doctors are perceived to be the 
authoritative figureheads that are not to be challenged.  
 
Aviation has implemented incident reporting systems such as the aviation safety action 
program developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (2010). The basis of this system is to 
encourage confidential, voluntary, non-punitive reporting by pilots and airline crew staff. For 
this reason, the management of this reporting system is conducted by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) – a neutral party with no power of enforcement or discipline. 
Furthermore, should a staff member violate a safety rule, the Federal Aviation Administration 
will afford immunity if the staff member can provide proof that the violation was submitted to 
the incident reporting system and is considered as a constructive attitude towards safety. The 
immunity afforded by the aviation industry is akin to the ‘Good Samaritan’ statues in 
healthcare, where protection against civil liability is afforded to clinicians that provide 
emergency medical care to a patient as long as the clinician did not have a duty to provide such 
care (Brown 2010). The commonality between aviation and the healthcare industry is the 
prevention of incidents and mitigation of system failures. As such, this has led to the healthcare 
industry implementing reporting principles adopted from aviation based incident reporting 
systems.  
 
As previously discussed, CRM based interventions utilised within the aviation industry have 
been adopted within healthcare to improve team performance and communication. A study by 
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McCulloch et al. (2009) showed that CRM principles were used to improve the performance of a 
clinical team, which led to improved technical performance in operating theatres. This 
improvement in technical performance resulted in a reduction of average technical errors per 
operation (from 1.73 to 0.98). It is noted that this intervention was stratified by the presence 
(or absence) of a mentor, whom stimulated team briefings. The researchers of this study 
postulated that the presence of the mentor enhanced retention of knowledge. This justifies the 
use of feedback in incident reporting systems, as the retention of lessons derived from such 
systems may be enhanced by briefings and team discussions. In a similar study by Sax et al. 
(2009) it was demonstrated that CRM training interventions resulted in an increased use of a 
preoperative checklist, which was modelled from a pre-flight aviation checklist and modified to 
enhance patient safety. Furthermore, CRM principles have improved reporting frequencies (Sax 
et al. 2009) and increased awareness of patient safety (de Korne et al. 2010).  
 
Other industries such as nuclear energy, manufacturing, petrochemical and mining have similar 
incident reporting systems to that featured within healthcare. The relationship between these 
systems and healthcare are scantly explored in the literature. In relation to incident reporting in 
the nuclear energy industry the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) required incident 
reporting within 24 hours of “any intentional, or suspected intentional, diversion of radioactive 
material from its intended or authorised use”. Macilwain (1996) stated that this regulation is to 
identify near miss incidents that may have industry wide implications. The commonality in the 
NSW Health system with this regulation is the requirement that all incidents rated SAC 1 or 2 
are escalated to senior management and the NSW Ministry of Health (CEC 2009) within a 24 
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hour period; which could arguably enable the sharing of patient safety interventions that have 
system wide implications (Hor et al. 2010). 
 
 
Common Problems of Incident Reporting 
 
Lack of Transparency 
Open Disclosure processes have been mandated in several international healthcare 
jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and the USA due to high public expectations 
and increased media attention regarding healthcare system failures. The ethical responsibilities 
of clinicians are variably applied in relation to incident reporting systems, particularly Open 
Disclosure to the patient in response to an adverse event. Studies in the field of medical error 
(Iedema et al. 2008; Sorenson et al. 2010) argue that clinician accountability and admission to 
the patient following an adverse event is an integral part of the recovery process. The Open 
Disclosure process elicits the humanitarian aspects of healthcare professions. However, 
clinicians can erect barriers to this process; dismissing patient involvement as futile given that 
the technical skills of their professions are beyond the understanding of the patient. This is 
evident in a study by Gallagher et al. (2006) as 60% of doctors surveyed reported they would be 
less likely to disclose an error if they believed the patient would not understand. Conversely, 
patients are more receptive when clinical staff not only explain the diagnosis but provide an 
interpretation that would allow the patient to have a better understanding of their care 
(Boudreaux & O’Hea 2004). In Australia, the need for discussions between healthcare providers 
and patients on the consequences of adverse events has resulted in the Australian Open 
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Disclosure Standard (ACSQHC 2009). Hence, this author argues that communication principles 
and guidelines must be developed and implemented by clinicians to facilitate clinician-patient 
communication, which will prove meaningful to both parties. Furthermore, such improvements 
in communication may overcome litigious patient behaviour that causes clinicians to avoid 
incident reporting and Open Disclosure processes (Kaldjian et al. 2008). The Open Disclosure 
principles are prominent in the Patient Rights and Responsibilities of NSW Health, including the 
former Sydney South West Area Health Service (SSWAHS), which stated that patients have a 
right to understanding their conditions and the associated risks (SSWAHS 2008). Hence, it is 
argued that incidents affecting a patient’s care must be promptly discussed with the patient in 
order to acknowledge their experience and advise them of the response to mitigate recurrence 
of the incident (Sorenson et al. 2009). 
 
Fear of Litigation 
Fear of litigation has been identified as a barrier to incident reporting, particularly by the 
medical profession (Iedema et al. 2008). Clinician resistance in relation to Open Disclosure 
advocacy is believed to be explained by clinicians’ resistance to engage in the process due to 
fear of litigation (Kaldjian et al. 2008).This barrier shared amongst clinicians is repeated in a 
study by Studdert et al. (2006), which demonstrated that 73% (653 / 889) of injuries due to 
error resulted in litigation. A potential mechanism to overcome litigious outcomes was explored 
in a study by Wallace (2010), which reviewed a practice within the NHS that included a patient 
in the incident investigation process, only if the incident was treated as a complaint. In contrast, 
Iedema et al. (2008) argued that a patient’s involvement should occur regardless whether there 
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is a likelihood that the incident will result in a complaint, as patients can offer insight into 
incidents for the purpose of service improvement.  Additionally, Iedema et al. (2008) noted that 
patients’ felt discussions regarding adverse events were not promptly disclosed, that healthcare 
organisations were not forthcoming with information and that these discussions had to be 
initiated by the patient themselves. Furthermore, several patients interviewed as part of the 
study stated they had to insist for an Open Disclosure process to take place. This raises the 
concern that the lack of timely feedback from incident reporting systems affects staff and 
patients alike. A study by Gallgaher et al. (2006) showed that two-thirds of doctors agree that 
disclosing a serious error reduced malpractice risk and one-third would disclose a near miss. 
Furthermore, patients’ that pursue an Open Disclosure discussion seek an apology or assurance 
that recurrence will be prevented, rather than compensation (Sorenson et al. 2010). The Open 
Disclosure process can also exonerate healthcare providers of guilt from their involvement of 
an error, particularly those resulting in patient harm (Sirriyeh et al. 2010). This author shares 
the belief that patient safety opportunities identified by clinicians via the Open Disclosure 
process can be replicated via the promotion of learning opportunities from incident reporting. 
Medical staff are widely known for adopting an insular approach in response to clinical errors 
(Gallgaher et al. 2006; Kaldjian et al. 2008); however, a demonstration of what benefits Open 
Disclosure and incident reporting can achieve for staff and patients alike may overcome barriers 
synonymous with the medical profession.  
 
Patients harmed by medical error within New South Wales (NSW) may submit a complaint and 
pursue legal action via organisations such as the NSW Ombudsman or the Health Care 
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Complaints Commission (HCCC). The latter organisation was established under the Health Care 
Complaints Act 1993 and in 2008-09 there were 85 matters that resulted in litigation (HCCC 
2009). However, it is noted that these matters do not indicate whether medical error was the 
primary cause of the complaint, nor whether it was present at all. Furthermore, the literature 
cites perceived negligence by the patient as motivation to pursue litigation (Davis et al. 2003). 
Countries such as New Zealand have abolished tort liability and introduced a ‘no fault’ system 
that affords legal privilege to clinicians (Davis et al. 2003). Similarly, this ‘no fault’ system exists 
in the aviation industry (Federal Aviation Administration 2010), to encourage incident 
reporting, under the principle of safety improvements. Conversely, it is argued that ‘no fault’ 
systems may eliminate a legal deterrent to clinicians, resulting in substandard clinical practices 
(Davis et al. 2003). A study by Davis et al. (2003) showed the rate of adverse events were similar 
to the Australian and USA tort liability systems, which suggests no association between the 
legal environment and the quality of patient safety. Thus, whilst the underlying principle of 
removing tort liability is to encourage the disclosure of an error, the utility of such disclosure 
may have a stronger impact on patient safety improvements. In other organisations such as the 
Minnesota Department of Health, the Adverse Health Care Events Law introduced in 2003 
requires hospitals to report if 1 of 28 different types of adverse event has occurred, within 15 
days of the event. A review of this mandatory reporting system 5 years following 
implementation saw that 72% of hospitals feel safer compared to 2003 (Minnesota Department 
of Health 2009). It is interesting to note that regardless of patient safety accomplishments the 
Minnesota incident reporting model still has non-compliant clinicians. This barrier to incident 
reporting is compounded by clinicians from neighbouring jurisdictions that have different 
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incident reporting frameworks (Minnesota Department of Health 2009), suggesting that 
clinicians will adopt the practice that suits them most. This author believes that this 
jurisdictional challenge would particular apply in rural areas where retention of clinicians, 
necessitating “fly-in” clinicians, is prevalent. Furthermore, in the absence of universal or 
consistent incident reporting systems and practices across neighbouring jurisdictions, then such 
a transit clinical workforce will require specific training and support to ensure accuracy if and 
when utilising these systems (Runciman et al. 2006).  The Minnesota Department of Health 
(2009) argued that inconsistent reporting practices across multiple organisations can inhibit the 
utilisation of reporting systems, further providing justification for a consistent approach to such 
systems. 
 
Accountability and Causes of Incidents 
The accountability for reportable incidents has caused widespread debate within public health 
industries worldwide (Pham et al. 2010). There is much literature that supports the notion that 
systemic factors are the cause for near misses, errors and failures (Evans et al. 2006). 
Conversely, there have been scholarly arguments that suggest individuals must be held 
accountable for any incidents that they have contributed to (Hor et al. 2010). The challenge is 
how to obtain a clear distinction to identify the underlying contributing factor of an incident.  
 
A study by Gallagher et al. (2006) showed that from a survey of 2,637 physicians there was a 
division of belief on whether “medical errors are usually caused by failures of care delivery 
systems, not the failure of individuals”, with 50.4% agreeing and 49.6% disagreeing. It is the 
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challenge of incident reporting systems to determine whether a system failure or human error 
was the underlying cause of either an adverse event or near miss. This challenge can be 
perpetuated by the inherent human compulsion to attribute blame to an individual. Ross (1977) 
describes this as ‘the fundamental attribution error’. Additionally, Reason (2000) suggests that 
blaming individuals is emotionally satisfying than attributing such blame to an organisation. It is 
blame towards an individual, as opposed to blaming the system, which acts as a barrier to 
incident reporting (Waring 2005). Kingston et al. (2004) argued that blaming the system is less 
confronting than blaming an individual, as exposing a healthcare provider’s error can have 
professional, legal and personal ramifications, further deterring incident reporting utilisation.  
 
The patient safety literature advocates that human error is inevitable and systems must be 
designed to mitigate these mistakes (Leape 1994). Accountability must be attributed to those 
responsible for the implementation of system improvements, based on incident reporting 
systems (Vincent, Stanhope & Crowley-Murphy 1999). System failures can be used by clinical 
staff as a means to relinquish their individual accountability. This presents a situation where 
blaming the system becomes the precedent as opposed to acknowledging individual 
shortcomings. Yet, if system failures were the cause of an incident the individual is accountable 
to report these failures so an appropriate intervention can be developed. Thus, ‘blaming the 
system’ can become redundant if system failures are not locally identified and rectified. 
However, it is acknowledged that the feedback void from incident reports can promote the lack 
of accountability of those responsible, specifically in relation to productively utilising incident 
reporting data to address system failures (Benn et al. 2009).  
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 Incident reporting can be influenced by accountability pressures at the local level (Hor et al. 
2010). A study by Hor et al. (2010) showed that clinical staff may reduce the SAC rating of an 
incident in order to prevent the escalation of the incident to senior management and avoid 
reporting requirements to the NSW Ministry of Health. The reluctance to involve senior staff in 
the management of an incident demonstrates that frontline staff hold the view that local 
methods are less disruptive than formal investigative processes. Although, Hor et al. (2010) 
suggested that the involvement of senior management may be advantageous, given their 
broader reach and authority. Hor et al. (2010) continues, stating that the involvement and 
authority of senior management can be useful if an identified patient safety issue has system 
wide implications.  
 
The literature suggests that healthcare providers found to deliberately divorce themselves from 
patient safety systems, and by doing so forego opportunities to prevent patient harm, are to be 
held individually accountable for their actions (Moss & Martinko 1998). Hor et al. (2010) stated 
that exposing deliberate or even malicious human error may prove challenging due to collegiate 
protection of the respective discipline; particularly prevalent in the medical fraternity (Kaldjian 
et al. 2008). Thus, the use of incident reporting system can be interpreted as an act of 
retribution against colleagues and a violation of the preference for managing incidents within a 
profession, removed from management intervention. In order to avoid underreporting due to a 
punitive management approach the accountability within incident reporting systems must be 
based towards quality improvement and patient safety (Pham et al. 2010). 
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 The Underreporting Phenomenon 
The challenge of incident reporting systems is the phenomenon of underreporting (Alvarez-
Requejo et al. 1998; Hazell and Shakir 2006). It is documented (Wallace 2010) that a lack of 
feedback from incident reporting systems contributes to a perceived lack of utility of such 
systems, resulting in the deterrence from its use. Kaldjian et al. (2008) stated that an active 
learning environment with a focus on patient safety and clinical improvements is impeded by 
incident reporting systems that do not support the exchange of information. Additionally, 
clinical staff often do not witness improvements in patient safety that are derived from the 
incidents that they report as part of their daily tasks; causing frustration amongst clinical staff, 
who cite an overburdening workload and lack of time as justification to ignore incident 
reporting (Lawton & Parker 2002; Mahajan 2010; Wallace 2010).  
 
Critique of Current Literature 
 
An Australian survey of IIMS users described the benefits of IIMS, specifically the promotion of 
patient safety and system improvements (Spigelman & Swan 2005). The latter was supported 
by significant changes to equipment use, medication prescribing or administration standards, 
new policies or protocols for clinical care, training programs, falls and pressure ulcer risk 
assessment tools (Spigelman & Swan 2005). Conversely, limitations identified included low rate 
of incident reporting by medical staff, difficulties in measuring improvements in patient 
outcomes, and the time consuming nature of reporting incidents (Spigelman & Swan 2005). 
These limitations are consistent with the literature (Evans et al. 2006; Mahajan 2010; Stanhope 
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et al. 1999). The survey also demonstrated the advantage of customising incident reports based 
upon specialty focused incident reporting systems. A prominent example of specialty based 
incident reporting systems is by Wu, Pronovost and Morlock (2002), which focuses on incidents 
within an Intensive Care Unit (ICU). It is noted that specialty based incident reporting systems 
predated modern, generic incident reporting systems in Australia (Beckmann et al. 1996). 
Despite the consistency with the literature the conclusions drawn from the survey by Spigelman 
and Swan (2005) is limited due to a relatively small sample size of twelve participants. 
Additionally, the design of the questionnaire focuses on the benefits of IIMS, which is arguably 
a form of ‘lead-in’ questioning, as there is a presumption that there have been benefits as a 
result of IIMS. Another common barrier to incident reporting, explored by the aforementioned 
questionnaire, is the time required to enter an incident into the respective reporting system. 
Dependent on the complexity of the incident reporting system staff can contribute hours of 
unpaid work to enter data into these systems (Spigelman & Swan 2005). The administrative 
component of incident reporting systems may act as a deterrent to clinical staff, as entering 
incident reporting data may be seen as time being spent away from direct patient care, 
evidenced within the literature (Hor et al. 2010). Staff must be assured that incident reporting 
data can lead to increased visibility of boundaries within the operational environment and can 
also educate those within such an environment to recognise these boundaries (Rasmussen 
1997). To understand the opportunities and limitations of this study a thorough literature 
review was conducted and several key themes emerged, as follows: 
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Lag in Reporting and Feedback 
Studies in the field of patient safety focus on improving incident reporting rates rather than the 
feedback component and subsequent lessons (Wilson 2007). Whilst the literature has 
established that delayed feedback is a barrier to incident reporting (Evans et al. 2006; Jha et al. 
2010) there is scant evidence that addresses how the timeliness of incident report submission 
and feedback have resulted in patient safety improvements. Lag between observation and 
submission of the report is prevalent in hospital incident reporting systems on a global scale 
(Hirose et al. 2007; Regenbogen et al. 2009). Longer lag times are evident when incidents are 
reported by doctors compared to other healthcare professionals (Regenbogen et al. 2009). 
Additionally, lag times for reporting minor events are double that of major events, independent 
of healthcare profession (Regenbogen et al. 2009). This is supported by Frey et al. (2002) that 
stated events that cause harm to a patient are reported expeditiously when compared to near 
misses. 
 
Feedback mechanisms such as automatic emails to Quality Managers and discussions at 
morbidity and mortality meetings may take months to reach frontline staff (Freestone et al. 
2006; Tighe et al. 2006). A study by Freestone et al. (2006) showed that serious incidents are 
escalated to the hospital Risk Manager for immediate analysis; however, the timeliness of 
feedback mechanisms were not recorded, nor was there an indication that feedback was 
provided directly to the reporting staff member. Personal digital assistants and other electronic 
recording devices have been used to expedite the reporting of incidents but have failed to 
capitalise on the electronic transmission of feedback (Bolsin, Faunce & Colson 2005). 
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Explanations regarding why lag is greater in near miss incident reports compared to adverse 
events are scantly accounted for in the literature. It is maintained that the root cause of near 
misses is the same for adverse events (Jimenez 2005). Thus, the same opportunities exist for 
remediation of incidents reported and promotion of patient safety regardless of incident 
severity. In a study by Ursprung et al. (2005) a short cycle patient safety audit was conducted in 
a neonatal intensive care unit. This study deviated from traditional incident reporting systems 
that focus on adverse events, but rather routine monitoring of everyday care, identifying errors 
and immediately addressing them with clinical staff. This exploratory study facilitated staff 
engagement, due to the immediateness of the real time patient safety audit and short cycle 
feedback, which empowered staff in identifying patient safety improvement opportunities 
(Ursprung et al. 2005). In an environment that is starved of short cycle feedback, it is expected 
that this research study will demonstrate an improvement in staff satisfaction; similar to the 
findings made by the aforementioned study. There are further parallels between the study by 
Ursprung et al. (2005) and the research study by this author; namely, the use of an incident 
reporting system as a learning tool as opposed to simply a repository for incident reports. 
Ursprung et al. (2005) recognised the opportunities for individual competency improvement via 
lessons learnt from incident reporting systems – a theme that features throughout this research 
study.   
 
Perceived Lack of Utilisation (and Clinician Engagement)  
The active engagement of clinical staff is essential for the successful implementation of patient 
safety initiatives and quality improvement (Davies, Powell & Rushmer 2007). However, clinical 
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engagement is seen as a major challenge in incident reporting due to a lack of feedback 
provided to frontline staff (Mahajan 2010). The literature demonstrates that both medical and 
nursing staff resist the use of incident reporting systems as there is a perceived lack of utility 
and no tangible changes that arises from the submission of an incident (Mahajan 2010). It was 
deduced that clinicians associated the need for error reporting with the severity of the error 
and subsequent outcome (Kaldjian et al. 2008). This introduces the concept of severity bias, 
which suggests that clinicians are motivated to report based on the severity, which practically 
translates to the magnitude of patient harm. Furthermore, this would explain the 
underreporting of near miss incidents by clinicians (Basu et al. 2009). To the contrary, accidents 
gradually develop over time due to several small failures, both system and the individual 
(Qureshi 2008); ultimately resulting in an adverse event. The severity of an incident is not 
indicative of the educational opportunities nor the significance of a contributory human error. 
As previously stated, near miss incidents carry learning opportunities without resulting in 
patient harm (Kessels-Harbraken et al. 2010). Since patients are not exposed to harm in a near 
miss incident the likelihood of litigation against a clinician is minimal, thus eliminating fear of 
litigation as a barrier to near miss incident reporting.  
 
It has been documented that clinicians believe errors are inevitable and incident reporting is 
therefore pointless (Waring 2004). Despite the extensive literature on barriers to incident 
reporting there are few practical recommendations to overcome these cultural issues. Shekelle 
(2002) suggested the focus on patient safety should be redirected from quantifying and 
categorising the incidents reported to ways in which patient care can be improved. Clarke et al. 
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(2010) stated that the provision of formative feedback to clinicians must be the foundation for 
quality improvement initiatives, as it is ultimately the clinician’s responsibility for patient care. 
However, Mahajan (2010) argued that it is the ‘blame and shame’ cultural belief, synonymous 
with incident reporting, that perpetuates the challenge of clinician engagement. Therefore, the 
responsibility for patient care should be equally shared with clinicians, nurses and managers 
alike, as incidents are largely attributed to system issues compared to individual performance 
(Wilson 2007).    
 
The timeliness regarding provision of incident reporting may impact upon the utility of the 
feedback once received by the reporting staff member and / or frontline staff. A study by Tighe 
et al. (2006) indicated that the purposes of learning from incidents reported were compromised 
due to at least a 1 month lag time between reporting and resolution of the incident. A study by 
Evans et al. (2006) indicated that a lack of feedback was a significant deterrent to incident 
reporting. This discourages incident reporting and results in a culture of underreporting, 
particularly by the medical profession (Mahajan 2010; Braithwaite et al. 2010). The utility and 
influence of incident reporting systems on clinical practice is enhanced when feedback is 
delivered at the time of decision making (Jamtvedt et al. 2006). Evans et al. (2006) argued that 
if feedback is to generate an improvement in staff performance then it is a condition that 
feedback must be provided within a short cycle timeframe. To complicate this issue is the 
variability of feedback timeliness and practicality. The system of feedback is diverse ranging 
from quarterly analysis of incident by a quality assurance group (Frey et al. 2002) or monthly 
discussions at morbidity and mortality meetings (Bolsin, Faunce & Colson 2005). Lemley et al. 
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(2007) showed that students who received immediate feedback performed better in a final 
examination compared to students who received delayed feedback. This is supported in a study 
by Dihoff et al. (2004) that showed immediate feedback assessment techniques enhanced 
examination performance. The duplication of these educational feedback techniques is limited 
in healthcare due to fast-paced, unpredictable environments such as an emergency department 
(Yarris et al. 2009). The literature has showed a clear understanding that the effectiveness of 
feedback is a means to overcome incident reporting barriers (Mahajan 2010); however, there is 
scant evidence to suggest that patient safety intervention efforts were strengthened by 
expeditious feedback. 
 
Formative Feedback vs. Punitive Feedback 
The provision of formative feedback can enhance retention of knowledge and lead to 
improvements in technical skills performance (Porte et al. 2007). Conversely, punitive feedback 
can contribute to a culture of blame (Lake & Landau 2007) and fear of punishment from the 
submission of incident reports (Kingston et al. 2004). In order to maximise staff engagement 
with incident reporting systems the former style of feedback is preferred compared to punitive 
feedback, since non-punitive feedback will enhance staff acceptance of incident reporting 
systems (Farley et al. 2008). The appropriateness of punitive feedback is inconclusive, 
particularly since there is scant literature in relation to its use within incident reporting systems. 
Punitive feedback is likely to be exercised when poor performance is attributed to a lack of 
effort as opposed to lack of ability (Moss & Martinko 1998). Thus, it may be considered that 
punitive feedback may have use in response to incidents derived from negligent behaviour; 
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although, the challenge remains in relation to empirically confirming the presence of such 
negligence and the culpable staff members. Furthermore, the style and method of feedback 
provided can influence memory retention in relation to lessons learnt from incident reporting. 
Porte et al. (2007) demonstrated that expert verbal feedback is superior to computer-
generated augmented feedback in the acquisition of new surgical skills. This is due to the 
former providing feedback on multiple factors that composed the task. Porte et al. (2007) 
suggests that written feedback generated from an incident reporting system would be 
complemented by verbal expert feedback, to increase the understanding and retention of 
knowledge, as opposed to the 2 methods in isolation. Another study by Rego et al. (2009) 
confirmed that learning and development of medical students (N = 159) was improved by the 
use of verbal, formative feedback compared to a control group (N = 162). Croskerry (2000) 
emphasised that ineffective feedback can inhibit the development of clinical skills and result in 
increased error. Despite the style and method of feedback, the underlying objective is to affect 
learning and development, which ideally leads to improved job performance, measured by 
patient care (Fischer et al. 2006). 
 
To summarise, despite the magnitude of patient safety literature the ‘best practice’ for incident 
reporting systems in healthcare is unclear (Pham et al. 2010). The preferred approach to 
incident reporting system are for non-punitive, voluntary and confidential reporting, in order to 
encourage reporting by frontline staff. In contrast, common barriers exist, particularly the 
challenge with converting incident reporting data into learning opportunities and system 
improvements. However, these improvements are impeded by a lack of feedback, which 
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diminishes the utility of incident reporting systems and discourages frontline staff (Mahajan 
2010). Furthermore, individual accountability with incident reporting is viewed by frontline staff 
as in opposition to the patient safety principles of incident reporting systems (Pham et al. 
2010). 
 
The literature has not empirically demonstrated an association between incident reporting 
behaviour, feedback interventions and patient safety improvement. There is an assumption 
within the literature that a focus on understanding errors will lead to a reduction in their 
frequency (Kaldjian et al. 2008). Simply overcoming barriers to incident reporting may not 
result in improved patient safety, without the presence of practical initiatives delivered to 
frontline staff, supported by timely feedback (Croskerry 2000). The provision of feedback must 
be constructed to facilitate the improvement of individual performance, as well as addressing 
system vulnerabilities. Whilst the literature has identified the learning aspects of incident 
reporting systems (Wallace 2010) there are no empirical studies that measure the quality of 
lessons learnt and whether improvements in patient safety were achieved. Studies on the 
timeliness of feedback and the impact on organisational learning within a hospital setting 
remain unknown. It is the objective of this study to satisfy the knowledge gap and deliver 
feedback regarding lessons learnt from incidents to frontline staff, to achieve patient safety 
improvements. 
 
Justification of Study 
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Delays in feedback from incident reporting systems can impede learning and improvements 
regarding patient safety (Tighe et al. 2006) and deter staff from utilising incident reporting 
systems (Mahajan 2010). This directly influences patient outcomes, as latent errors hidden 
within models of care continue undetected. Incident reporting is already viewed as a time-
consuming, bureaucratic process by clinical staff (Waring 2005). Ineffective and delayed 
feedback diminishes the utility of incident reporting, in an already time-crucial environment. It 
is proposed that a short cycle of feedback will allow clinical staff to immediately correct work 
practices, reducing the frequency of errors that may otherwise contribute to a poor patient 
outcome.  
 
Feedback acts as a psychological intervention for the reporting staff member, which encourages 
learning deduced from incident reporting data (Basu et al. 2009; Franklin et al. 2007). 
Furthermore, the literature has shown that feedback on non-technical skills such as teamwork 
and communication can lead to improved technical outcomes and decreased error rates 
(McCulloch et al. 2009). If incident reporting systems continue to solely emphasise reporting 
rather than feedback then this alienates staff from a crucial part of the patient safety and 
improvement process.  
 
Literature within the area of incident reporting systems is limited to lag time measurements 
between the observation and submission of the incident (Regenbogen et al. 2009). Further 
research is required into the timeliness of feedback provision and the effects on the retention 
of lessons learnt and applied by frontline staff. The literature showed that the reporting of an 
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incident is determined by its severity (Hirose et al. 2007); however, this should not suggest that 
lessons cannot be learnt from near miss incidents (Mahajan 2010). This area of study is limited 
by a lack of research into the utility of feedback, whether feedback contributed to improved job 
performance and whether prevention of incident recurrence was achieved. The absence of 
feedback from incident reporting systems will perpetuate resistance by clinicians (Evans et al. 
2006) – an outcome that was found to be prevalent amongst pilots during the development of 
aviation safety systems (Helmreich, Merritt & Wilhelm 1999).  
 
Research Opportunities Explored  
 
Measuring Underreporting 
It is important to determine the difference between reported incidents and observed incidents 
to understand the extent of underreporting, which can provide insight into the patient safety 
culture and reporting utilisation by frontline staff (Mahajan 2010). Lessons which improve 
individual job performance and system changes mitigate system failures and reduce the 
severity of reported incidents (Evans et al. 2006; Franklin et al. 2007). Furthermore, lessons 
learnt from incidents and provided in a timely manner to reporting staff members could assist 
in professional development and increase job satisfaction (Lemley et al. 2007; Raleigh et al. 
2009).  
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Effective Feedback Mechanisms 
There is debate within the literature in relation to the most effective feedback mechanism. The 
composition of these feedback mechanisms can be determined by: 
i) timeliness; 
ii) frequency; 
iii) source; 
iv) intensity; 
v) format; and 
vi) duration (Jamtvedt et al. 2006). 
 
Structured feedback following an incident report would enable an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the feedback, respective of the incident reported. The literature has 
demonstrated disparity amongst methodologies employed for audit and feedback systems. 
Ursprung et al. (2005) utilised an audit questionnaire, which was divided into 2 categories. One 
category focused on delays in care, equipment failure, communication, and laboratory studies, 
whilst the second category evaluated compliance with hospital policy and guidelines. The 
results proved that the 2 categories identified different types of errors. Nonetheless, Ursprung 
et al. (2005) confirmed several patient safety improvements were made, which were routinely 
audited over a subsequent sixteen month period. This produced data that showed continued 
compliance above 90%.  
 
The focus of this study is to investigate the impact of timely feedback to clinical staff. 
Importantly, as stated within the literature (Pronovost et al. 2004; Ursprung et al. 2005), 
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feedback on routine clinical work can identify a broad range of errors, which can be used to 
improve patient safety and outcomes. Timely feedback to clinicians can enhance their learning 
and development (Jolley et al. 2007), which can potentially decrease incident frequency and 
severity.  
 
The provision of feedback to frontline staff will demonstrate the utility of incident reporting 
systems and determine whether it encourages reporting practices. The validity and applicability 
of the research question is substantiated by similar studies in the patient safety literature 
(Franklin et al. 2007). Clinician engagement is a widely documented barrier to incident 
reporting due to the lack of feedback provided from incident reporting (Braithwaite et al. 2010), 
which results in a perceived lack of utility of the incident reporting system (Warring 2005). 
Timely feedback directly to the reporting staff member is expected to overcome this barrier 
(Mahajan 2010), particularly if the feedback provided results in tangible patient safety 
improvements observed by frontline staff (Tighe et al. 2006). Studies that have focused on lag 
times within incident reporting system have focused on the lapse between the incident 
occurrence and the submission of the respective incident report (Hirose et al. 2007; 
Regenbogen et al. 2009). Hence, due to scant literature on the timeliness of feedback, it is 
proposed that this author’s study will expand the patient safety and incident reporting 
literature by empirically studying the effect of short cycle feedback on incident reporting 
barriers, measured by an expected increase in incident reporting rates.  
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Organisational Learning Derived from Short Cycle Feedback 
It is anticipated that the severity of incidents will decrease as a result of the short cycle 
feedback intervention of the proposed study. The intervention is expected to be accepted, 
considering that learning and development via feedback is sought after by frontline staff (Evans 
et al. 2006). The educational aspects of incident reporting systems make it a valuable tool for 
learning from errors, which lead to improved job performance and competency (Fischer et al. 
2006). Whilst the medical profession believes that errors are inevitable and are thus accepted 
as part of medical practice (Fisher et al. 2006) it is constructive feedback derived from these 
errors that will improve performance (Croskerry 2000), which benefits the safety of the patient.  
 
Croskerry (2000) argued that in order for feedback to be effective it must be provided as quickly 
as possible after the event. In the interest of patient safety it is believed that the provision of 
timely feedback will prevent the recurrence of an incident, which may otherwise cause patient 
harm if left unaddressed. Feedback is essential to the development of staff, particularly junior 
clinicians with respect to their acquisition and development of technical skills (Porte et al. 
2007). As staff acquire the knowledge to correct their own clinical practices, identify and 
constructively change system deficiencies (Croskerry 2000) it is believed that this will lead to an 
improved patient safety culture, evident by a reduction in actual incidents. 
 
The fundamental premise of this research is that short cycle feedback will produce changes in 
practices and outcomes regarding clinical practices and incident reporting, facilitated by 
facilitate single-loop learning. Furthermore, this single-loop learning will result in improved 
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incident rates, decrease actual incidents and decrease the severity of incidents, within the 
context of an acute healthcare setting. Single-loop learning should facilitate improvements in 
clinical practice and outcomes as a result of the learning process that occurs via short cycle 
feedback. Hence, the learning process that precedes single-loop learning and follows the 
provision of short cycle feedback enables the recipient personalised insights into their 
individual clinical practices, with the objective being to identify and implement improvements. 
This individual-level learning can be disseminated across the organisation, which would satisfy 
Argyris and Schon’s (1978) definition of organisational learning.  
 
Within the context of this study, single-loop learning theory informs the premise that a learning 
outcome will be achieved by the recipient of short cycle feedback. Argyris and Schon (1978) 
define single-loop learning as the improvement of performance, in accordance with existing 
values and norms, achieved by error-detection, review and remediation. Featured throughout 
organisational learning theory literature (Argyris & Schon 1978; Levitt & March 1988; Wang & 
Ahmed 2003) is the analogous description of a thermostat to describe single-loop learning. The 
thermostat is bound by specific thresholds to maintain the temperature of a defined space. 
Should the temperature of this space either increase or decrease beyond the specific thresholds 
then the thermostat will make the necessary adjustments to return the temperature to within 
the accepted levels. Hence, a single feedback loop is activated upon detection of non-threshold 
temperatures, which triggers the thermostat to intervene until the accepted threshold 
temperatures are achieved.  
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Within the organisational learning literature (Argyris & Schon 1978) the individual in receipt of 
short cycle feedback is considered to be an organisational agent. The achievement of single-
loop learning by the organisational agent would translate into organisational learning upon 
dissemination of such learning outcomes. The method in which learning outcomes are shared 
to other organisational agents within the organisation can be achieved by vicarious learning. 
Miner and Mezias (1996) described vicarious learning as the observation of learning achieved 
by others and incorporating successful routines into their own practices. The observation of 
short cycle feedback by organisational agents could support individual-level learning (Lampel, 
Shamsie & Shapira 2009). Additionally, such an observation could alter the perceived utility of 
incident reporting systems and could motivate organisational agents to engage in incident 
reporting practices. Therefore, short cycle feedback can influence changes in the attitudes, 
knowledge and behaviour of organisational agents, which is evidenced by an increase in 
incident reporting rates. Respectively, this study aims to quantify the underreporting 
phenomenon; specifically, the proportion of submitted incident reports in which the author 
self-identifies or elects to be anonymous. If the condition of receiving short cycle feedback is to 
nominate the former, then it is reasonable to expect that organisational agents will both submit 
incidents reports and identify themselves. Such a change in behaviour is expected due to the 
incentive that single-loop learning will be a tangible outcome that can be applied to their 
organisational agent’s individual clinical practices.   
 
The impact of single-loop learning theory on participants’ attitudes, knowledge and behaviour 
regarding incident reporting is measured by a comparison between the pre-intervention and 
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post-intervention questionnaires. As evidenced within the literature, staff within an acute care 
setting have the perception that incident reporting is a burden and any benefit derived from 
such reports is scant. It is theorised that short cycle feedback holds value in relation to single-
loop learning for both the organisation and organisational agents. The absence of a defined 
procedure in relation to the provision of feedback from incident reporting throughout the NSW 
public health system has contributed to the concept of this research. In order to achieve single-
loop learning, this researcher has defined the accepted norms and values in relation to the 
short cycle feedback system; those being, that feedback is provided by a feedback specialist 
within a 72 hour timeframe, directly to the self-identified author of an incident report. Whilst 
the primary objective is to achieve an improvement in clinical practice, facilitated by single-loop 
learning, other learning mechanisms can be achieved.  
 
Double-loop learning results in the development of new norms and values that would 
otherwise be static within single-loop learning (Kim 1993). It is anticipated that double-loop 
learning will be featured throughout this research due to the importance of defining what 
learning outcomes are expected by the organisation. It is reasonable to accept that the 
majority, if not the entirety, of incident reports have a negative connotation, which ultimately 
affects the patient. Specifically, incident reporting is the method in which acute care facilities 
capture occurrences when clinical practices deviate from expected patient treatment protocols. 
Thus, double-loop learning enables the organisation to examine whether the norms and values 
which form the foundation of organisational learning from incident reporting systems are 
conducive to the organisation’s strategies and actions (Argyris & Schon 1978). Particularly 
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important for an industry such as healthcare, a healthcare organisation must support a learning 
environment that facilitates continuous or incremental improvements. As explored by this 
research, ongoing education is achieved via systems such as the short cycle feedback loop. If 
single-loop learning enables organisational inquiry that facilitates correction of error, fostering 
improvement, then double-loop learning supports the organisation’s ability to examine and 
modify the parameters that govern such learning practices (Argyris & Schon 1978). This is an 
imperative element of the organisation’s strategy to achieve effectiveness and performance 
objectives.  
 
Triple-loop learning, or deuterolearning (Argyris & Schon 1978) emphasises the structures that 
compose the organisation’s systems of inquiry. Essentially, the organisation’s “learning how to 
learn” capability is determined by these structures. Such structures can take the form of 
communication mechanisms, technology and procedures (Argyris & Schon 1978); all of which 
can either facilitate or inhibit the organisation’s potential to learn and how to channel such 
learning into operational improvements. The short cycle feedback system within this research 
can facilitate triple-loop learning, evidenced by the system’s potential to drive continuous 
improvement of individuals and the collective of individuals that form the organisation. Asides 
from individual-level learning, lessons that emerge from the short cycle feedback system can 
manifest into patient safety initiatives and programs that further enhance the learning capacity 
of the organisation. Quite simply, triple-loop learning maximises knowledge regarding how to 
convert inquiries into organisational learning. Within the context of this research, the mass 
collection of incidents from incident reporting systems can be transformed into learning 
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outcomes; an objective of this study being how effective the short cycle feedback system can 
achieve organisational learning. Additionally, this is to be measured by the acknowledgement of 
learning by the short cycle feedback recipient, which is to be documented by the feedback 
specialist.  
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CHAPTER III: METHOD 
 
Study Aims and Research Questions 
 
The primary research aim of this study was to ascertain the impact of short cycle feedback on 
organisational learning. This study explored whether short cycle feedback, provided by a 
Feedback Specialist, facilitated an improvement in one’s clinical practices, resulting in the 
avoidance of repeated incidents and thus strengthening patient safety. Beyond this primary 
research aim were 3 distinct research propositions, in relation to “Can a short cycle incident 
reporting system”: 
i) Improve incident reporting rates; 
ii) Decrease actual incidents; and, 
iii) Decrease the severity of incidents. 
 
This study empirically investigated the proposition that a short cycle feedback intervention on 
routine clinical work would reduce the number of errors made, whilst also enhancing the 
confidence of frontline staff in their clinical aptitude (Hu, Herrick & Hodgin 2004). This study 
also investigated staffs’ attitudes towards patient safety and feedback from incident reporting 
systems, via a pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaire.  
 
Incident reporting data from both study and controls wards were reviewed prior to the 
commencement of the study, to determine baseline data regarding incident reporting 
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behaviours. The study featured 5 consecutive monthly phases. A pre-intervention questionnaire 
was completed by participants, to establish perspectives on incident reporting culture. 
Thereafter, observed incidents were compared to reported incidents; the quantification of the 
former being achieved via a verbal query protocol. To facilitate the intervention, a feedback 
specialist was then introduced, who was responsible for providing formative feedback (within a 
72 hour timeframe) to an identified staff member that had reported an incident during the 
intervention phase. A post-intervention questionnaire aimed to measure staff satisfaction with 
the intervention, particularly in relation to educational merit and practical use within the day-
to-day patient-care setting.   
 
Research Design 
 
The research was an observational, longitudinal study that employed a non-equivalent control-
group design. A study and control ward was used for comparative analysis between 
intervention and non-intervention effects.  
 
The study was conducted in 5 consecutive phases, which were of 1 month duration each; thus, 
the study was conducted over a 5 month period. By the flip of a coin, 1 ward was designated as 
the ‘study ward’ leaving the other as the ‘control ward’.  The same data gathering protocols 
were used in both wards, but only the study ward received the phased intervention described 
in detail below. A number of dependent variables were tracked over various temporal phases 
(the independent variable). The intention was to isolate any effect by the intervention, from 
mere reporting regimes, and to track the stability (or lack thereof) of any effect.  
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 As described in Jamtvedt et al. (2006) the clinical setting is an important factor in feedback and 
audit interventions. Thus, the criteria for the study and control wards were:  
i) in-patients only;  
ii) have a single medical and nursing head of department; and,  
iii) a primary treatment discipline (e.g. general medicine; general surgical). 
 
The dependent variables are: 
i) Number of reported incidents (e.g. via the IIMS incident reporting system); 
ii) Number of observed incidents (e.g. observed incidents recorded from verbal query); 
iii) Rate of reporting (e.g. reported incidents as a proportion of observed incidents); 
iv) Severity of reported incidents (e.g. actual SAC ratings); 
v) Staff job satisfaction (e.g. derived from pre-intervention and post-intervention 
questionnaires); 
vi) Satisfaction with existing incident reporting system (e.g. IIMS); and 
vii) Satisfaction with short cycle formative feedback (e.g. derived from pre-intervention and 
post-intervention questionnaires). 
 
The independent variables are: 
i) Time in the form of the 5 phases of the study; and, 
ii) Group membership.  
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The first 3 dependent variables were tracked through each phase of the study while the 
remaining dependent variables were only compared during the post-intervention phase of the 
study, due to the direct comparisons made between the pre-intervention questionnaire and 
post-intervention questionnaire. 
 
A staff questionnaire administered before and after the feedback phase of this study sought to 
compare and substantiate whether staff perceived the utility of the incident reporting system 
(i.e. IIMS) was enhanced by the provision of feedback based upon the incident report they 
submitted. The questionnaire focused on staffs’ satisfaction with all aspects of the feedback 
provided, an approach similarly undertaken in other studies (Yarris et al. 2009; Franklin et al. 
2007). This includes usefulness, timeliness and mode of delivery.  
 
Prior to the commencement of the study, a “pre-study” phase was undertaken, which focused 
on determining the average monthly level of incident reporting on both the study and control 
wards. Data for the period November 2011 to February 2012 (4 months) was retrospectively 
analysed via the Hospital’s Incident Management System, which established baseline incident 
reporting data – this is explored further below.  
 
A retrospective audit was considered in relation to whether identified incident reporting staff 
members received feedback in response to the incident they had submitted. However, this 
would not have explored the practical limitations when providing short-cycle feedback within a 
busy, healthcare environment. It was considered that the limitations and challenges 
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experienced in this study are applicable for similar interventions within a healthcare 
environment, which is valuable in the maximising the utility of future interventions. The 
feedback intervention within a ‘live’ environment was selected due to the benefit of 
demonstrating the ‘real-life’ challenges of implementing such an intervention in a healthcare 
environment. The longitudinal design demonstrated how the feedback intervention could 
influence staff perception regarding incident reporting behaviours. 
 
These variables for each incident report were recorded throughout the duration of the study, in 
order to determine the effect of each phase on incident reporting behaviours.  
 
During phase 1 staff in the study and control wards were asked to complete the pre-
intervention questionnaire to ascertain staffs’ satisfaction with the IIMS incident reporting 
system. The pre-intervention questionnaire featured a total of 91 questions, which were 
divided into sections pertaining to patient safety, incident learning, personal experience, 
incident reporting systems and feedback from incidents. A 5 point Likert scale was used as the 
basis for the response to each question, with the exception of 3 free-text questions, related to 
personal experiences of the participant, regarding a memorable incident. The questionnaire 
was treated confidentially, facilitated by the use of an alias that was unique to the personal 
details of the participant, governed by parameters set by the researcher. This alias would later 
be used for the post-intervention questionnaire, introduced in phase 5, which enabled a direct 
comparison at the individual level.  
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During phase 2 a verbal query procedure was introduced in the study and control wards. This 
procedure was in relation to the observation of any incidents during a participant’s shift. A 
Clinical Support Officer and In-Charge Nurse supported this procedure by verbally querying 
each consenting participant prior to the conclusion of their shift and documenting their 
response on a standard verbal querying template, designed by the researcher. The observation 
of an incident did not substitute the formal reporting of the incident into IIMS, which enabled a 
calculation between observed incidents and reported incidents, in order to determine the 
presence and magnitude of incident underreporting. The verbal querying procedure continued 
subsequently in phases 3 and 4, which occurred concurrently with procedures unique to these 
phases. 
 
In phase 3 of the study the short cycle feedback intervention was introduced. Formative 
feedback was provided to the reporting staff member, from the study ward, following 
submission of an incident report into IIMS. It is noted that the reporting staff member must 
identify themselves within the submitted incident report; hence, all anonymous incident 
reports were considered outside the scope of this intervention and did not receive feedback 
from the feedback specialist. A Clinical Nurse Consultant was selected to undertake the role of 
the feedback specialist. In accordance with the Public Health System Nurses’ and Midwives’ 
[State] Award 2008 the Clinical Nurse Consultant must have a minimum professional experience 
of 5 years. This is consistent with similar feedback interventions facilitated by a clinical expert 
(Porte et al. 2007). The short cycle feedback intervention was administered to all participants 
on the study ward, regardless of their working shift, in order to prevent a roster bias. The timely 
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provision of short cycle feedback to the reporting staff member was governed by this self-
imposed timeframe of 72 hours between submission of the incident report and the feedback 
being supplied. The feedback mechanism employed in this study aimed to provide feedback to 
the reporting staff member, via a feedback specialist; however, based upon the severity of the 
incident (i.e. actual SAC rating), further standard investigative processes (i.e. Root Cause 
Analysis, Reportable Incident Briefs) and feedback may have been initiated concurrently.   
 
Phase 4 was highlighted by the removal of the short cycle feedback intervention from the study 
ward. The intervention’s stability of effect was reviewed via the recording of incident reporting 
data. The verbal query of observed incidents remained in effect on both the study and control 
wards, as was the case for phases 2 and 3.  
 
Phase 5 was the concluding phase of the study, which featured the cessation of the verbal 
query of observed incidents from both the study and control ward. A post-intervention 
questionnaire was introduced, which featured 19 questions pertaining to feedback from 
incidents and the short cycle feedback intervention, including staff satisfaction towards the 
feedback specialist and the utility of feedback provided. Responses were received throughout 
this monthly phase. A reminder / prompt was issued to all participating staff members in both 
the study and control wards to return their completed post-intervention questionnaire. 
Responses to the post intervention questionnaire dissipated after an additional fortnight 
beyond the conclusion of this monthly phase. The stability of effect, in relation to the 
intervention, was measured via the recording of incident reporting data.  
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 Figure 1: Visual Summary of the Research Design 
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Participants 
 
Recruitment Criteria 
An invitation to participate was provided to all clinical and corporate staff from the study and 
control wards. The study and control wards were each a general specialty, in which acute 
patient care is provided on a 24-hour, 7-day a week rotational roster. The composition of 
clinical staff was largely from the nursing workforce, followed by allied health and medical 
disciplines. Considering that the number of staff on the study and control wards was consistent 
with similar general specialty wards within the study hospital and other hospitals within the 
Local Health District, it is argued that this affirms the generalisability of the study (SSWAHS 
2010). A minimum sample size of 20 participants each, for the study ward and control ward, 
was sought for the study. This desired sample size was calculated based upon a population of 
25 total staff members within the study ward, using a confidence level of 95% and a confidence 
interval of 10.  
 
It was determined that the existing staff profiles of both wards would ensure suitable 
representativeness amongst the variety of professional disciplines that generally compose a 
hospital general ward. Furthermore, it was believed that the combination of clinical and 
corporate staff would afford valid, multi-faceted perspectives regarding incident reporting 
systems, which could be replicated in similar clinical settings.  
 
Casual and agency staff were excluded from the scope of the research study. The unpredictable 
nature of casual and agency staff working a shift, typically in response to unplanned leave (i.e. 
P a g e | 65 of 245 
sick leave) made their inclusion in the study challenging and impractical. Additionally, as such 
staff are able to work in any ward within the Hospital, it was not feasible to seek each casual 
and agency staff member’s consent to participate in the study, should they fulfil a shift within 
either the study or control ward.  
 
Recruitment Method 
A presentation was initially provided to the executive team of the study Hospital, in order to 
seek in-principle support, as well as confirm that there would be no disruption to patient care. 
Following receipt of the executive team’s support, the same presentation was conducted with 
each Nursing Unit Manager and medical Head of Department on the study and control wards. 
The medical and nursing managers of each ward were shown that ethics approval had been 
received in relation to the study, as well as documentation that their staff would receive when 
invited to participate in the study. Support was received from the medical and nursing 
managers of both the study and control ward, following assurance that staff would not be 
disturbed in the provision of patient care.  
 
A list of staff members from the study and control ward was produced via the Hospital’s Human 
Resources Department. The researcher, guided by the Hospital’s Director of Medical Services, 
added the relevant Visiting Medical Officers to either the study or control ward eligible 
participant list, based upon their identified scope of practice. It is noted that Hospital Assistants 
(Cleaners) and Wardspersons are typically rostered on a rotational basis through all wards of 
the Hospital; however, the respective participating staff members were rostered for the 
P a g e | 66 of 245 
majority of the study’s phases, and continued to participate once they concluded their rostered 
period within the study and control ward, which coincided with the end of phase 4.  
 
At the beginning of phase 1, in March 2012, all staff within the study and control wards 
received a: 
i) participant information sheet; 
ii) consent form; and 
iii) pre-intervention questionnaire. 
 
These documents were attached to each staff member’s fortnightly pay-slip.  
 
The researcher offered to each Nursing Unit Manager and relevant Corporate Manager (i.e. 
Ward Clerks and Clinical Support Officers; Hospital Assistants (Cleaners) and Wardspersons) to 
meet with staff to further explain the nature of the study; this was in addition to an invitation 
within the participant information sheet, which encouraged staff members to direct any queries 
directly to the researcher. It is noted that the researcher’s contact details were provided. The 
researcher was invited on a few occasions to meet with staff, for the purposes of explaining the 
study further, as well as promoting the merits of the study; and thus participation.  
 
As anticipated, a challenge for the study was clinician engagement. This is consistent in similar 
studies highlighted in the literature review (Pronovost et al. 2003; Braithwaite et al. 2010). To 
ensure clinician engagement was maximised, this author personally spoke with each senior 
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doctor (Visiting Medical Officer) to explain the purpose of study, focusing on the education of 
medical staff and the benefits of feedback on patient safety. It was determined that it was 
beneficial to meet with each individual senior doctor, due to some doctors advising anecdotally 
that they would not have otherwise agreed to participate had it not been for the personal 
explanation by the researcher. However, it proved difficult to speak with each senior doctor 
from the study ward, due to the variability of their roster, which was determined by their 
patient load and commitments at other hospitals. In lieu of a face-to-face meeting, the 
aforementioned documentation was provided to the Hospital’s Medical Administration 
Department, for dissemination to the outstanding senior doctors.  
 
A follow-up, de-identified email was circulated approximately 2 weeks after the initial mail-out, 
to those staff members from the study and control wards that had a work email address. 
Nursing Unit Managers published a hard-copy of the follow-up email on the staff noticeboard 
within each ward, to ensure staff members that did not have a work email address were not 
disadvantaged by not receiving follow-up correspondence. Additionally, the researcher met 
with staff on each ward, on an ad-hoc basis, at varying shifts, to encourage participation in the 
study and to answer any questions that staff members may have had.   
 
Invited staff members had the option of either providing their signed consent form to the 
Nursing Unit Manager of their respective ward or by submitting the form in the staff-accessible, 
secure drop-box of the researcher, located within the General Administration department of 
the Hospital. For the ease of participants, the researcher’s drop-box was visually highlighted, to 
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prevent any erroneous submissions to other staff members’ drop-boxes. Upon receipt of each 
signed consent form, a spreadsheet was developed and updated by the researcher, which was 
cross-checked against the original staff list of both wards, produced by the Human Resources 
Department. This enabled 1 additional round of follow-up with outstanding staff members, 
approximately 3 weeks after initial invitations were distributed, to verify whether they had 
intentions of participating in the study, or if they declined.  
 
By the end of phase 1, the number of consenting participants were determined; which was 
essential to identify the staff members that would participate in phase 2, prior to the 
commencement of this phase. It was accepted that any non-response by an outstanding staff 
member would be interpreted as a declinature to participate in the study. This was particularly 
evident in the medical profession, as most Registrars and Junior Medical Officers failed to pick 
up their pay-slips by the conclusion of phase 1. It is noted that only 1 staff member (a nursing 
professional) from the study ward actively declared their declinature, which was advised to 
their respective Nursing Unit Manager. The result of this recruitment method was: 
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Table 2: Number of Study Participants, by Profession 
Profession Ward Number Distributed Participants 
Administration 
Study 2 2 2 
Control 2 2 1 
Combined 4 4 3 
Allied Health 
Study 9 9 9 
Control 7 7 5 
Combined 16 16 14 
Medical 
Study 16 9 1 
Control 11 11 3 
Combined 27 20 4 
Nursing 
Study 34 32 31 
Control 25 23 8 
Combined 59 55 39 
Support / 
Hotel 
Study 2 2 2 
Control 2 2 2 
Combined 4 4 4 
Total 
Study 63 54 45 
Control 47 45 19 
Combined 110 99 64 
 
Context and Characteristics  
Fairfield Hospital 
The study was performed at Fairfield Hospital, a 220-bed major metropolitan hospital based in 
the South Western Sydney Local Health District. Fairfield Hospital is geographically located at 
Prairiewood, which is 35 kilometres south-west of the Sydney Central Business District. Fairfield 
Hospital was originally located at Fairfield when the hospital officially opened in 1956. In 1988, 
Fairfield Hospital moved to its current location. Fairfield Hospital services a number of Local 
Government Areas (LGAs) that feature a variety of culturally and linguistically diverse 
populations, totalling approximately 196,000 people. Additionally, in 2011, the Fairfield City 
LGA ranked as the fifth most socioeconomically disadvantaged population in NSW (Australian 
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Bureau of Statistics 2011). In the 2011-12 financial year, the Emergency Department had 
approximately 32,000 presentations and 14,000 overnight admissions. For the 2011-12 financial 
year the staffing profile of Fairfield Hospital was approximately 800 head count and 650 full 
time equivalents (FTE). Furthermore, the composition of the Hospital’s staffing profile was:  
 
Table 3: Proportion of Staff at Fairfield Hospital for the 2011-12 Financial Year 
Profession FTE % 
Administration 78.58 12 
Allied Health 91.32 14 
Medical 77.41 12 
Nursing 330.07 51 
Support / Hotel 72.82 11 
Total 650.2 100 
 
The study and control ward of the case hospital is the General Medical ward (Ward 1A) and 
General Surgical ward (Ward 2A), respectively. These wards have 30 beds each; however, 8 of 
the beds within the General Surgical ward are unfunded and are only utilised during high 
activity periods. Both wards have an identical management structure, in which there is a 
Nursing Unit Manager and a medical Head of Department. The latter role is undertaken by a 
Visiting Medical Officer, who has clinical duties in other hospitals within the South Western 
Sydney Local Health District.  
 
The following table shows a summary of general patient demographics and staffing 
compositions for the study and controls wards, compared to the entire hospital: 
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Table 4: Summary of general patient demographics and staffing compositions for the Study 
and Control wards, compared to the entire Hospital, for the period 2011-12 
Wards General Medical Ward (Study Ward) 
General Surgical Ward 
(Control Ward) 
Fairfield Hospital 
(Case Hospital) 
Avg. Length of Stay 
(Days) 6.02 7.29 4.56 
Acute Separations    26,204 
Beds 30 30 220 
Average Occupancy   87.73% 
Administration  
(avg. headcount) 2 2 92 
Allied Health  
(avg.  headcount) 9 7 114 
Medical  
(avg. headcount) 16 11 90 
Nursing  
(avg. headcount) 34 25 423 
Support / Hotel  
(avg. headcount) 2 2 86 
Total Staff  
(avg. headcount) 63 47 805 
 
Study Ward 
The Study Ward is a 30-bed General Medical ward, which is staffed by nursing, medical and 
allied health multidisciplinary teams. The General Medical ward features 8 telemetry units, 
which enable the admission of patients that present with chest pain and require cardiovascular 
monitoring. A breakdown of the types of patients, by principal Diagnosis Related Group (DRG), 
admitted into the Study Ward is featured in the below: 
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Table 5: Top ten (10) DRGs for the General Medical (Study) ward, for the period July 2011 – 
February 2012 
AN DRG Description Separations 
F74Z Chest Pain 146 
F73B Syncope and Collapse W/O Catastrophic or Severe CC 55 
E65B Chronic Obstructive Airways Disease W/O Catastrophic CC 47 
F76B Arrhythmia, Cardiac Arrest & Conduction Disorders W/O Cat or Sev CC 43 
B69B TIA and Precerebral Occlusion W/O Catastrophic or Severe CC 38 
D61Z Dysequilibrium 34 
F62B Heart Failure and Shock W/O Catastrophic CC 34 
E62A Respiratory Infections/Inflammations W Catastrophic CC 32 
E62B Respiratory Infections/Inflammations W Severe or Moderate CC 26 
F76A Arrhythmia, Cardiac Arrest & Conduction Disorders W Cat or Sev CC 21 
 
Control Ward 
The Control Ward is a 30-bed General Surgical ward, which is staffed by nursing, medical and 
allied health multidisciplinary teams. As mentioned previously, 8-beds are considered unfunded 
and are typically utilised during peak demand periods, such as the winter season. These 
unfunded 8-beds were utilised for the majority of the 5 month study period, as this study 
coincided with majority of the winter season. The General Surgical ward is predominantly 
composed of respiratory patients and acute surgical patients. A breakdown of the types of 
patients, by principal Diagnosis Related Group (DRG), admitted into the Control Ward is 
featured in the below: 
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Table 6: Top ten (10) DRGs for the General Surgical (Control) ward, for the period July 2011 – 
February 2012 
AN DRG Description Separations 
E65B Chronic Obstructive Airways Disease W/O Catastrophic CC 54 
G70B Other Digestive System Diagnoses W/O Catastrophic or Severe CC 33 
E62B Respiratory Infections/Inflammations W Severe or Moderate CC 31 
G67B Oesophagitis and Gastroenteritis W/O Cat/Sev CC 30 
E62A Respiratory Infections/Inflammations W Catastrophic CC 26 
L63A Kidney and Urinary Tract Infections W Catastrophic or Severe CC 22 
F62B Heart Failure and Shock W/O Catastrophic CC 21 
J64B Cellulitis W/O Catastrophic or Severe CC 19 
L63B Kidney and Urinary Tract Infections W/O Catastrophic or Severe CC 19 
G66Z Abdominal Pain or Mesenteric Adenitis 17 
 
Baseline Incident Reporting Data  
 
Collection 
Incident reporting data was collected from IIMS, for the period November 2011 to February 
2012, to establish baseline data for:  
i) incident type; 
ii) incident location;  
iii) incident date; 
iv) time of incident; 
v) time band; 
vi) principal incident type; 
vii) incident description; 
viii) initial SAC consequence; 
ix) initial SAC likelihood; 
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x) initial SAC rating; 
xi) initial action taken; 
xii) incident prevention; 
xiii) notifier designation; 
xiv) notifier first name; 
xv) notifier last name; 
xvi) actual SAC consequence; 
xvii) actual SAC likelihood; 
xviii) actual SAC rating; and 
xix) incident recorded date. 
 
It is noted that the Patient Safety Manager of the study Hospital is the primary person 
responsible for incident report governance. As such, the Patient Safety Manager provided 
retrospective data in accordance for the baseline incident reporting parameters. The provision 
of this data was continued on a daily basis, in relation to daily incident reports from the study 
ward and control ward, throughout all phases of the study. This was opposed to the researcher 
gaining temporary access to IIMS beyond standard areas of responsibility and as per the 
request of the Director of Clinical Governance for the South Western Sydney Local Health 
District. 
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Rationale  
The incidents for both the study ward and control ward were reviewed retrospectively for the 
period November 2011 to February 2012 (a 4 month period). This retrospective review of 
baseline incident reporting data enabled the calculation of the average number of incidents per 
month, the types of incidents and the reporting behaviours of staff, including proportion of 
incidents reported anonymously. Additionally, the use of Severity Assessment Codes (SAC), 
both by the reporting staff member (initial SAC rating) and the relevant manager / supervisor 
(actual SAC rating), was measured, to determine the use of SAC ratings in order to identify the 
seriousness of reported incidents.  
 
Phase 1: Pre-Intervention Questionnaire 
 
The pre-intervention questionnaire was designed to explore the study participants’ perspective 
on incident reporting culture within their workplace. Both the pre-intervention and (later) post-
intervention questionnaire required the participant to identify themselves via a self-created 
alias, which enabled comparative analysis at an individual level, whilst also maintaining 
confidentiality of the participant. The direct comparison between the pre-intervention 
questionnaire and post-intervention questionnaire determined whether the satisfaction of 
participating staff members changed due to the short cycle feedback intervention. Participant 
information common to both questionnaires enabled segregation of results based upon 
whether the participant was from the study or control ward, as well as the participant’s 
profession. The units of measure in both questionnaires were based on a 5-point Likert scale 
and were converted to a numerical value that supported the quantitative analysis.   
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 The pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaires are based upon a staff survey tool 
by Cooke, Dunscombe, and Lee (2007). Cooke et al. (2007) surveyed 125 frontline and support 
staff in relation to their ability to learn from incidents, respective of their personal experiences. 
The appearance of the pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaire is akin to that 
featured in the study by Cooke et al. (2007) and consent was received directly from the primary 
author prior to use in this study.  
 
It is noted that a semi-structured interview was considered; however, the principal researcher 
was employed at the study hospital, throughout the course of the study. Furthermore, the 
principal researcher’s substantive position was of a senior Executive of the Hospital. To this 
end, and through consultation with the thesis Supervisors, it was considered that direct 
communication (particularly face-to-face) between the principal researcher and participants 
was to be avoided. The participants may have perceived any advice regarding the study, issued 
by the principal researcher, as a direction due to the principal researcher’s authority; 
particularly for participants whom the principal researcher had direct management 
responsibility for. Alternative administrators of a potential interview were considered; 
however, resource limitations prevented suitable staff members being available.  
 
Description 
Throughout the course of the study, documentation provided to study participants were 
marked with a unique identifier to indicate whether the participant was from the study ward or 
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the control ward. The study material / documentation, including the pre-intervention 
questionnaire, was marked with either a star or a heart, to indicate the study ward or control 
ward, respectively.  
 
Staff were advised, via their participant information sheet that the surveys would be treated 
confidentially and that no identifying information (e.g. name, position) would be required. The 
confidentiality of the questionnaires was imperative to retrieve honest responses; this 
approach being consistent within the literature (Mahajan 2010), as confidential surveys also 
facilitate a non-punitive and supportive environment that enhances staff acceptance (Farley et 
al. 2008). 
 
The use of aliases was featured in the pre-intervention questionnaire (and later, post-
intervention questionnaire) as a means to link responses of individual staff members whilst 
preserving their confidentiality. Section 1 of the both the pre-intervention and post-
intervention questionnaires asked each participant to use the first 4 letters of their father’s 
name and the first 4 letters of their favourite superhero as their unique alias. It is noted that 
this information, regarding how to create a unique alias, was featured at the beginning of both 
the pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaire. The method in which an alias was 
created proved unique for all participants, as there were no 2 aliases the same. Additionally, 
since the participating staff member created their own alias based on their personal 
information and preference (i.e. father’s name and favourite superhero, respectively) this 
enabled simple memory recall when the same alias was required 3 months later for the post-
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intervention questionnaire. Asides from the entry of an alias, the participant was required to 
indicate their profession, by ticking a box linked to each available option: Medical, Nursing, 
Allied Health, Support / Hotel, Administration and Other. It is noted the provision of ‘Other’ as 
an option was for staff members that were not familiar with professional classification; 
however, this option was not selected by any participant.  
 
Section 2 featured common incident reporting definitions that were used consistently 
throughout the study period. It was considered that the subjective interpretation of common 
incident reporting terminology, such as near-miss and adverse event, could create a bias that 
would skew the data. Therefore, in accordance with definitions adopted throughout this study, 
it was determined that the provision of incident reporting definitions would diminish any 
subjectivity within a participant’s response. 
 
The remaining sections (Sections 3 to 7) categorised the questions according to the nature and 
content of each individual question. Section 5 focused on the personal experience of the 
participant. The participant was asked what the average number of incidents was in a year that 
they experienced, either as a participant or observer. Furthermore, based on these incidents, 
the participant was asked how many of the incidents were reported, how many were near-
missed and how many were investigated. Additionally, this section required participants to: 
i) describe a memorable incident that they have been involved in; 
ii) summarise what they had learnt from this incident; and 
iii) in their opinion, what did the organisation learn from this incident. 
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 These free-text responses were later classified into themes and nodes, which allowed the 
researcher to perform an inter-rater reliability test (Upton & Cook 2006). The researcher’s 
supervisor was recruited as the second rater. It is noted that the completion of the inter-rater 
reliability by the research and the researcher’s supervisor was independent of one another, in 
order to avoid any bias.  
 
An ordinal scale was used to measure the survey questions, with the exception of the 3 free-
text questions within the pre-intervention questionnaire. The questionnaires used a 5-point 
Likert-scale, which categorised data based on qualitative differences: ‘Strongly Disagree’ (1),’ 
Disagree’ (2), ‘Neutral’ (3), ‘Agree’ (4) and ‘Strongly Agree’ (5). A zero (0) value was given for 
staff members that selected ‘No Opinion’.  In relation to the pre-intervention questionnaire, 
questions 27, 53, and 84 had alternative nominal values, which were: ‘Very Poor’, ‘Poor’, 
‘Average’, ‘Good’, ‘Very Good’. Additionally, question 58 had alternative nominal values, which 
were: ‘Very Negative’, ‘Negative’, ‘Neutral’, ‘Positive’, ‘Very Positive’ and ‘No Experience’; the 
only difference being that ‘No Experience’ had a numerical value of 0. Questions 59 to 68 also 
featured alternative nominal values, due to the phrasing of the questions. In this series of 
questions, the study participant is asked to rate the importance of each question with reference 
to why they would not report an incident. The nominal values used were followed a similar 
ascending pattern as described above: ‘Extremely’ (1), ‘Very Important’ (2), ‘Quite Important’ 
(3), ‘Somewhat’ (4), ‘Slightly’ (5) and ‘Not At All’ (6). The absence of a ‘No Opinion’ option was 
purposeful to encourage study participants to rate the importance of reasons underreporting 
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may affect incident reporting practice. Blank and ‘No Opinion’ responses were not scored in 
both the pre-intervention questionnaire and post-intervention questionnaire. The pre-
intervention and post-intervention questionnaires were administered in paper-based form, 
which are appended to this dissertation at Appendix 6 and 7, respectively. 
 
Distribution 
The pre-intervention survey was provided to each individual eligible staff member in the first 
phase of the study, in addition to the participant information sheet and consent form. Pre-
intervention questionnaires were attached to all staff members’ fortnightly pay-slips. It is noted 
that nursing and non-nursing staff have alternating fortnightly pay periods; for example: non-
nursing staff members would receive their pay slip during week 1 and nursing staff members 
would receive their pay-slip during week 2. The exception to this method of distribution 
regarding the pre-intervention questionnaires was the senior medical staff, including Visiting 
Medical Officers. This is due to senior medical staff do not often collect their pay slips and 
Visiting Medical Officers bill the Hospital for their services; hence, they do not receive a pay 
slip. Additionally, it was believed that participation rates amongst senior medical staff and 
Visiting Medical Officers would increase if individual discussions took place. Furthermore, 
support was sought from medical Heads of Department (majority being Visiting Medical 
Officers) to encourage junior medical staff within their Departments to participate in the study. 
It is noted that all Allied Health staff were hand-delivered the study documentation (i.e. 
participation information sheet, consent form and pre-intervention questionnaire) by the 
researcher. This was at the request of the relevant Allied Health Department Managers, so that 
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clarification regarding the study could be immediately. This distribution method afforded the 
researcher the opportunity to encourage participation and answer any queries.  
 
Collection 
Each staff member that received a pre-intervention questionnaire, and a consent form to 
participate in the study, were asked to return the completed documentation to either the 
researcher directly, via drop-box or to their direct line manager (typically the Nursing Unit 
Manager of the ward), which was later collected by the researcher. A follow-up email was 
provided to the staff that had email access, a fortnight after the pre-intervention questionnaire 
was distributed, and a hard-copy was displayed on the staff notice board in the study and 
control wards, which captured staff that did not have email access. It is noted that in order to 
ensure confidentiality was maintained the distribution list of the email was redacted. Upon 
receipt of either the consent form or pre-intervention questionnaire a self-created spreadsheet 
was updated to record consenting study participants.   
 
Response Rate 
The overall response rate for the pre-intervention questionnaire was 36.36% (36 / 99). 
Furthermore, the response rate from the study ward and control ward was 43.64% (24 / 55) 
and 26.67% (12 / 45), respectively. The highest number of participants was nursing staff (N = 
14). It is noted that the questionnaire was distributed with the participant consent form. Hence, 
there were participants that had completed the participant consent form but had not 
completed the questionnaire. For example, there were 36 participants that had completed the 
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pre-intervention questionnaire out of a total of 64 consenting participants; hence, the response 
rate to the survey was 56.25%. 
 
A summary of participants, by profession, is indicated in the table below: 
 
Table 7: Pre-intervention Questionnaire Response Rate, by Profession 
Profession Ward Number Distributed Participants 
Administration 
Study 2 2 2 
Control 2 2 1 
Combined 4 4 3 
Allied Health 
Study 9 9 7 
Control 7 7 4 
Combined 16 16 11 
Medical 
Study 16 9 1 
Control 11 11 3 
Combined 27 20 4 
Nursing 
Study 34 32 12 
Control 25 23 2 
Combined 59 55 14 
Support / 
Hotel 
Study 2 2 2 
Control 2 2 2 
Combined 4 4 4 
Total 
Study 63 54 24 
Control 47 45 12 
Combined 110 99 36 
 
 
Phase 2 – 4: Verbal Query of Observed Incidents 
 
The measurement between reported incidents and observed (unreported) incidents was 
measured to quantify the magnitude of underreporting within the study and control ward. It is 
acknowledged that this was a departure from typical practice of both wards, which can be 
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considered an intervention in itself; however, no follow-up was undertaken to confirm if staff 
members reported any incidents they may have observed. The number of incidents observed 
was quantified via an incident observation document that was completed by staff following the 
completion of their shift. In order to mitigate ‘double-counting’ of observed incidents (i.e. 2 
staff members that observed the same incident) the time and nature of the incident was 
recorded on the incident observation document, which was reviewed by the principal 
researcher to determine whether ‘double-counting’ was present.  
 
The disparity between the number of incidents reported and incidents observed was measured 
over phases 2 to 4 (3 month period) of the study. As described in the literature (Mahajan 2010) 
the presence of short cycle feedback to the reporting staff member may increase the utility of 
incident reporting systems; potentially resulting in an inflated number of incidents reported, 
which could suggest a sudden rise in adverse events and near misses. Nonetheless, when 
incidents reported were compared to the number of incidents observed, the actual number of 
incidents was then deduced.  
 
Implementation 
The study encompassed all shifts on the study and control wards, to avoid a roster bias. The 
verbal query of observed incidents, which was recorded by the Clinical Support Officer during 
business hours, was assigned to in-charge nursing staff for evening shifts. Additionally, the 
feedback provided by the Clinical Nurse Consultant to evening shift staff was conducted by 
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face-to-face communication when the relevant nursing staff were rostered on shifts that 
coincided with business hours.   
 
The verbal query form sought the following information from each participant:  
i) date and time the verbal query was asked; 
ii) the number of incidents observed during the course of the participant’s shift; 
iii) a brief description of the incident; and 
iv) the profession of the participant.  
 
The brief description was used to identify whether more than 1 staff member observed the 
same incident; thus, this would inaccurately increase the number of observed incidents. If the 
participant refused a verbal query, the staff member assisting in the verbal query process was 
encouraged to seek a reason why the participating staff member declined. It is noted that there 
were no staff members that refused to answer a verbal query.  
 
Clinical Support Officers and In-Charge Nurses 
In order to establish the presence and extent of underreporting in the study and control wards 
a verbal querying process was undertaken. The Clinical Support Officers of the study and 
control wards were asked to assist in the verbal querying process, following consultation with 
the Nursing Unit Managers of these wards. In accordance with their normal business hours 
work pattern, Clinical Support Officers asked all staff members (regardless of profession) within 
their respective ward whether they observed any incidents. The relevant Clinical Support 
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Officer was advised of the 1 staff member that refused to participate in the study to ensure that 
the verbal querying of observed incidents was not asked. Additionally, the Clinical Support 
Officer and Nursing Unit Manager from the control ward were provided with a list of staff that 
had consented to participate in the study, as there had been a lower response rate compared 
to the study ward. As nursing staff members were the largest staffing group in both the study 
and control ward, a list of consenting nursing staff members from the latter was particularly 
required, as there had been a response rate of 8 out of  23 potential participants, compared to 
the study ward’s response rate of 31 out of 33 potential participants. In addition to the Clinical 
Support Officers, who were able to only facilitate the verbal querying process during business 
hours (8:30 am – 5:00 pm), Mondays to Fridays, the Nurses in-charge of the afternoon shift 
(2:30 pm – 11:00 pm) and evening shift (11:00 pm – 7:00 am) were also asked to assist. Whilst 
the Nursing Unit Manager sought the support of the Nurses in-charge, the researcher met with 
these staff members to explain the correct procedure regarding verbal querying was 
understood.  
 
The Clinical Support Officers and Nurses in-charge were each provided with a one-page 
instruction document regarding the verbal querying process. A concern raised by Nursing Unit 
Managers was the disruption that the verbal querying process could cause staff members as 
they undertake clinical tasks. Therefore, it was emphasised in the instruction document that no 
staff member was to be approached if they were performing a clinical task. Additionally, the 
assisting staff members and Nursing Unit Manager of each Ward were provided with a list of 
participants, per the signed consent form. As such, instructions were issued for the staff 
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members assisting with the verbal query to avoid approaching non-participants. Verbal queries 
were asked of staff members towards the end of their shift. The Clinical Support Officers and 
Nurses in-charge were verbally encouraged to seek verbal queries during the last 90 minutes of 
the participant’s shift. This timeframe was nominated in consultation with Nursing Unit 
Managers, particularly to allow for the time spent towards the end of a staff member’s shift on 
clinical handover to staff on the next shift. To facilitate the verbal querying process, standard 
forms were provided to the Clinical Support Officers and Nurses in-charge for them to complete 
at each verbal query. These completed forms would then be placed into a drop-box located at 
the nurses’ station of the study and control ward. The drop-box was marked with signage, 
which showed that it was the drop-box for verbal query forms as part of the study. Additionally, 
to ensure the forms were secure, the drop-box was securely locked with a padlock and the 
researcher was the only person that had the key. The researcher would then regularly collect 
these completed verbal query forms and enter this data into a spreadsheet.  
 
As the verbal querying process occurred for 3 consecutive months, and simultaneously with the 
short cycle feedback intervention for 1 month, the researcher regularly met on an informal 
basis with the Clinical Support Officers, Nurses in-charge and Nursing Unit Managers 
throughout the verbal query phases of the study (April 2012 to June 2012). The researcher 
aimed to provide any support to the staff involved in the verbal querying process, including 
regularly supply of verbal querying forms.   
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During the month of June, the Clinical Support Officer of the study ward went on 2 weeks 
annual leave. The Ward Clerk within the study ward provided relief support to the Clinical 
Support Officer’s role, and as such, the verbal querying responsibilities. It is noted that the 
Ward Clerk received the one-page instruction document regarding the verbal querying process, 
as initially provided to the Clinical Support Officers and in-charge nursing staff at the beginning 
of phase 2. Nonetheless, the number of verbal queries decreased compared to the 2 previous 
months. This procedural issue is further discussed in the results chapter of this dissertation. 
 
Phase 3: Short Cycle Feedback Intervention (in Study Ward) 
 
In order to determine whether feedback was provided within the study’s definition of short 
cycle (i.e. within 72 hours of when the incident was reported) the time interval between when 
the incident was reported into IIMS and when the feedback specialist provided feedback was 
measured. Additionally, in instances when the short cycle feedback period was not achieved 
the feedback specialist documented reasons why this did not occur. During the provision of 
short cycle feedback, the feedback specialist was required to complete a record of feedback 
provided. This documented record of feedback provided included: 
i) IIMS ID; 
ii) incident date; 
iii) incident time; 
iv) principal incident type; 
v) notifier designation; 
vi) notifier first name; 
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vii) notifier last name; 
viii) incident recorded date; 
ix) feedback date; 
x) feedback time; 
xi) feedback transmission; and 
xii) details of feedback. 
 
The ‘details of feedback’ was a free-text field, which allowed the feedback specialist to indicate 
whether the reporting staff member believed the feedback provided had educational value in 
relation to day-to-day patient care tasks, should they volunteer this information.  
 
The short cycle feedback intervention was the primary intervention phase of the study, in which 
staff members within the study ward would receive educational and formative feedback within 
a 72 hour period, from when they reported an incident into IIMS. The caveat being that the 
reporting staff member must identify themselves in the report. It was determined that it would 
be logistically difficult to provide generic feedback from anonymous incident reports to all study 
ward staff members and measure the effectiveness of this feedback in accordance with the 
parameters measured during this phase of the study.  
 
Prior to the commencement of the short cycle feedback intervention phase it was understood 
that IIMS allowed staff members from other areas to enter an incident and assign it to the 
study ward. An example of such an incident was if a patient from the study ward is transferred 
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to another ward (in the study Hospital) and the standard clinical handover procedure is not 
followed. The receiving ward would be able to enter an incident into IIMS and assign it to the 
study ward, for appropriate management. It was determined that if any incidents of this nature 
were received during this phase of the study then no feedback would be provided as the 
reporting staff member is likely to be from a ward other than the study ward; hence, this 
circumstance would be beyond the scope of the study. Furthermore, such a reporting staff 
member would not have completed a consent form to participate in this study. However, it is 
noted that no incidents of this nature were reported in IIMS during this phase. The verbal query 
process continued throughout this phase. 
 
Implementation 
Due to the restrictions regarding access to incident reports from the IMMS database, the 
researcher was required to send de-identified incident reports to the feedback specialist. 
Automated distribution of incident reports to the feedback specialist was not possible due to 
the limited capabilities of IIMS. Additionally, to ensure continued clinical governance, the 
Nursing Unit Manager requested that feedback provided by the feedback specialist was advised 
to her, to ensure consistency of clinical practices within the study ward. Any standard methods 
of feedback provided by the Nursing Unit Manager continued during this phase of the study, as 
no interruption to regular clinical practices was a condition of ethics approval. Additionally, the 
Nursing Unit Manager confirmed that discussions normally take place with the reporting staff 
member in order to clarify incident details, so the Nursing Unit Manager can implement 
appropriate remedial action, if required. The Nursing Unit Manager noted that there was no 
P a g e | 90 of 245 
specific timeframe in which she liaised with a self-identified reporting staff member to clarify 
incident details; furthermore, it was advised that prompt clarification regarding an incident was 
dependent on her availability and the reporting staff member.  
 
As per communiqués to study participants in previous phases, an email was exclusively 
provided to staff members of the study ward in preparation for the short cycle feedback 
intervention phase (Appendix 7). This email (provided both electronically and in hard-copy) 
introduced the feedback specialist and provided details on what staff members can expect if 
they reported an incident in IIMS during this phase.  
 
Standard feedback form was provided to the feedback specialist, to enable standardised 
recording of information regarding the delivery of formative feedback to reporting staff 
members from the study ward. The feedback specialist provided the completed feedback forms 
to the researcher for data entry into a spreadsheet.  
 
Feedback Specialist 
Selection of the feedback specialist was conducted with guidance from the Director of Nursing 
and Midwifery Services of the study Hospital. It was important that the feedback specialist is 
not in a position of authority over the staff members on the study ward, as staff perception of 
the feedback provided may be interpreted as punitive. The feedback specialist’s substantive 
position was largely based within a community health setting and not within the study or 
control ward. Furthermore, whilst the feedback specialist was considered a senior nursing staff 
P a g e | 91 of 245 
member, this was a reflection of the level of clinical expertise, rather than any managerial 
responsibility. To ensure the feedback provided was practical and clinically meaningful, the 
feedback specialist was a senior nurse with at least 5 years experience and involved in the 
ongoing education of clinical staff.  
 
Phase 5: Post-Intervention Questionnaire 
 
The post-intervention questionnaire was sent to staff 1 month following the conclusion of the 
short cycle feedback intervention phase. The post-intervention questionnaire was not 
immediately provided to staff following the conclusion of the short cycle feedback intervention 
phase in order to mitigate a ‘halo effect’, where participants may have provided exaggerated 
responses due to the immediacy between the intervention and post-intervention questionnaire 
phases of the study. Additionally, the timing regarding the provision of the post-intervention 
staff survey was determined by the principal investigator and supervisor, on the basis that 
memory retention may be compromised if the staff survey is administered beyond a 1 month 
period of the relevant phase (intervention phase). Incidents reported in IIMS continued to be 
provided to the researcher. These incident reports were reviewed to determine any stability of 
effect from the study, particularly the short cycle feedback intervention.  
 
Description 
The post-intervention questionnaire had 18 questions (in contrast to the pre-intervention 
questionnaire which featured 91 questions), which focused on satisfaction regarding the short 
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cycle feedback intervention, utility of the feedback received and whether the participant 
personally observed improvements in patient safety. Feedback was measured to determine if 
reported incidents were reduced due to the learning and development aspects of the short 
cycle feedback intervention. Data specific to the post intervention staff survey was used to 
identify the acceptance of the intervention and staffs’ belief on the effect the intervention had 
on patient safety. 
 
Distribution 
The post-intervention questionnaire was provided to staff members a month after the 
conclusion of the intervention phase. As per the pre-intervention questionnaires, the 
distribution of post-intervention questionnaires was primarily via pay-slips, with a few being 
hand-delivered to Allied Health staff.  Informal feedback from staff members was that the 
number of question in the pre-intervention questionnaire was “excessive” and proved difficult 
for staff to complete in a timely fashion during their shift. Furthermore, staff anecdotally 
advised that they would only be able to complete the questionnaire during either their 20-
minute tea break or 30-minute meal break; hence, they would not be completing the 
questionnaire in their own time. 
 
Collection 
A follow-up reminder was provided to staff, a fortnight following the initial distribution of the 
post-intervention questionnaire, in addition to the researcher informally meeting with staff on 
both wards to confirm whether participants have either received or completed the post-
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intervention questionnaire. Similarly to the pre-intervention questionnaire, responses were 
accepted 2 weeks after the conclusion of phase 5; hence, a 6 week time period was allowed for 
responses to be returned. Thereafter, responses dissipated and no further follow-up reminders 
were provided.   
 
Response Rate 
The overall response rate for the post-intervention questionnaire was 38.38% (38 / 99). 
Furthermore, the response rate from the study ward and control ward was 56.36% (31 / 55) 
and 15.55% (7 / 45), respectively. The highest number of participants was nursing staff (N = 24). 
A summary of participants, by profession, is indicated in the table below: 
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Table 8: Post-intervention Questionnaire Response Rate, by Profession 
Profession Ward Number Distributed Participants 
Administration 
Study 2 2 2 
Control 2 2 0 
Combined 4 4 2 
Allied Health 
Study 9 9 4 
Control 7 7 3 
Combined 16 16 7 
Medical 
Study 16 9 1 
Control 11 11 0 
Combined 27 20 1 
Nursing 
Study 34 33 24 
Control 25 23 2 
Combined 59 55 26 
Support / 
Hotel 
Study 2 2 1 
Control 2 2 2 
Combined 4 4 3 
Blank 
Study 0 0 1 
Control 0 0 0 
Combined 0 0 1 
Total 
Study 63 55 31 
Control 47 45 7 
Combined 110 99 38 
 
Analysis of Questionnaires 
 
Comparison of Pre- and Post- Intervention Questionnaires from Study Ward 
Responses in the form of nominal values for both questionnaires were tabulated in a 
spreadsheet. These nominal values were converted to numerical values, to allow for further 
analysis. Averages for each response were calculated, as well as the percentage of responses 
according to each possible nominal response. Nil responses were manually deleted from the 
spreadsheet, in order to be excluded from aggregated calculations.  
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Feedback Intervention 
There were 2 questions, unique to the post-intervention questionnaire, which specifically 
sought the participant’s opinion regarding the feedback specialist. These questions were made 
available to participants from the control ward, despite that the feedback specialist 
intervention was not featured within this ward. The 2 questions focused on the participant’s 
“satisfaction” regarding the “availability” of the feedback specialist, and the “overall 
experience” with “learning from feedback” from the feedback specialist. It is noted that the 
former question allowed participants to select a “no opinion” response; however, the latter 
question did not feature a “no opinion” response, which was a deliberate strategy employed by 
the researcher in order to force a measured response. Despite this, there were 4 participants 
that did not provide a response, which was considered a “nil response” and was omitted from 
the aggregated data.  
 
Comparison of Pre- and Post- Intervention Questionnaires from Control ward 
Participant data from the control ward, in relation to both questionnaires, were entered into 
the same spreadsheet as per the study ward. This data recording method is listed in the 
previous section. 
 
Comparison of Pre- and Post- Intervention Questionnaires between Study and 
Control Wards 
Common Questions 
There were 7 questions that were featured in both the pre-intervention and post-intervention 
questionnaires. These common questions pertained exclusively to feedback and were featured 
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under this section heading in both questionnaires accordingly. A comparison was made 
between an individual participant’s responses to these common questions, per the participant 
alias used in both questionnaires. Of the 15 participants that completed these common 
questions on either questionnaire, there were 6 participants that had finished both. 
Furthermore, there were 3 participants each from the study ward and the control ward. A 
spreadsheet was used to tabulate these results and nominal responses were converted to the 
respective numerical value. Variances between the pre-intervention and post-intervention 
numerical value was calculated, to determine whether there was a change in an individual’s 
response. It was determined that the participants from the study ward had a positive average 
improvement of 1.5 across all responses to the 7 common questions. This calculation was based 
on a conversion of the participant’s response. The 5-point Likert scale used was converted from 
a nominal score to a numerical score, to which averages were calculated and compared. 
Conversely, there was a fractional positive average improvement of 0.2 in relation to the 
participants from the control ward.  
 
Responses by Profession 
Asides from the unique alias that each participant self-generated the individual was required to 
indicate their profession. This participant information was recorded in a spreadsheet. Nursing 
staff participants improved in the post-intervention questionnaire, compared to the 
responsiveness to the pre-intervention questionnaire. Anecdotally, nursing staff verbally 
advised the researcher that the pre-intervention questionnaire was burdensome, due to the 
number of questions. In contrast, there was a decrease of Allied Health staff responses from 
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the pre-intervention questionnaire to the post-intervention questionnaire (N = 4). The 
responses by profession is summarised in the table below: 
 
Table 9: Comparison of Response Rate, by Profession, between the Pre-Intervention and 
Post-Intervention Questionnaires 
Profession Ward Pre Post Variance 
Administration 
Study 2 2 0 
Control 1 0 -1 
Combined 3 2 -1 
Allied Health 
Study 7 4 -3 
Control 4 3 -1 
Combined 11 7 -4 
Medical 
Study 1 1 0 
Control 3 0 -3 
Combined 4 1 -3 
Nursing 
Study 12 22 10 
Control 2 2 0 
Combined 14 24 10 
Support / 
Hotel 
Study 2 1 -1 
Control 2 2 0 
Combined 4 3 -1 
Blank 
Study 0 1 1 
Control 0 0 0 
Combined 0 1 1 
Total 
Study 24 31 7 
Control 12 7 -5 
Combined 36 38 2 
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
 
During the study period, a total of 110 staff members from the study ward and the control ward 
were identified as eligible to participate. The criteria being that these staff members had to be 
employees of Fairfield Hospital that primarily worked in 1 of these wards. It is acknowledged 
that pre-questionnaires were not distributed to all eligible staff (N = 10) due to medical staff 
semester rotations or unavailability (i.e. maternity leave); despite several attempts to contact 
individual staff members directly. Additionally, only 1 staff member (from the study ward) 
declined to participate in the study. Of the staff members that received questionnaires, there 
was a response rate of 36% (36 / 100) and 38% (36 / 100) for the pre-questionnaire and post-
questionnaire, respectively.  
 
The representativeness of staff that participated in the questionnaires, in comparison to the 
staff that were eligible, is shown in the table below: 
 
Table 10: Summary of staff representativeness that responded to the questionnaires 
Category Study Ward Control Ward Overall Eligible Pre-Q Post-Q Eligible Pre-Q Post-Q Eligible Pre-Q Post-Q 
Admin 2 2 2 2 1 0 4 3 2 
A/Health 9 7 4 7 4 3 16 11 7 
Medical 9 1 1 11 3 0 20 4 1 
Nursing 33 12 22 23 2 2 56 14 24 
Sup./Hot.* 2 2 1 2 2 2 4 4 3 
Blank 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 55 24 31 45 12 7 100 36 38 
* Sup./Hot. = Support / Hotel staff 
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To further demonstrate staff representativeness the following table shows the study 
participants that were eligible and completed either of the questionnaires, in comparison to the 
whole of Hospital: 
 
Table 11: Summary of staff representativeness that responded to the questionnaires, 
compared to the whole of Hospital 
Category Hospital (n) Hospital (%) Overall – Eligible (%) 
Overall – Pre-
Q (%) 
Overall – 
Post-Q (%) 
Admin 93 18% 4% 75% 50% 
A/Health 94 48% 16% 69% 44% 
Medical 161 11% 20% 15% 4% 
Nursing 421 12% 56% 24% 41% 
Sup./Hot* 106 11% 4% 100% 75% 
Total 875 100% 100% 33% 35% 
* Sup./Hot. = Support / Hotel staff 
 
It is noted that Table 11 is based on head count of full-time, part-time and casual staff. In 
relation to medical staff, 69 Visiting Medical Officers are included in the total count of medical 
staff, as they are eligible to participate in the study. Ward Orderlies are normally grouped 
within the Allied Health staff category of the staff profile reports. However, in accordance with 
this study’s definition of Allied Health staff, 20 Ward Orderlies were moved from the Allied 
Health staff category to the Support / Hotel staff category.  
 
In the pre-questionnaire, questions 69, 70 and 71 were 3 free-text questions that related to 
learning experiences from a memorable incident. Responses were reviewed to identify relevant 
nodes and themes, which were then submitted to an independent rater to undertake an inter-
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rater reliability test, as a means to establish a thematic analysis of study participants’ free-text 
responses.  
 
The thematic analysis contributes to the contextualisation and interpretation of the study 
participants’ responses. Additionally, the inter-rater reliability test acts as a filter to remove 
responses that may not be relevant to the question asked. As such, each response was 
reviewed and separated into unique nodes, which featured key words or phrases that captured 
the overall context of the response. Thereafter, individual themes were created with respect to 
the established nodes; however, each node must only relate to a single specific theme (i.e. 
must not overlap with several themes).  
 
P a g e | 101 of 245 
Figure 2: Illustrative Example of Nodes and Themes 
R
E
S
P
O
N
S
E
• A patient had handover in the file form the nursing home about the modified diet and fluids they should be on. Patient was placed 
on normal diet and fluid and it took several days before a referral was made to the Speech Pathologist as the patient was not 
tolerating it and developed a chest infection. The patient developed an aspiration pneumonia and required a chest physio 
antibiotics and an increased length of stay and service.
Q
U
E
S
T
IO
N
• Please describe a memorable incident that you have been involved in?
N
O
D
E
S
• A patient had handover in the file form the 
nursing home about the modified diet and 
fluids they should be on. Patient was 
placed on normal diet and fluid and it took 
several days before a referral was made to 
the Speech Pathologist as the patient was 
not tolerating it and developed a chest 
infection. 
• The patient developed an aspiration 
pneumonia and required a chest physio 
antibiotics and an increased length of stay 
and service.
T
H
E
M
E
S
• Procedure not followed by Staff or a Patient due to 
human error
• Injury to either Staff or a Patient
 
Nodes and themes were identified based on the free-text responses from the following 3 
questions: 
i) Please describe a memorable incident you have been involved in? 
ii) Please summarise what you learned from this incident? 
iii) In your opinion, what do you think the organisation learned from this incident? 
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157 nodes were identified across the 3 questions. There were groups of 10 individual themes 
assigned to each question, resulting in 30 themes overall. Following completion of the inter-
rater reliability test by the researcher, the nodes and themes were submitted to an 
independent rater to complete. Essentially, the independent rater was coding independently, 
as they were unaware of what nodes were matched to which themes by the researcher. 
Thereafter, there was an overall match of 47% between the researcher’s and the independent 
rater’s node-theme matches. This is considered unreliable, as a match of greater than 80% is 
considered to be a reliable inter-rated reliability test (McHugh 2012). Based on feedback from 
the independent rater, it was deemed that some nodes were too separated, which diminished 
the context. It was also determined that certain themes were ambiguous and thus multiple 
themes could be applied to a single node. Hence, the merging of similar themes was required in 
order to eliminate any ambiguity. For example, ‘Procedure not followed’ and ‘Staff error’ were 
deemed similar and were therefore merged in the revised inter-rater reliability test. 
Additionally, nodes that were left blank or irrelevant to the question asked would be removed.  
 
A second attempt at the inter-rater reliability test was conducted, with a new independent 
rater (as the original independent rater had already seen the nodes, which would create a bias 
if they were to attempt the inter-rater reliability test for a second time). Based on the feedback 
from the original independent rater, the nodes and themes were revised, as shown in the 
following table: 
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Table 12: Summary of the number of nodes and themes used in the original and revised inter-
rater reliability tests 
 Q69 Q70 Q71 Overall 
Original Nodes 61 51 45 157 
Revised Nodes 32 33 22 87 
Original Themes 10 10 10 30 
Revised Themes 7 6 4 17 
 
The number of nodes and themes reduced from the original and revised inter-rater reliability 
test were 70 (55%) and 13 (57%) respectively. As a result, an overall match of 84% was achieved 
between the researcher’s and independent rater’s node-theme matches, for the revised inter-
rater reliability test. These results, compared to the results from the original inter-rater 
reliability test are detailed in the following table: 
 
Table 13: Summary of results for the original and revised inter-rater reliability tests 
 Agree (n) Agree (%) Disagree (n) Disagree (%) Overall (n) 
Q69: Original 21 48% 23 52% 44 
Q69: Revised 27 84% 5 16% 32 
Q70: Original 17 52% 16 48% 33 
Q70: Revised 28 85% 5 15% 33 
Q71: Original 7 37% 12 63% 19 
Q71: Revised 18 82% 4 18% 22 
 
Question 69 asked study participants to describe a memorable incident in which they were 
involved. The purpose of this question was to determine the types of incidents from which staff 
learned during an incident report. The most common theme that featured in the 32 nodes was 
‘Procedure not followed by Staff or a Patient due to human error’, which represented 9 out of 
32 participants.  
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Table 14: Frequency of themes selected for the nodes in Question 69 (Please describe a 
memorable incident you have been involved in?) 
Theme Nodes % 
Procedure not followed by Staff or a Patient due to human error 9 28% 
Injury to either Staff or a Patient 8 25% 
Aggressive behaviour by either Staff or a Patient 6 19% 
Staff dissatisfaction from incident reporting 3 9% 
Lack of training / education 3 9% 
Lack of incident reporting 2 6% 
Lack of equipment 1 3% 
Total 32 100% 
 
Furthermore, the second most common theme was ‘Injury to either Staff or a Patient’, which 
represented 8 out of 32 participants. This would suggest that memorable incidents are 
commonly associated with negative outcomes, such as human error or injury.  
 
Question 70 focused on what study participants learned from the memorable incident they 
described.  
 
Table 15: Frequency of themes selected for the nodes in Question 70 (Please summarise what 
you learned from this incident?) 
Theme Nodes % 
Value of procedure 11 33% 
Value of incident reporting 6 18% 
Procedure requires review / improvement 6 18% 
Staff dissatisfaction from incident reporting 5 15% 
Requirement for training / education 4 12% 
Nothing 1 3% 
Total 33 100% 
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The purpose of this question was to identify the types of lessons that staff reported learning 
through incidents. The most common theme that featured in the 33 nodes was ‘Value of 
procedure’, which represented 11 out of 33 participants.  
 
Question 71 sought the study participants’ opinion on what the organisation leaned from the 
incident they described.  
 
Table 16: Frequency of themes selected for the nodes in Question 71 (In your opinion, what 
do you think the organisation learned from this incident?) 
Theme Nodes % 
Improve awareness / training / education 12 55% 
Feedback / consultation re: incident reporting requires improvement 6 27% 
Enhance resources (human or financial) 3 14% 
Nothing 1 5% 
Total 22 100% 
 
The purpose of this question was to identify staff members’ perception of lessons embedded 
into organisational practices, derived from incident reports. The most common theme that 
featured in the 22 nodes was ‘Improve awareness / training / education’, which represented 12 
out of 22 participants.  
 
The most common themes featured in response to all 3 questions all shared a focus on 
procedure and human error. One possible explanation may be that the incident was made 
memorable due to a procedure not being followed (due to human error), which may have 
resulted or contributed to an injury sustained by a staff member or a patient. It is believed that 
the staff participants personally gained a better understanding or appreciation on the value of 
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the procedure, which majority of participants believed that the organisation could benefit from 
improving education, in relation to the relevant procedure. The results of the inter-rater 
reliability test suggests an adverse event, documented via incident reporting processes, can be 
converted into a practical learning opportunity for both the individual and the organisation as a 
whole, which represents the fundamental theoretical principal of this research.  
 
There were 7 questions that were identical in the pre-intervention questionnaire and post-
intervention questionnaire, which focused on each participant’s opinion regarding feedback 
from incidents. Based on the aliases used by participants, 7 or 8 participants were identified 
that answered the 7 identical questions in both questionnaires, which enabled direct 
comparisons of each individual participant’s opinion between the pre-questionnaire and post-
questionnaire. A summary of these results, which featured direct comparisons of individual 
participants that answered the same question in each questionnaire, is as follows: 
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Table 17: Summary of average results for pre-intervention questionnaire and post-
intervention questionnaire, for common questions 
Question 
Avg. Pre-Q 
(num.) 
Avg. Post-Q 
(num.) 
Participants 
surveyed (n) 
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Feedback is provided to me from an 
incident that I have submitted as part of 
my daily work tasks 
2.0 2.8 2.4 3.5 3.0 3.3 3 4 7 
I am satisfied with the feedback provided 
to me from an incident I have reported 2.5 3.3 2.9 3.8 3.3 3.5 4 3 7 
I am satisfied with the quantity of 
feedback I receive 2.5 2.8 2.6 3.8 3.0 3.4 4 4 8 
I am satisfied with the quality of feedback 
I receive 2.5 3.0 2.8 3.8 3.0 3.4 4 4 8 
I am satisfied with the timeliness of 
feedback I receive 2.0 3.0 2.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 3 4 7 
The feedback provided to me improves my 
awareness about patient safety 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.7 3.8 4 3 7 
I believe the feedback I receive improves 
my job performance and / or skills 3.3 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3 4 3 7 
 
There was an improvement in the average numerical scores of 2.3 to 3.6 in from the pre-
intervention questionnaire to the post-intervention questionnaire, respectively; in relation to 
the feedback is provided from a submitted incident as part of daily work tasks. When converted 
to a nominal value, the average result has shifted from ‘disagree’ to ‘neutral’. All 3 participants 
from the study ward indicated an improvement of 2 in their numerical scores. When converted 
to the equivalent nominal score, there was a shift from ‘disagree’ to ‘agree’.   
 
The following tables summarise the responses in relation to the 2 questions regarding the 
feedback specialist: 
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 Table 18: Summary of responses in relation to the question “I was satisfied with the 
availability of the feedback specialist” 
Response Study Ward (n) 
Study 
Ward (%) 
Control 
Ward (n) 
Control 
Ward (%) 
Overall  
(n) 
Overall  
(%) 
Strongly Disagree 1 3% 0 0% 1 3% 
Disagree 3 10% 0 0% 3 8% 
Neutral 2 6% 3 43% 5 13% 
Agree 16 52% 2 29% 18 47% 
Strongly Agree 4 13% 0 0% 4 11% 
No Opinion 5 16% 2 29% 7 18% 
Total 31 100% 7 100% 38 100% 
 
Table 19: Summary of responses in relation to the question “Please rate your overall 
experience with learning from feedback provided by the feedback specialist” 
Response Study Ward (n) 
Study 
Ward (%) 
Control 
Ward (n) 
Control 
Ward (%) 
Overall  
(n) 
Overall  
(%) 
Very Poor 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Poor 4 15% 0 0% 4 13% 
Average 7 26% 3 60% 10 31% 
Good 15 56% 2 40% 17 53% 
Very Good 1 4% 0 0% 1 3% 
Sub-Total 27 100% 5 100% 32 100% 
Blank 4  2  6  
 
16 out of 27 participants of the study ward participants rated the overall experience with the 
feedback specialist as either ‘good’ or ‘very good’, compared to only 2 out of 5 participants of 
the control ward participants. However, the low response rate from the control ward may not 
afford a satisfactory representation of the control ward staff. The study ward shows 16 
participants indicated a ‘good’ or ‘very good’ response; however, it is noted that only 9 staff 
members from the study ward received personalised feedback from the feedback specialist. 
Additionally, 4 participants rated their experience as ‘poor’ and 7 participants rated their 
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experience as ‘average’. It is acknowledged that these results require further context, such as 
whether the participant directly received feedback from the feedback specialist. Responses 
should be considered validated for those participants that confirmed they received feedback; 
conversely, participants that critiqued the feedback specialist without having received feedback 
first-hand should have their responses disregarded for the questions featured in Tables 18 and 
19.  
 
Overall, the average rating of the overall experience with the feedback specialist was 3.0 and 
3.5 for the pre-questionnaire and post-questionnaire, respectively. When translated to the 
nominal value, these values are akin to ‘neutral’ and ‘neutral / agree’. If this average rating is 
viewed at the ward level, the average rating of the feedback specialist in the study ward is 3.1 
and 3.5 for the pre-questionnaire and post-questionnaire, respectively. Conversely, the control 
ward counterpart ratings are 2.4 to 3.4 for the pre-questionnaire and post-questionnaire, 
respectively. There is a shift of 1 rating point for the control ward (compared to 0.4 for the 
study ward); however, it is noted that there is a smaller number of participants from the control 
ward in the post-questionnaire (N = 7) and even a smaller number of participants that 
answered the question in relation to rating their overall experience with the feedback specialist 
(N = 5). This is in contrast to the study ward, which had 31 participants in the post-
questionnaire and 27 participants that answered the question in relation to rating their overall 
experience with the feedback specialist (87%).  
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Impact of Short Cycle Feedback on Organisational Learning 
 
The pre-intervention questionnaire featured a section on incident learning, which included 26 
individual questions regarding the utilisation of reported incidents for educational outcomes. A 
summary of these results is featured in the table below. It is noted that responses which were 
blank or indicated ‘no opinion’ were omitted. 
 
Table 20: Summary of responses in relation to the section regarding ‘incident learning’ from 
the pre-intervention questionnaire 
Question n 
St
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 D
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e 
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Learning from incidents is an important policy 
objective of my organisation 32 3% 0% 13% 56% 28% 
The program for learning from incidents in my 
organisation improves patient care 34 3% 6% 12% 62% 18% 
In my organisation, people tend to cover up 
mistakes 30 23% 37% 23% 13% 3% 
People in leadership positions are committed 
to learning from incidents 33 0% 9% 15% 61% 15% 
In my organisation there is no blame or stigma 
attached to reporting an incident 32 6% 22% 9% 50% 13% 
I would feel quite comfortable reporting an 
incident in which I made an error or omission 34 0% 21% 6% 65% 9% 
I learn from my own incidents, but not from 
incidents involving others 32 16% 66% 9% 6% 3% 
I would know how to respond appropriately if 
I saw an incident occur 34 0% 9% 18% 53% 21% 
Secrecy between different departments, 
specialisations or functions makes it difficult 
to learn from incidents 
29 3% 24% 21% 34% 17% 
Incidents in my organisation are investigated 
impartially and objectively 28 7% 14% 25% 39% 14% 
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I have learned how to do my own job better 
by learning about mistakes made by my co-
workers 
34 3% 12% 12% 62% 12% 
My organisation allocates sufficient resources 
to incident investigations 25 0% 20% 44% 32% 4% 
Incidents do not happen in my organisation 34 50% 38% 12% 0% 0% 
Recommendations from incident 
investigations are acted upon 29 3% 7% 24% 52% 14% 
My organisation turns lessons learned from 
incidents into actions that improve the patient 
care system 
32 3% 9% 13% 66% 9% 
My organisation treats incidents as learning 
opportunities 34 3% 15% 18% 56% 9% 
My organisation ignores incidents as long as 
no one gets hurt 30 20% 67% 7% 3% 3% 
Lessons learned from incident investigations 
are communicated to staff 33 15% 9% 24% 42% 9% 
Differences between departments, 
specialisations or functions make it difficult to 
improve the system 
29 7% 31% 14% 48% 0% 
The program for learning from incidents in my 
organisation improves operational 
effectiveness 
30 0% 23% 13% 60% 3% 
My organisation rewards or recognises 
individuals and teams for effective incident 
reporting and investigation 
28 18% 32% 29% 18% 4% 
My organisation accepts that people make 
mistakes and puts the focus of incident 
investigations on system improvement 
30 0% 7% 33% 47% 13% 
My organisation shares learning from 
incidents with similar organisations within the 
health care system 
22 0% 23% 18% 50% 9% 
The workload and paperwork involved in 
learning from incidents outweighs the 
benefits 
30 10% 33% 37% 13% 7% 
I feel that incidents present learning 
opportunities that can improve daily work 
tasks and patient safety 
32 0% 0% 6% 66% 28% 
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Furthermore, when asked to rate the organisation’s overall ability to learn from incidents, 56% 
of participants indicated either ‘good’ or ‘very good’. Additionally, there were 38% that 
indicated ‘average’ and only 6% indicated ‘poor’. No participant indicated ‘very poor’.  
 
From the pre-intervention questionnaire results, it was demonstrated that 75% of participants 
either ‘agreed’ or strongly agreed’ that the organisation converts lessons arising out of incident 
reports and transforms these lessons into patient safety improvements. Additionally, 60% of 
participants either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that the focus of incident investigations is 
placed on system improvement, as opposed to being a punitive process. In contrast, 22% of 
participants either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that rewards or recognition is given to either 
teams or individuals for effective incident reporting and investigation. Overwhelmingly, 94% of 
participants either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that incidents present learning opportunities 
that can improve daily work tasks and patient safety, which emphasises that incident reporting 
can be an effective organisational learning tool.   
 
A comparison of common questions from the pre-intervention questionnaire and post-
intervention questionnaire was undertaken in order to understand whether a tangible 
improvement in learning capabilities from incident reporting was achieved. As such, there were 
2 specific questions in the above-mentioned questionnaires that addressed this: i) the feedback 
provided to me improves my awareness about patient safety; and, ii) I believe the feedback I 
receive improves my job performance and / or skills. There were 7 participants that had 
answered both questions in the pre-intervention questionnaire and post-intervention 
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questionnaire, which allowed a direct comparison. Furthermore, 5 out of 7 participants were 
from the study ward, which received the direct feedback; however, it is noted that these 5 
participants may not have received the direct feedback personally, due to the anonymous 
nature of the questionnaires and provision of feedback. For the purposes of understanding 
whether feedback provided during the study had an effect on organisational learning, the 
results for the participants from the study ward will be taken into consideration only.  
 
On average, there was an improvement in the question regarding awareness of patient safety 
when converted from numerical to nominal values (based on the Likert scale), with participants 
reporting a ‘neutral’ response and ‘agree’ response for the pre-questionnaire and post-
questionnaire, respectively. This would suggest that the provision of feedback from incident 
reporting has contributed to increased patient safety awareness, with learning opportunities 
arising from this information. The existence of collegiate knowledge sharing, whilst not 
measured, is supported by staff responses in the pre-questionnaire, particularly in relation to 
the questions “I learn from my own incidents, but not from incidents involving others” and “I 
have learned how to do my own job better by learning about mistakes made by my co-
workers”. Respectively, 82% of participants indicated either ‘strongly disagree’ or ‘disagree’ and 
74% of participants indicated either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’. It is acknowledged that a 
comparison of pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaires is attributed to the 
individual participant’s alias. Furthermore, only 5 of the participants were from the study ward, 
which is a small sample size compared to the overall response rate for both the pre-
intervention and post-intervention questionnaire in isolation. As such, whilst it is maintained 
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that the findings suggest the presence of increased patient safety awareness and learning it is 
accepted that a larger response rate is required to address any equivocacy. Further 
interpretation of these results will be discussed in the subsequent chapter of this dissertation.  
 
There was no change in relation to the question regarding feedback improving job performance 
or skills, as a ‘neutral’ nominal average score was recorded for the pre-intervention 
questionnaire and post-intervention questionnaire. It is noted that a time lapse of 
approximately 6 weeks occurred between the conclusion of the feedback phase and the 
completion of the post-questionnaire by the study participants. Hence, a longer period of time 
may allow staff to put into practice any knowledge gained from the provision of feedback.  
 
The provision of feedback by the feedback specialist was provided to 9 individual staff members 
from the study ward. The composition of these staff members were: 7 nursing staff members, 1 
allied health staff member and 1 administration staff member. The details of the feedback 
provided were documented in a standard feedback form by the feedback specialist. It was 
determined that a learning outcome was present if the staff member accepted a suggestion 
from the feedback specialist, which would benefit the staff member’s clinical skills and practice. 
Therefore, the results demonstrate that organisational learning was present on 7 out of 9 
occasions. Examples of this included:  
i) enhanced toileting scheduled for confused patients; 
ii) ordering specialised mattresses on the day of a patient’s admission following a thorough 
review of a patient’s risk to pressure ulcers; 
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iii) significance of providing a detailed and accurate handover to prevent pressure ulcers; 
iv) utilising basic translation flash cards for patients from a non-English speaking  
background;  
v) expeditious family case conferences with the multidisciplinary team for chronic / 
complex patients; and, 
vi) relocating mobility-compromised patients closer to the nurses’ station to prevent falls. 
 
It is noted that 4 out of 9 participants received feedback within 72 hours, which is this study’s 
definition of “short cycle”. The occasions when feedback could not be provided within 72 hours 
was due to the standard clinical tasks of the feedback specialist and absence of weekend 
coverage, as well as reporting staff members were either on evening shift or were on sick leave. 
It is acknowledged that the administration of the intervention was limited for evening shift 
staff, due to the absence of the Clinical Nurse Consultant outside of standard business hours; 
however, this was to be overcome via documented correspondence, phone calls and face-to-
face meetings that took place when an evening shift staff member was rostered during business 
hours; although, these alternative means of communication were not successful, due to the 
unavailability of the staff member when attempts were made to contact such a staff member 
by the feedback specialist. Feedback provided outside of the 72 hour timeframe should not be 
disregarded as it was determined that a single-loop learning outcome was present in these 
instances. This was evident by the feedback specialist’s observation that a single-loop learning 
outcome was achieved via verbal acknowledgement from the recipient, including their 
intention to incorporate the feedback provided into their day-to-day practices.  
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 It is noted that the provision of feedback was only applicable for staff members within the 
study ward that submitted identified incident reports. Obviously, this prerequisite was required 
in order for the feedback specialist to identify the staff member to provide feedback. As such, 
the number of identified and anonymous incidents are summarised in the table below: 
 
 
Table 21: Number of identified incidents and anonymous incidents, per Ward 
Ward Incidents Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Total 
Study 
Identified  8 8 9 12 12 49 
Anonymous  9 7 3 12 7 38 
Reported  17 15 12 24 19 87 
Control 
Identified  10 18 13 5 11 57 
Anonymous  7 8 10 8 10 43 
Reported  17 26 23 13 21 100 
Total 
Identified  18 26 22 17 23 106 
Anonymous  16 15 13 20 17 81 
Reported  34 41 35 37 40 187 
 
The types of incidents in which feedback was provided by the feedback specialist are 
summarised in the table below: 
 
Table 22: Types of incidents in which feedback was provided by the feedback specialist 
Theme n % 
Fall 4 44% 
Pressure Ulcer 3 33% 
Complaint 1 11% 
Nutrition 1 11% 
Total 9 100% 
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These results are consistent with all incidents recorded during the study period, due to falls and 
pressure ulcers being incident types in which reporting into IIMS is mandatory. For comparison, 
during the study period, falls and pressure ulcers represented 30% (34 / 115) and 36% (41 / 
115) of incident types, respectively. The transmission of feedback by the feedback specialist 
was entirely via face-to-face.  
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Impact of Short Cycle Feedback on Staff Satisfaction 
 
In relation to questions regarding feedback from incidents a comparison of the results from the 
pre-intervention questionnaire and the post-intervention questionnaire is summarised in the 
table below. It is noted that for the purposes of comparison the responses were grouped, that 
being ‘strongly disagree’, ‘disagree’ and ‘neutral’ were grouped into the ‘negative’ category, 
whereas ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ were grouped into the ‘positive category’. It is noted that 
responses that were blank or indicated ‘no opinion’ were omitted. 
 
Table 23: Comparison of results from the pre-intervention questionnaire and the post-
intervention questionnaire in relation to questions regarding feedback from incidents 
Question 
Pre-Q Post-Q 
n 
N
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Feedback is provided to me from an incident 
that I have submitted as part of my daily work 
tasks 
27 70% 30% 32 28% 72% 
I am satisfied with the feedback provided to me 
from an incident I have reported 27 70% 30% 32 28% 72% 
I am satisfied with the quantity of feedback I 
receive 27 70% 30% 33 36% 64% 
I am satisfied with the quality of feedback I 
receive 27 67% 33% 32 34% 66% 
I am satisfied with the timeliness of feedback I 
receive 26 69% 31% 30 27% 73% 
The feedback provided to me improves my 
awareness about patient safety 27 48% 52% 32 22% 78% 
I believe the feedback I receive improves my job 
performance and / or skills 27 48% 52% 32 28% 72% 
 
The questions based on satisfaction with feedback from incident reporting have shifted from a 
dominant negative perspective in the pre-intervention questionnaire (average of 63% across all 
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7 questions) to a positive perspective in the post-intervention questionnaire (average of 71% 
across all 7 questions). It is noted that there were 24 out of 36 participants and 12 out of 36 
participants in the pre-intervention questionnaire from the study ward and control ward, 
respectively. This is in contrast to 31 out of 38 participants and 7 out of 38 participants in the 
post-intervention questionnaire from the study ward and control ward, respectively. Thus, the 
control ward is less represented in the post-intervention questionnaire.  
 
There was an overwhelming proportion of staff that supported the provision of short cycle 
feedback on a permanent basis with 80% of staff stating they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’. 
Additionally, 81% of staff ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ when asked if they felt the feedback 
provided was practical. It is acknowledged that the positive response may have been attributed 
to the desire to have a feedback mechanism in relation to incident reporting, rather than 
satisfaction from direct experience with the feedback specialist. Furthermore, to preserve the 
confidentiality of the participants’ to the post-intervention questionnaire, it is unknown 
whether the 9 participants in receipt of feedback from the feedback specialist actually 
completed a post-intervention questionnaire; and, if so, what their level of satisfaction was.  
 
Improvement in Reporting Rates 
 
Throughout the course of the study period, all incidents entered in to the IIMS database were 
calculated based on whether the notifying staff member provided their name (either first 
name, last name or both). As such, both wards showed that the notifying staff member was 
identifiable in approximately 57% of all IIMS entered on a monthly basis. Furthermore, the 
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percentage of IIMS that identified the notifying staff member increased to 62% if the pre-study 
period (November 2011 – March 2012) and post-study period (July 2012) are included. 
Conversely, in relation to incidents entered anonymously, 16 of 49 participants indicated the 
notifier designation, which was unanimously nursing staff. Since feedback was only to be 
provided to staff members that self-identified when reporting an incident, it was initially 
theorised that the provision of feedback by the feedback specialist would motivate staff to self-
identify. The above results are equivocal as the increase in self-identified staff members cannot 
be solely attributed to the feedback specialist. It is suggested that participants should have 
been asked whether they begun self-identifying incident reports in order to receive feedback 
from the feedback specialist.  
 
The number of incidents submitted by the study ward (regardless of whether the notifying staff 
member was identifiable or not), as a proportion of the total number of incidents for both 
wards, decreased in the first 2 months of the study period. It is theorised that this decrease 
could be attributed to the verbal query phase of the study, with staff members believing that 
acknowledging an incident via the verbal query process may have substituted incident reporting 
via IIMS. As such, this was addressed in the post-questionnaire, with a question specifically 
asking participants whether they reported in incident into IIMS after acknowledging the 
incident via the verbal querying process. Respectively, 84% of participants stated that they 
either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’, confirming that they did report an incident into IIMS after 
acknowledging the incident via the verbal querying process. Conversely, only 3 participants 
‘disagreed’ (12%). 
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 The figure below shows the number of incidents reported by the study ward and control ward 
on a monthly basis. It is noted that the 3-month study period, in which the verbal querying 
process and short cycle feedback was delivered, is highlighted.  
 
Figure 3: Number of incidents reported by study ward and control ward between November 
2011 and July 2012 
 
 
Decrease in Actual Incidents 
 
The number of incidents entered into the IIMS database for both the study ward and control 
ward were recorded on a monthly basis. Data collection of IIMS on a monthly basis also 
included a 5 month period prior to the actual study taking place, which was used to identify 
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baseline data, notwithstanding seasonal fluctuations. On average, there were 16 and 17 
incidents per month for the study and control wards, respectively. The number of incidents 
entered into the IIMS database was compared to the number of incidents observed, deduced 
during the verbal query phases of the study. The study ward demonstrated that there was a 
12% underreporting rate in April ([15 incidents reported - 17 incidents observed] / 17 incidents 
observed) and 25% underreporting rate in May ([12 incidents reported - 16 incidents observed] 
/ 16 incidents observed). Whilst this demonstrates that there was a decrease in incidents 
reported during this period, it is concerning that the underreporting rate increased in the 
second month of the study period. Therefore, this suggests that a decrease in actual incidents 
was not present, as there were a number of incidents that were unreported, as demonstrated 
in the following table: 
 
Table 24: Summary of number of incidents observed vs. number of incidents reported, 
including results of the verbal query process 
Ward Value Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Total 
St
ud
y 
Verbal Query Responses 137 173 88 398 
Observed Incidents 17 16 4 37 
Reported Incidents 15 12 24 51 
Variance 2 4 -20 -14 
Variance % 12% 25% -500% -38% 
Co
nt
ro
l 
Verbal Query Responses 9 0 0 9 
Observed Incidents 6 0 0 6 
Reported Incidents 27 24 13 64 
Variance -21 -24 -13 -58 
Variance % -350% N/A N/A -967% 
To
ta
l 
Verbal Query Responses 146 173 88 407 
Observed Incidents 23 16 4 43 
Reported Incidents 42 36 37 115 
Variance -19 -20 -33 -72 
Variance % -83% -125% -825% -167% 
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There was a disappointing response rate to the verbal querying process in the control ward; 
hence, which diminished the ability to compare the number of observed incidents to reported 
incidents. As a means to explain such a result, the weight of evidence seems to suggest that 
there was a lack of support from staff responsible to facilitate the verbal querying process (i.e. 
Clinical Support Officer and Nurse in-charge on shift), which was further exacerbated by limited 
interest by control ward staff to participate in the study. This is supported by 19 out of 45 
control ward staff completing the consent form to participate in the study, as opposed to 82% 
of study ward staff (45 / 55). Despite attempts to meet with Nurses in-charge on shift, including 
evening shifts, to explain the verbal querying process, interest remained minimal. Similarly, this 
was consistent with Nurses in-charge from the study ward, who also demonstrated reluctance 
to assist with the verbal querying process, particularly after-hours and weekends. AS such, 
there was an average of 155 verbal querying responses across April and May. The verbal 
querying responses decreased to 88 in June, which is attributed to a procedural issue, as the 
Clinical Support Officer of the study ward was on 2 weeks leave. Consequently, the number of 
incidents reported in June is higher than the incidents observed, which suggests over reporting 
of incidents; however, this conclusion is limited as the aforementioned procedural issue would 
have affected this result.  
 
Decrease in the Severity of Incidents 
 
The severity of incidents was measured by the Severity Assessment Code (SAC). The reporting 
staff member of an incident is capable of entering a SAC rating (initial SAC). Despite there being 
literature and reference documents from NSW Health key agencies (most notably the Clinical 
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Excellence Commission) it is debatable whether this material is referenced by the reporting 
staff member when assigning a SAC rating, or whether it is purely a subjective assessment. 
Nonetheless, the relevant manager or supervisor of the area in which the incident occurred 
must enter a SAC rating (actual SAC), which may differ to the initial SAC rating. 
 
The results from the pre-intervention questionnaire demonstrate that 88% of participants (N = 
33) either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that they understand the definition of an “adverse event”. 
Additionally, 85% of participants (N = 33) either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that they understand 
the definition of a “near miss”. It is noted that 22 out of 115 (19%) reported incidents during 
the study period had an initial SAC rating and an actual SAC rating.  
 
A review of SAC ratings for the study period confirmed a decrease in the severity of incidents 
for the study ward only. Both the study ward and control ward experienced a decrease in the 
severity of incidents in May, with no significant change in the number of incidents reported 
compared to the previous month. Overall, the average SAC for the study ward and control ward 
were 3.6 and 3.3, respectively.   
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Table 25: Summary of Severity Assessment Code (SAC) ratings for reported incidents during 
the extended study period (May – July) 
Ward Value Phase 1 
Phase 
2 
Phase 
3 
Phase 
4 
Phase 
5 Total Avg. 
Study 
Incidents with 
actual SAC 17 5 2 5 19 48   
Avg. actual SAC 3.8 3.2 4.0 3.6 3.6   3.6 
Control 
Incidents with 
actual SAC 17 14 7 6 21 65   
Avg. actual SAC 3.5 3.2 3.6 3.2 3.2   3.3 
Total 
Incidents with 
actual SAC 34 19 9 11 40 113   
Avg. actual SAC 3.6 3.2 3.8 3.4 3.4   3.5 
 
During the study period (April – June) there were 53% (61 / 115) of incidents that did not have 
an initial SAC rating, for the study ward and control ward. Additionally, there were 66% (76 / 
115) of incidents that did not have an actual SAC rating. This would suggest a further 
requirement to educate staff in relation to entering an appropriate initial SAC rating, as well as 
training for managers to assign an appropriate actual SAC rating. In relation to the latter, it is 
noted that this is a mandatory field in the management section of each incident in IIMS. 
Consequently, it is suggested that incidents that did not have an actual SAC rating did not have 
the management section of these incidents completed. This has implications on this study, as 
creating a mandatory field in the management section of each incident that indicates the 
provision of feedback to the reporting staff member may not ensure its completion, as the 
management section in its entirety can be ignored. This will be further explored in the 
discussion chapter of this dissertation.  The following table demonstrates the SAC ratings for all 
reported incidents during the study period: 
 
P a g e | 126 of 245 
Table 26: Summary of Severity Assessment Code (SAC) ratings for reported incidents during 
the study period (April – June) 
Ward SAC 1 2 3 4 Sub-Total Blank Average Total 
Study Initial 3 0 6 9 18 33 4.5 51 Actual 0 0 6 6 12 39 10.5 51 
Control Initial 3 3 23 7 36 28 16.7 64 Actual 0 1 17 9 27 37 15.2 64 
Total Initial 6 3 29 16 54 61 13.5 115 Actual 0 1 23 15 39 76 9.8 115 
 
For the purpose of differentiating between the severity of incidents (in Table 26), SAC ratings of 
1 and 2 were considered ‘serious’ and SAC ratings of 3 and 4 were considered ‘not serious’. The 
composition of incidents with an initial SAC rating for the study ward were 3 out of  18 incidents 
categorised as ‘serious’ and 15 out of 18 as  ‘not serious’. This is in contrast to the actual SAC 
ratings, which were 0 out of  12 as ‘serious’ and 12 out of 12 as ‘not serious’; although, 6 
incidents did not have an actual SAC rating, yet had an initial SAC rating. Conversely, the initial 
SAC rating for the control ward were 6 out of 36 as ‘serious’ and 30 out of  36 as ‘not serious’. 
The actual SAC ratings featured 1 out of 27 incidents considered ‘serious’ and 26 out of 27 
incidents considered ‘not serious’; although, as with the study ward, there is a discrepancy 
between the number of incidents that had an initial SAC rating (N = 36) and the number of 
incidents that had an actual SAC rating (N = 27). These results suggest that completion of data 
fields in the management tab, including the mandatory fields, are being ignored by the 
authorised staff members. This is emphasised in Table 27, which shows 40% of incidents during 
the 5-month study period did not have an actual SAC rating.  
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Table 27: Summary of Initial and Actual Severity Assessment Code (SAC) ratings for reported 
incidents during the extended study period (March – July) 
Ward Initial SAC 
Actual 
SAC 
Phase  
1 
Phase  
2 
Phase  
3 
Phase  
4 
Phase  
5 
Tota
l Average 
Study 
Yes No 0 3 2 8 0 13 2.6 
No Yes 7 3 0 4 11 25 5.0 
Yes Yes 10 2 2 1 8 23 4.6 
No No 0 7 8 11 0 26 5.2 
Total 17 15 12 24 19 87 17.4 
Control 
Yes No 0 6 9 4 0 19 3.8 
No Yes 4 6 2 2 8 22 4.4 
Yes Yes 13 8 5 4 13 43 8.6 
No No 0 7 8 3 0 18 3.6 
Total 17 27 24 13 21 102 20.4 
Total 
Yes No 0 9 11 12 0 32 6.4 
No Yes 11 9 2 6 19 47 9.4 
Yes Yes 23 10 7 5 21 66 13.2 
No No 0 14 16 14 0 44 8.8 
Total 34 42 36 37 40 189 37.8 
 
The impact of this study has demonstrated that there has been a small improvement on the 
severity of incidents. As per Table 25, the combined result of the study and control wards show 
that the average actual SAC rating was 3.6 in March, with this changing to 3.2 in April, indicating 
the presence of additional serious incidents. However, this improved to 3.8 in May, which was 
the least serious actual SAC rating in the study period. Finally, the actual SAC rating increased to 
3.4 for June and July. Whilst the seasonal impact of winter is noted, it is maintained that the 
learning outcomes arising out of incident reporting should have facilitated patient safety 
awareness and thus neutralised any impact of the higher demand winter period, including the 
susceptibility of an increased number of serious incidents as a result. 
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CHAPTER V: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS & PRELIMINARY 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Introduction and Rationale for Study 2 
 
The outcomes and conclusions from Study 1 demonstrated that short cycle feedback to an 
incident reporting staff member had formative learning benefits that could be incorporated 
into everyday practice; however, several organisational factors throughout the study period 
contributed to the equivocal results of Study 1. The results from Study 1 were reviewed to 
determine whether the short cycle feedback system developed actually achieved the desired 
changes in day-to-day practice, which being improvements in patient safety and outcomes. The 
response of staff members from the study ward, who received short cycle feedback from the 
feedback specialist, demonstrated that learning outcomes were achieved, which could translate 
to practical improvements for the individual and organisation. However, the mechanism to test 
whether the learning outcome was in fact incorporated within everyday practice and 
subsequently produced improvements in patient safety and outcomes remained equivocal. It is 
suggested that the duration of the study was shorter than the period of time required to 
incorporate lessons learnt from short cycle feedback into everyday practice and the feedback 
recipient to be presented a situation in which these lessons could be applied and measured. 
Another metric used to substantiate whether improvements were achieved was a reduction in 
the severity of incidents within the study ward following the short cycle feedback intervention 
phase of the study. Incident severity was measured by the actual SAC rating, which decreased 
in the short cycle intervention phase of the study for both the study and control wards, when 
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compared to preceding phases. Furthermore, incident severity increased marginally in the 
phases following the short cycle intervention phase. Organisational factors that limited 
conclusions drawn from these results were the low proportion of incidents that had an actual 
SAC rating assigned compared to the total number of incidents and the low number of study 
participants that received the short cycle feedback – both factors are explored further in this 
Chapter. Nonetheless, it was determined that the short cycle feedback intervention had a 
positive impact upon the clinical practice of those staff members in receipt of it, which also 
encouraged incident reporting behaviour – a conclusion supported by study ward participants’ 
positive response within the post-intervention questionnaire. To validate and refine the 
preliminary conclusions from Study 1 and to explore potential adjustments to the study design 
to avoid the organisational factors that contributed to the equivocal results it was determined 
that a focus group be conducted, which featured senior executive management staff members 
from the Local Health District that have a high level of knowledge and expertise in relation to 
organisational change process and practical implementation within a hospital setting. Thus, 
Study 2 was formulated to validate and test the preliminary conclusions from Study 1 and to 
extract any additional insights that may enhance the understanding of the subject matter even 
further. This chapter aims to examine the preliminary conclusions from Study 1 and explain the 
rationale for a focus group in Study 2, which was used to validate the equivocal results and 
explore further insights.  
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Organisational Factors that Affected the Short Cycle Feedback Model 
 
Short cycle feedback was determined to have a positive influence on staff satisfaction, evident 
by the improvement in results from the pre-intervention questionnaire to the post-intervention 
questionnaire. Of the former, 70% of responses were considered ‘negative’, out of 27 
participants. In contrast, the post-intervention questionnaire featured 72% ‘positive’ responses, 
out of 32 participants. In relation to the short cycle feedback intervention it is worth noting that 
there were 9 occasions of feedback provided by the feedback specialist to staff within the study 
ward. By comparison, it is noted that there were 45 consenting participants from the study 
ward that were able to submit a self-identified incident report and receive feedback from the 
feedback specialist.  Due to the anonymity of the post-intervention questionnaire, it was not 
possible to measure the satisfaction of a staff member from the study ward that received short 
cycle feedback from the feedback specialist. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
majority of post-intervention questionnaire participants from the study ward (N = 31) did not 
receive the short cycle feedback. Regardless, the post-intervention questionnaire results 
demonstrated that there was an overwhelming positive response to staff satisfaction in relation 
to the feedback provided to them following submission of an incident report. It is suggested 
that whilst study ward staff may not have personally received feedback from the feedback 
specialist, the observation of feedback provided by the feedback specialist, or the sharing of 
such an experience amongst colleagues could have contributed to the positive response 
regarding staff satisfaction.  
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As mentioned above, there were 9 occasions when feedback was provided to a self-identified 
reporting staff member, following submission of a reporting into the incident reporting system 
(i.e. IIMS). It was determined that 7 out of 9 occasions had a tangible organisational learning 
component, evidenced by the data recorded by the feedback specialist, which could be utilised 
within the everyday patient care environment. Whilst not actively measured per the feedback 
specialist report template, the feedback specialist documented the feedback recipient’s 
response, which anecdotally demonstrated their appreciation of feedback provided and intent 
to incorporate lessons learnt into their daily patient care practices. Furthermore, all 9 recipients 
expressed their satisfaction with the feedback provided, with some stating that it encouraged 
critical thinking and reflection on their individual practices. As mentioned earlier in this 
Chapter, the anonymity of the post-intervention questionnaire did not enable further 
investigation into the individual staff member’s satisfaction that had received short cycle 
feedback from the feedback specialist. It is possible that the feedback specialist could measure 
the individual staff member’s staff satisfaction upon delivery of the short cycle feedback, using 
the Likert scale employed in the pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaires. A 
limitation of this adjustment to the study design could be the “Halo Effect” (Leuthesser, Kohli & 
Harich 1995), due to the immediacy between feedback provided and satisfaction measured, 
which could skew the individual staff member’s staff perceived satisfaction regarding the short 
cycle feedback intervention. Additionally, it is not advisable that the feedback specialist both 
provides feedback and measures the satisfaction regarding this feedback, as the staff member’s 
opinion must be performed in a confidential manner to encourage the individual staff member 
to provide an honest opinion.  
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 It was believed that the organisational learning component of feedback, provided by the 
feedback specialist, would be determined by a reduction in the severity of incidents from the 
study ward, measured by the average actual SAC rating. It is noted that a review of actual SAC 
ratings throughout the study period demonstrated that the average actual SAC rating for 
reported incidents within the study ward decreased from 3.2 in phase 2 to 4.0 in phase 3. 
Subsequently, the average actual SAC rating increased fractionally to 3.6 in phases 4 and 5. 
However, the preliminary conclusion that short cycle feedback resulted in organisational 
learning evidenced by a decrease in incident severity remained equivocal. It is suggested that 
there was sufficient evidence from the delivery of short cycle feedback by the feedback 
specialist to support that organisational learning was present; however, there was insufficient 
evidence to suggest that this organisational learning translated to improved patient safety. 
Arguably, there may have been operational improvements that were derived from the short 
cycle feedback intervention; which would suggest that the average actual SAC rating may have 
been a narrow metric regarding the measurement of practical benefits from feedback provided. 
As such, a potential adjustment to the study design could be to incorporate a question within 
the post-intervention questionnaire that explicitly asks the participant whether they received 
short cycle feedback from the feedback specialist and incorporated any organisational learning 
into their daily practices. This additional method may provide greater context, as organisational 
learning from short cycle feedback may be valid but not applicable to subsequent reported 
incidents; hence, it would appear that organisational learning is not being applied within the 
practical setting, whereas it is actually the nature of the incident that determines whether 
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lessons learnt from previous experiences can be applied. Furthermore, should a larger 
replication study be initiated, such questions could be explored in a follow-up questionnaire, 
which would afford insight into the stability of organisational learning and whether the initial 
feedback provided still had relevance in an operational context. It is acknowledged that the 
study period of the larger replication study would have to be expanded to support any follow-
up questionnaires beyond the post-intervention questionnaire featured in Study 1.  
 
The low completion rate of actual SAC rating scores for incidents within the study ward limited 
the preliminary conclusion that the short cycle feedback intervention had produced 
improvements in patient safety and outcomes.  The Nursing Unit Manager is the primary staff 
member responsible for managing reported incidents, including the allocation of actual SAC 
ratings for each incident. For example, for the study ward, there were only 5 out of 24 incidents 
in phase 4 that had an actual SAC rating. In contrast, there was 19 out of 19 completion rate 
regarding actual SAC ratings for the study ward in phase 5. It is noted that the Nursing Unit 
Manager for the study ward was available throughout the entire study period and there were 
no obvious operational constraints that would have affected the Nursing Unit Manager’s ability 
to manage incidents appropriately, specifically allocating actual SAC ratings. Furthermore, the 
allocation of actual SAC ratings should not be influenced by the number of incidents reported. 
In circumstances when the number of incidents reported were higher than average the Nursing 
Unit Manager could call upon additional resources that typically exist within a Hospital setting, 
such as a Patient Safety Manager, Operational Nurse Manager of Director of Nursing and 
Midwifery. The Nursing Unit Manager’s non-compliance with allocating actual SAC ratings 
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suggests that an additional metric would have strengthened the method for verifying the 
impact of short cycle feedback on organisational practices and whether this resulted in 
improved patient outcomes. Considering that the actual SAC rating is ultimately determined by 
a single person, there remains an element of subjectivity that is influenced by the extent of the 
Nursing Unit Manager’s investigation into an incident, which could be either more or less than 
the feedback specialist’s own investigation, leading up to the point in which short cycle 
feedback was provided to the reporting staff member. Hence, in hindsight, a follow-up 
questionnaire with the staff members that received short cycle feedback may be an additional 
metric that could determine whether feedback was translated into improved organisational 
practices; however, the timeframes allocated to Study 1 would not have been conducive to 
such a follow-up questionnaire – although, this could be incorporated into a larger, replication 
study; as alluded to earlier in this Chapter.    
 
The short cycle feedback model was not executed as expected, due to operational constraints 
of the feedback specialist. Part of the study’s objectives was to provide feedback within a 72 
hour timeframe from the point a staff member submitted an incident report to when the 
feedback specialist provides feedback. The results showed that 4 out of 9 recipients received 
feedback within this timeframe. The impediments in relation to the feedback not being 
provided within the designated timeframe were due to the: 
i) Absence of feedback specialist weekend coverage; 
ii) Reporting staff members on evening shifts; 
iii) Reporting staff members on leave (i.e. sick leave, annual leave); and, 
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iv) Priority of work tasks by the feedback specialist, related to the feedback specialist’s 
substantive role. 
 
For 3 incidents that did not meet the 72 hour timeframe, it is noted that the incident was 
submitted on a Thursday. Due to the feedback specialist performing work tasks off-site on a 
Friday, per their substantive role, and no feedback specialist coverage on a weekend, the 
feedback specialist was unable to provide feedback until returning to the workplace on the 
following Monday. As the feedback specialist was limited in relation to providing feedback on a 
Friday, incident reports submitted on a Thursday were unable to meet the 72 hour timeframe. 
For 2 other incidents the reporting staff member was either on days off or was on sick leave.  
The timeframe in which feedback was provided was 7 days and 11 days, respectively. There was 
1 incident that feedback was delayed by 25 days, due to an omission by the feedback specialist; 
which was immediately rectified (and feedback provided) once the feedback specialist detected 
this omission.  
 
The results pertaining to the 72 hour short cycle timeframe were deemed equivocal due to the 
absence of any tangible contrast between recipients that received feedback within this 
timeframe and those that did not. Hence, it was not possible to determine whether 72 hours 
was the optimal time frame for the provision of short cycle feedback. Furthermore, it was 
unclear whether the recipient’s perception that the utility of feedback provided was reduced 
due to the receipt of feedback exceeding the 72 hour timeframe. This demonstrates that 
further considerations must be made to precisely quantify the timeframe in which the utility of 
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feedback dissipates, in order to ensure feedback is provided within this timeframe. Hence, it 
was determined that recipients of feedback provided by the feedback specialist were satisfied 
that they were receiving personalised, formative feedback at all. This may be suggestive that 
recipients were within an operational environment that did not foster a positive learning 
experience from incident reports; hence, participants had a low threshold for expecting 
feedback from an incident report – this suggestion is supported by the pre-intervention 
questionnaire responses from study ward participants. However, the equivocal findings 
regarding the selection of 72 hours as the definitive short cycle timeframe would improve from 
further refinement should a replication study be undertaken.  
 
Equivocal Results from Study 1 
 
The findings of Study 1 demonstrated that short cycle feedback has a positive influence on the 
incident reporting culture of an organisation. This feedback, provided by a feedback specialist, 
was measured with unanimous support and positive staff satisfaction from feedback recipients. 
However, whilst it was encouraging that feedback recipients acknowledged the educational 
merit of feedback provided, it was limited to conclude that lessons learnt were not only applied 
within the operational environment, but also manifested by a decreased incident severity, 
measured by a reduction in the average actual SAC rating. Separate to this was the equivocal 
results produced in relation to whether the 72 hour short cycle timeframe had any impact on 
the utility of feedback provided by the feedback specialist. It is maintained that feedback must 
be provided within a short period of time to a self-identified reporting staff member following 
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submission of an incident report; however, it is equivocal whether this timeframe should be the 
72 hour period used within Study 1.  
 
The equivocal results produced from Study 1 were affected by the lack of participation, 
particularly from the control ward, in relation to the verbal query process used to quantify the 
underreporting phenomenon. Initially, it was believed that the short cycle feedback model 
would encourage incident reporting behaviour and mitigate barriers to incident reporting, 
perceived by participants and evidenced by the pre-intervention questionnaire results. 
However, the lack of data regarding observed incidents, which were compared to submitted 
incidents, was insufficient to support the conclusion that the short cycle feedback model 
encouraged incident reporting. Nonetheless, this conclusion was more applicable for the study 
ward, as more data regarding observed incidents was retrieved, compared to the control ward.   
 
It was determined that the feasibility and implementation of the short cycle feedback model 
would benefit from a review by the focus group, due to the focus group participants’ 
experience with implementing significant organisational change processes. Due to the relatively 
small-scale implementation of the short cycle feedback model, it was necessary for the short 
cycle feedback model to be tested in a larger setting, for a potential roll-out across the Local 
Health District and beyond. It was initially theorised that roll-out within a larger setting was 
necessary to ensure the theoretical and equivocal benefits fulfilled anticipated wide-spanning 
organisational improvements. Thus, to ensure the short cycle feedback model was critiqued in 
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preparation for a large-scale roll-out, rigour testing from the focus group was deemed a 
suitable process to achieve the further refinement the model required.  
 
Findings from Study 1 and Organisational Learning 
 
Within the context of this study, single-loop learning theory supports the premise that a 
learning outcome will be achieved by the recipient of short cycle feedback. Argyris and Schon 
(1978) define single-loop learning as the improvement of performance, in accordance with 
existing values and norms, achieved by error-detection, review and remediation. Featured 
throughout organisational learning theory literature is the analogous description of a 
thermostat to describe single-loop learning. The thermostat is bound by specific thresholds to 
maintain the temperature of a defined space. Should the temperature of this space either 
increase or decrease beyond the specific thresholds then the thermostat will make the 
necessary adjustments to return the temperature to within the accepted levels. Hence, a single 
feedback loop is activated upon detection of non-threshold temperatures, which triggers the 
thermostat to intervene until the accepted threshold temperatures are achieved.  
 
Respective of organisational learning literature (Argyris & Schon 1978; Yang 2007) the 
individual in receipt of short cycle feedback is considered to be an organisational agent. The 
achievement of single-loop learning by the organisational agent would translate into 
organisational learning upon dissemination of such learning outcomes. The method in which 
learning outcomes are shared to other organisational agents within the organisation can be 
achieved by vicarious learning. Miner and Mezias (1996) describes vicarious learning as the 
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observation of learning achieved by others and incorporating successful routines into their own 
practices. The observation of short cycle feedback by organisational agents could support 
individual improvements via vicarious learning. Additionally, such an observation could alter the 
perceived utility of incident reporting systems and could motivate organisational agents to 
engage in incident reporting practices (Lawton & Parker 2002). Therefore, short cycle feedback 
can influence changes in the attitudes, knowledge and behaviour of organisational agents, 
which is evidenced by an increase in incident reporting rates. Respectively, this study aims to 
quantify the underreporting phenomenon; specifically, the proportion of submitted incident 
reports in which the author self-identifies or elects to be anonymous. If the condition of 
receiving short cycle feedback is to nominate the former, then it is reasonable to expect that 
organisational agents will both submit incidents reports and identify themselves. Such a change 
in behaviour is expected due to the incentive that single-loop learning will be a tangible 
outcome that can be applied to their organisational agent’s individual clinical practices.   
 
The impact of single-loop learning theory on participants’ attitudes, knowledge and behaviour 
regarding incident reporting is measured by a comparison between the pre-intervention and 
post-intervention questionnaires. As evidenced within the literature, staff within an acute care 
setting have the perception that incident reporting is a burden and any benefit derived from 
such reports is scant. It is theorised that short cycle feedback holds value in relation to single-
loop learning for both the organisation and organisational agents. The absence of a defined 
procedure in relation to the provision of feedback from incident reporting throughout the NSW 
public health system has contributed to the concept of this research. In order to achieve single-
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loop learning, this researcher has defined the accepted norms and values in relation to the 
short cycle feedback system; those being, that feedback is provided by a feedback specialist 
within a 72 hour timeframe, directly to the self-identified author of an incident report. Whilst 
the primary objective is to achieve an improvement in clinical practice, facilitated by single-loop 
learning, other learning mechanisms can be achieved.  
 
Double-loop learning results in the development of new norms and values that would 
otherwise be static within single-loop learning. Fiol and Lyles (1985) affirm this higher level of 
learning is essential to an organisation’s long-term survival, particularly to develop new 
strategies and solutions. It is anticipated that double-loop learning will be featured throughout 
this research due to the importance of defining what learning outcomes are expected by the 
organisation. It is reasonable to accept that the majority, if not the entirety, of incident reports 
have a negative connotation, which ultimately affects the patient. Specifically, incident 
reporting is the method in which acute care facilities capture occurrences when clinical 
practices deviate from expected patient treatment protocols. Thus, double-loop learning 
enables the organisation to examine whether the norms and values which form the foundation 
of organisational learning from incident reporting systems are conducive to the organisation’s 
strategies and actions (Argyris & Schon 1978). Particularly important for an industry such as 
healthcare, a healthcare organisation must support a learning environment that facilitates 
continuous or incremental improvements (Levitt & March 1988). As explored by this research, 
ongoing education is achieved via systems such as the short cycle feedback loop. If single-loop 
learning enables organisational inquiry that facilitates correction of error, fostering 
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improvement, then double-loop learning supports the organisation’s ability to examine and 
modify the parameters that govern such learning practices (Argyris & Schon 1978). This is an 
imperative element of the organisation’s strategy to achieve effectiveness and performance 
objectives.  
 
Triple-loop learning or deuterolearning (Argyris & Schon 1978) emphasises the structures that 
compose the organisation’s systems of inquiry. Essentially, the organisation’s “learning how to 
learn” capability is determined by these structures (Wang & Ahmed 2003). Such structures can 
take the form of communication mechanisms, technology and procedures (Argyris & Schon 
1978); all of which can either facilitate or inhibit the organisation’s potential to learn and how 
to channel such learning into operational improvements. The short cycle feedback system 
within this research can facilitate triple-loop learning, evidenced by the organisation’s ability to 
evaluate the effectiveness of incident reporting systems as a means to support organisational 
learning and whether enhancements to patient safety practices emerge from such lessons. 
Asides from individual-level learning, lessons produced from the short cycle feedback system 
can manifest into patient safety initiatives and programs that further enhance the learning 
capacity of the organisation. Quite simply, triple-loop learning maximises knowledge regarding 
how to convert inquiries into organisational learning. Within the context of this research, the 
mass collection of incidents from incident reporting systems can be transformed into learning 
outcomes; an objective of this study being how effective the short cycle feedback system can 
achieve organisational learning. 
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The fundamental premise of this research is that short cycle feedback will produce changes in 
practices and outcomes regarding clinical practices and incident reporting, facilitated by single-
loop learning. Furthermore, this single-loop learning will result in improved incident rates, 
decrease actual incidents and decrease the severity of incidents, within the context of an acute 
healthcare setting. Single-loop learning should facilitate improvements in clinical practice and 
outcomes as a result of the learning process that occurs via short cycle feedback. Hence, the 
learning process that precedes single-loop learning and follows the provision of short cycle 
feedback enables the recipient personalised insights into their individual clinical practices, with 
the objective being to identify and implement improvements (Anderson et al. 2013). This 
individual-level learning can be disseminated across the organisation, which would satisfy 
Argyris and Schon’s (1978) definition of organisational learning. 
 
Preliminary Conclusions from Study 1 
 
The short cycle feedback model produced sufficient data and evidence to warrant large-scale 
implementation into organisational systems across the Local Health District, in which the study 
Hospital is within. It is believed that large-scale implementation would mitigate the equivocal 
results produced from Study 1 and further expand upon the positive staff satisfaction derived 
from the post-intervention questionnaire. Respective of the equivocal results from Study 1, 
explored throughout this Chapter, the short cycle feedback model did not unequivocally justify 
the use of a 72 hour period in which short cycle feedback must be provided to a staff member. 
This is evidenced as the utility of feedback was not compromised in instances when feedback 
provided exceeded the 72 hour period. However, this researcher maintains that a time period 
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must be imposed to ensure educational benefits derived from the feedback provided remains 
valid and to overcome barriers that incident reporting is a meaningless exercise with no benefit 
to the reporting individual. Additionally, it cannot be concluded that feedback provided by the 
feedback specialist produced tangible organisational and patient safety improvements, as a 
result of the equivocal data produced from Study 1. This is due to such improvements being 
observable over a period of time that exceeded the timeframes of Study 1, as well as the 
inconclusiveness regarding decreased incident severity within the study ward. Again, it is the 
belief of this researcher that a larger replication study, conducted over an extended period of 
time compared to Study 1, would demonstrate organisational improvements as a result of 
feedback provided via the short cycle feedback model.  
 
The issues experienced in Study 1 can be resolved in anticipation of a large-scale replication 
study, which can generate the outcomes sought from the short cycle feedback model. Several 
preliminary conclusions were derived from Study 1, which are: 
i) Conduct a larger replication study via either: multiple wards within the study hospital; 
within a larger hospital or across multiple hospitals. 
ii) Ensure the larger replication study has a larger representation of medical staff, either 
via specific promotional activities or enforced participation via senior management 
directive. 
iii) Recruit multiple senior nurses to perform the duties of the feedback specialist to ensure 
24 / 7 coverage of the feedback specialist role, to support the provision of short cycle 
feedback particularly during after-hours and weekends. 
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iv) Expand the verbal query process to encompass a variety of modalities (i.e. self-initiated 
and electronic). 
v) Consider offering the pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaires 
electronically. 
 
 Through consultation between the researcher and the researcher’s supervisor, it was 
determined that these preliminary conclusions would benefit from further refinement, which 
would enhance the implementation of a larger replication study and respective organisational 
outcomes. Therefore, it was decided that additional research was required prior to the larger 
roll-out of the feedback model. As such, a focus group was assembled with the operational 
authorisation of the Local Health District’s Chief Executive, which enabled the researcher to 
validate the preliminary conclusions and explore additional practical insights offered by focus 
group participants.  
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CHAPTER VI: SECOND PHASE OF RESEARCH – FOCUS 
GROUP 
 
The results produced from Study 1 were determined to be equivocal, due to organisational 
factors that occurred throughout the study period. As such, the preliminary conclusions derived 
from the equivocal results required further critical reflection. A focus group was assembled of 
senior health service managers and executives who focused on the applicability of Study 1 and 
the preliminary conclusions detailed in the previous chapter. The focus group was requested to 
explore the opportunities and barriers associated with the practical implementation of these 
preliminary conclusions within a hospital setting. Additionally, an objective of the focus group 
was to enable the researcher to substantiate whether the findings and preliminary conclusions 
were feasible in relation to achieving sustained practical implementation of the short cycle 
feedback model within a hospital setting and if any new conclusions should be considered.  
 
Participants and Design 
 
The selection process and inclusion criteria in relation to the participants of the focus group 
were senior staff members within South Western Sydney Local Health District (SWSLHD - the 
District within which the case hospital rests). The participants had 10 years or more experience 
in health administration and were in senior positions that carried high-level decision making 
responsibility, which could determine whether the recommendations arising from this study 
should be implemented throughout the SWSLHD. The participants also had to have direct 
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decision power (at various levels) in relation to possible implementation of the 
recommendations. As such, the focus group participants included:  
 
i) Chief Executive, SWSLHD 
ii) Director of Operations, SWSLHD 
iii) Director of Nursing and Midwifery Services, SWSLHD 
iv) Director of Clinical Governance, SWSLHD 
v) Director of Human Resources, SWSLHD 
vi) General Manager, Bankstown Hospital 
vii) Patient Safety Manager, SWSLHD 
viii) IIMS Surveillance Officer, SWSLHD 
ix) Manager of Clinical and Business Service, SWSLHD 
x) Director of Nursing and Midwifery, Fairfield Hospital 
 
The focus group was conducted in order to identify what opportunities existed from the study, 
how to overcome barriers encountered during the course of the study and to determine 
whether implementation of the preliminary conclusions arising from Study 1 were feasible.  
 
Due to the focus group discussion being recorded and transcribed, which would be 
incorporated into the results of this study, each focus group participant was required to 
complete a consent form, authorising their participation in the focus group. An example of the 
consent form completed by each participant is included in Appendix 5.  
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An invitation from the Chief Executive, on behalf of the researcher, was sent to each focus 
group participant, specifically inviting them to participate (Appendix 13). A briefing note was 
attached to this invitation, which summarised the methodology, preliminary findings and 
recommendations of the study (Appendix 14). An hour was allocated to the Focus Group 
session and only one session was scheduled.  
 
The focus group was conducted co-jointly by the researcher and the researcher’s supervisor. 
The discussion that took place during the focus group was recorded by an electronic recording 
device. The focus group participants were advised of this in the invitation from the Chief 
Executive, which was reiterated prior to the commencement of the focus group. While the 
participants of the focus group have been identified by their consent in order to underline the 
validity of the results, transcription did offer a level of anonymity. The recorded discussion was 
professionally transcribed by an independent transcription service. For the purposes of 
confidentiality the participants’ identity could not be discerned from the recording, which 
ensured any reference to the focus group discussion in this doctoral thesis could not be 
attributed to an individual participant.  
 
Analysis of Focus Group Data 
 
A thematic analysis was undertaken by the researcher, based upon the transcription of the 
focus group discussion. An inter-rater reliability test was performed between the researcher 
and researcher’s supervisor. It is noted that this test was also utilised in relation to the free-text 
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responses from the pre-intervention questionnaire. Specific nodes were defined with respect to 
the opportunities and barriers of the recommendations, which were explored by the focus 
group participants. In total there were 33 nodes derived from the focus group discussion. 
Consequently, there were 8 themes identified that related to the opportunities and barriers of 
the recommendations, with respect to the context of each node. The 8 themes are identified 
are all mutually exclusive of each other.  
The 8 themes identified were: 
i) Applicability of recommendations throughout LHD 
ii) Duplication of effort 
iii) Further resources required 
iv) Improvement in incident reporting culture 
v) Issue of timeframes re: provision of feedback 
vi) Issue of useful / practical feedback 
vii) Lack of ownership re: incident reporting 
viii) Opportunity for greater staff engagement 
 
A summary of the thematic analysis is as follows: 
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Table 28: Summary of thematic analysis performed in relation to the focus group discussion 
Theme No. of nodes 
(Researcher) 
No. of nodes 
(Supervisor) 
Percentage 
of matches 
Applicability of recommendations throughout LHD 4 6 66.67 
Duplication of effort 2 2 100.00 
Further resources required 4 3 75.00 
Improvement in incident reporting culture 3 2 66.67 
Issue of timeframes re: provision of feedback 5 5 100.00 
Issue of useful / practical feedback 3 5 60.00 
Lack of ownership re: incident reporting 6 6 100.00 
Opportunity for greater staff engagement 6 4 66.67 
Total 33 33  
True 27 81.82 
False 6 18.18 
 
One of the most discussed themes by participants was “opportunity for greater staff 
engagement”. It is argued that this theme identified a potential benefit of broader 
implementation across multiple hospitals throughout the Local Health District, which was a 
recommendation supported via the focus group discussion. Similarly, the focus group 
participants recognised that the acknowledgement of receipt, in relation to the submission of 
an incident report, to the reporting staff member promoted staff satisfaction, regardless 
whether this acknowledgement featured a practical learning outcome based on the nature of 
the incident reported. Additionally, it was unanimously agreed that an expansion of modalities, 
with reference to the delivery of feedback and the verbal query process, would be more 
convenient and appealing for staff, enhancing overall staff participation. The focus group 
participants recognised that some results from the study were equivocal; however, it was 
accepted that even in the absence of robust empirical evidence, the objective of the study 
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should be adopted as it was a sensible initiative, for the benefit of an improved incident 
reporting culture.  
 
Revised Recommendations  
 
The focus group discussion enabled further refinement of the preliminary recommendations, 
particularly in reference to the applicability throughout larger Hospitals within SWSLHD. As 
such, the focus group participants raised concern about variations regarding incident reporting 
culture at Hospital and Ward level. There was agreement that incident reporting culture at a 
Hospital level should be consistent throughout the organisation; however, this may not be the 
case across several Wards / Departments. A theory presented by the focus group participants 
was that due to the variability in specialties, and potentially nature of incidents, across multiple 
Wards / Departments the incident reporting practices may differ. For example, falls and 
pressure ulcers were the most reported type of incident in both the study and control wards. It 
is argued that this is a reflection of the acuity of patients, who are admitted into these wards. 
Thus, it is reasonable to expect that falls are far prevalent in elderly, frail patients compared to 
less mobility-compromised patients seen in a Maternity Ward. Nonetheless, it was accepted by 
the focus group participants that a further study conducted across a variety of specialties, as 
well as in larger Hospitals within the Local Health District would strengthen the versatility and 
applicability of the study.  
 
The 72 hour timeframe used as the time period in which feedback was provided to the 
reporting staff member via the feedback specialist was debated thoroughly by the focus group 
P a g e | 151 of 245 
participants. The researcher advised the focus group participants that the 72 hour timeframe 
was based upon the feedback specialist’s ability to provide feedback that was entered on a 
weekend, since the feedback specialist worked during business hours on weekdays only. Whilst 
the 72 hour timeframe was accepted for the purposes of the study the focus group participants 
questioned the validity of this timeframe and whether the timeliness of feedback directly 
contributed to its effectiveness. Furthermore, it was determined that feedback arising from 
serious incidents (i.e. incidents with a Severity Assessment Code of 1 or 2) may be limited due 
to standard investigation processes unable to be completed within 72 hours. Potentially, the 
reporting staff member may become dissatisfied with the limited feedback provided, 
particularly if this feedback does not contain any educational benefit. As such, the focus group 
participants commented that feedback may be withheld, irrespective of timeliness of feedback, 
until appropriate investigations are completed to ensure the feedback provided contains 
educational and developmental value. Undoubtedly, the more serious incidents demand 
significant investigation, which takes time to complete. Conversely, other contributors in the 
focus group stated that the acknowledgement of the incident and provision of any preliminary 
feedback would positively contribute to the satisfaction of the reporting staff member; and 
hence, improve incident reporting culture.  
 
The debate surrounding the validity of the 72 hour timeframe gave credence to future research 
regarding the provision of feedback within differing timeframes and what effect this has on 
effectiveness and staff satisfaction. A number of focus group participants questioned whether 
educational benefits from feedback provided to a reporting staff member would still be 
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meaningful within 72 hours versus a fortnight, for example. It was acknowledged that the 
provision of feedback within SWSLHD was poor. It can be argued that due to the absence of 
feedback staff have become accustomed to receiving no feedback from an incident they have 
reported, which is indicative of poor incident reporting culture, specifically in relation to the 
learning opportunities arising from reported incidents. Therefore, staff satisfaction would 
improve based on the provision of feedback, as the baseline in which to compare to is no 
feedback is provided at all. Herein is an opportunity to further explore the correlation between 
timeliness of feedback provided and effectiveness of feedback; the latter primarily being a 
subjective opinion from the reporting staff member. Additionally, the satisfaction of the staff 
member can be broken into 2 categories: satisfaction regarding the receipt of feedback and 
satisfaction on the quality of feedback provided. These 2 categories of staff satisfaction would 
be mutually exclusive should the link between timeliness and effectiveness of feedback be 
demonstrated by future research.   
 
The focus group participants discussed the effectiveness of the feedback provided and whether 
there was a demonstrated learning outcome. An objective of the study is the provision of 
formative feedback to the reporting staff member, in order to achieve a learning outcome for 
the individual, which may improve their knowledge and would have flow-on improvements 
regarding patient safety and care. It is reasonable to conclude that incident reports are related 
to human error, typically performed by a member of the multidisciplinary team. This conclusion 
is evident from the thematic analysis undertaken in relation to the free-text questions from the 
pre-intervention questionnaire. As such, focus group participants commented that feedback 
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may be provided to the reporting staff member, whereas the reporting staff member may not 
have directly contributed to an adverse outcome, documented by a reported incident. For 
example, it was noted that pressure ulcers may be a pre-existing condition in elderly patients 
that have arrived to Hospital from a nursing home. Therefore, once observed, a staff member is 
dutifully bound to report the incident; however, feedback would be restricted to management 
of a pressure ulcer, rather than its prevention, considering the pressure ulcer did not originate 
in the Hospital setting, due to suboptimal care provided by the reporting staff member. A focus 
group participant commented that nursing staff often report such incidents to absolve 
themselves of any blame that the adverse outcome (in this instance a pressure ulcer) is 
attributable to their performance (or lack thereof). Furthermore, this focus group participant 
emphasised that feedback to the reporting staff member in the form of assurance that the staff 
member did not contribute to the adverse outcome could be equally as effective if there was a 
learning opportunity in response to human error. The focus group participants queried whether 
staff members were able to explain to the feedback specialist that the nature of the incident 
reported was not individually attributable to them. This was observed during the feedback 
phase, given that the feedback specialist engaged with the staff member, seeking their 
feedback in order to collaboratively identify a satisfactory learning opportunity. This establishes 
a two-way dialogue that requires critical thinking from the reporting staff member. It is 
believed that collaboration between feedback specialist and reporting staff member may 
overcome any challenges in relation to the latter accepting the feedback being offered. 
Additionally, this may assist in avoiding any punitive interpretation of the feedback being 
offered, particularly for junior staff members reporting the incident, respective of the feedback 
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specialist’s seniority. The focus group welcomed the collaborative environment in which the 
feedback was provided; however, debate remained in relation to the existence of 
organisational learning in the absence of an error by the reporting staff member. It is argued 
that feedback can still exist in the absence of organisational learning, despite this being the 
primary objective of the study, as feedback itself can effectively enhance staff satisfaction and 
foster a positive incident reporting culture (Fleming 2005). This is unanimously supported by 
the reporting staff members who welcomed the feedback provided during the feedback phase 
of the study. 
 
It is acknowledged that the feedback provided to the reporting staff member should be 
relevant and afford a learning opportunity that can improve their job performance; ultimately 
resulting in an overall reduction in reported incidents due to improved patient safety 
awareness. Ensuring the effectiveness and quality of feedback is meaningful to the reporting 
staff member is influenced by the nature of the incident reported and the aptitude of the 
feedback specialist. The focus group participants discussed how well feedback would have been 
received if the reporting staff member was a medical officer, given that the feedback specialist 
was a nurse. A focus group participant emphasised that senior clinicians respond more 
effectively to collegiate feedback. As such, it was suggested that medical involvement, in the 
form of a feedback specialist, could create an opportunity for further staff engagement, 
particularly from medical officers.  This raises the issue that the feedback specialist may provide 
feedback to reporting staff members that are either more senior or in a different discipline; 
particularly that more serious incidents would potentially require more senior staff 
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involvement. The suggestion that feedback should be provided to reporting staff members by a 
feedback specialist from the same staffing discipline is potentially contentious. It is important 
that the feedback specialist has sufficient experience and skills to provide formative feedback 
and identify learning opportunities from incident reports. Organisational learning from incident 
reporting could be jeopardised if the nature of the incident reported exceeds the feedback 
specialist’s knowledge and experience. Furthermore, it would be counterintuitive if the 
feedback specialist provided feedback that was considered in opposition to best practice, which 
would be a detriment to the reporting staff member. Thus, to ensure feedback provided 
contains learning opportunities, regardless of the complexity of the incident, a variety of 
feedback specialists may be warranted. Yet, there is doubt that adherence to feedback 
provision timeframes (i.e. 72 hours) can be achieved unless feedback specialists of all staff 
disciplines are available to respond. Alternatively, feedback could be provided in multiple 
stages, as the initial engagement with the reporting staff member could simply be 
acknowledgement of the incident, which would be independent on the skills or profession of 
the feedback specialist. The determinant factor for the method in which the feedback is 
provided should be contingent on the complexity of the incident, rather than the profession of 
the reporting staff member. The suggestion that feedback provided to a medical officer must be 
from a fellow medical officer exacerbates professional barriers, whereas it is argued that 
multidisciplinary collaboration facilitates a positive incident reporting culture. Arguably, 
suggested learning opportunities offered across different professions, whether it is from the 
feedback specialist or the reporting staff member will ultimately benefit the patient, due to a 
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robust, multidisciplinary approach to incorporate an identified learning opportunity into daily 
clinical practice.  
 
Discrepancies amongst professions in relation to incident reporting behaviours were explored 
by the focus group participants. A participant suggested that senior clinicians are inclined to 
take a defensive stance in response to their involvement in an adverse outcome of a patient. 
The implication being that the organisation must accept that adverse outcomes will occur 
despite the best efforts of the most experienced clinicians. If this is so, then the organisation 
would need to determine what an acceptable threshold of adverse events is. The issue that 
relates to the study is the suggestion that a feedback specialist would be increasingly 
challenged to identify a learning opportunity based on the more senior and experienced the 
reporting staff member is. Additionally, another profession-based discrepancy was 
acknowledged, in relation to medical officer’s belief that incident reporting was the 
responsibility of nursing staff. Underreporting of incidents by medical staff may not be a 
reflection of underreporting definitively, yet may be related to a lack of ownership regarding 
incident reporting. As was advised to the focus group participants, there were 2 incidents 
reported by medical staff during the study; however, feedback was not provided as these 
incidents were not reported during the feedback phase of the study. Both issues were linked to 
the recommendation that focused on gaining greater engagement with medical staff in a larger 
replication study. As previously mentioned, there was a suggestion that a feedback specialist 
from the medical profession be introduced in a larger replication study. It is argued that any 
benefit would be limited as a medical feedback specialist would only overcome barriers related 
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to the provision and acceptance of feedback to fellow medical officers, rather than any 
influence over their reporting behaviours. Generally, it is believed that nursing staff report due 
to obligation, whereas medical staff report by exception. Nonetheless, the incorporation of a 
medical feedback specialist is justified to overcome any challenges associated with the 
provision of feedback to medical officers by non-medical feedback specialists (Kievit, Krukerink 
& Marang-van de Mheen 2010). However, these challenges were not tested in this study due to 
the absence of feedback being provided to medical officers. Furthermore, it is inconclusive 
whether the presence of a medical feedback specialist would alter or encourage incident 
reporting from medical officers. Focus group participants were unable to identify specific 
strategies that would improve incident reporting rates by medical officers; although, this is an 
objective that is beyond the scope of the study.  
 
A recommendation relating the recruitment of multiple feedback specialists, in order to achieve 
24 / 7 coverage of a feedback specialist, was explored by the focus group participants. This 
recommendation is aimed at ensuring feedback can be provided within the 72 hour timeframe. 
The feedback specialist in this study undertook the role of feedback specialist in addition to 
normal duties. As such, 44% of feedback provided was within the 72 hour timeframe. This is 
indicative of the challenges the feedback specialist experienced in contacting the reporting staff 
members and balancing other work tasks. It was acknowledged that feedback specialist 
coverage after-hours was far more challenging than normal business hours. Focus group 
participants were adamant that the After Hours Nurse Manager in a Hospital would not be able 
to undertake this role, due to the demand of normal work tasks. A suggested alternative was to 
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utilise other methods of feedback delivery, such as electronic notes, podcasts and phone calls. 
It is noted that other methods of feedback delivery was not utilised in this study as face-to-face 
feedback was the sole method employed, even though phone calls were specifically offered as 
a means of delivering feedback. The focus group participants acknowledged that feedback 
specialists should undergo appropriate training, to equip themselves with the skills required to 
effectively identify a learning opportunity from an incident and educate the reporting staff 
member accordingly. Feedback specialist training could be incorporated into existing in-charge 
nurse programs and mentorship programs. A training regime for feedback specialists would 
ensure a consistent approach regarding the delivery of feedback. This is important for a 
Hospital environment in which majority of staff are not restricted to a single Ward or 
Department, and are often rotated throughout multiple areas. Additionally, a training program 
for feedback specialists would need to emphasise the delivery of formative feedback, rather 
than punitive feedback. The perception of the latter is indicative of feedback being delivered 
from a management position; hence, the requirement to carefully select feedback specialists 
removed of senior management positions, to avoid barriers regarding acceptance of feedback 
provided.  
 
A variety of modalities was suggested to be used for the verbal query phases of a larger 
replication study. As suggested in relation to the provision of feedback, the focus group 
participants agreed that greater staff engagement can be achieved by offering a variety of 
modalities that staff can select, in order to participate in the study. Examples of other 
modalities that could be used for the verbal query phase include self-initiated, electronic and 
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incorporation into existing systems. The latter was debated that this could result in staff 
members double-reporting, which could potentially skew the number of incidents reported into 
IIMS and thus promulgate the underreporting phenomenon. Staff members could report all or 
parts of an incident into 1 system, believing that this satisfies their incident reporting 
obligations, excusing them from reporting into IIMS. This was accepted as a risk to incident 
reporting practices and to the organisation. Furthermore, it was believed that this may have 
been present in this study, as staff members may have perceived that the verbal query process 
absolved them of the requirement to report the incident into IIMS; yet, this was explicitly 
queried during the post-intervention questionnaire. Respectively, 84% of participants stated 
they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that they reported an incident into IIMS despite having 
acknowledged this incident as per the verbal query process. A suggestions was to have staff 
members complete a form, either written or electronically, at the conclusion of their shift. 
Compliance could be determined via an audit and reconciled against the number of incidents 
reported. There was no discussion or conclusion regarding whether staff members would need 
to identify themselves on this self-initiated form; if so, this could impose on the staff member’s 
right to privacy and confidentiality when reporting an incident. The implementation of a system 
to determine incident reporting compliance is beyond the scope of the study and the verbal 
query phase was purely to determine the presence and magnitude of the underreporting 
phenomenon. Ultimately, the focus group participants agreed that a variety of modalities in 
relation to the verbal query phase of the study would enhance staff involvement. 
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Both the pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaires were only offered in written-
form to participants. Based on feedback directly from study participants a recommendation to 
expand the questionnaires to include an electronic form was tabled to the focus group. It was 
noted that participating staff members may not have an electronic device available to them. 
Furthermore, it was noted that some staff members, particularly those that do not utilise a 
computer as part of their daily work tasks, could be computer illiterate. Obviously, these staff 
members would be better suited for the written version of the questionnaires. The 
questionnaires presented via different mediums are intended to enhance response rates rather 
than for simple convenience. Another logistical issue highlighted was ensuring computer access 
can be conducted via generic logins. As previously indicated, this issue would apply only to 
those participating staff members that do not already use a computer as part of their daily work 
tasks. A potential benefit from employing electronic questionnaires was the automated 
retention of a unique alias used by individual participating staff members. The unique alias was 
featured in the written versions of the questionnaires throughout the study, which was used to 
demonstrate changes of opinion at an individual level. There were 15 participants that used the 
same unique alias in the pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaire. Thus, it was 
believed that individuals may have been unable to recall their unique alias due to the 3 month 
time lapse between questionnaires. A system that features the electronic questionnaires could 
store the unique alias of a participating staff member, which could be accessed via a username 
and password. The focus group believed that this could present difficulties with unique login 
credentials. Furthermore, some focus group participants were unconvinced of the comparisons 
between the pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaires on an individual basis. It is 
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argued that this comparison can demonstrate an improvement in individual satisfaction in 
relation to incident reporting culture and should be justifiably retained in a larger replication 
study. Furthermore, potential difficulties with ensuring unique login credentials for 
participating staff members could be overcome by utilising their existing login credentials used 
when accessing a computer workstation. Whilst this is not applicable to non-computer using 
participants, it is believed that these participants would be undeterred from completing the 
written version of the questionnaires.  
 
A constant theme that emerged from the focus group discussion was the practicality of 
feedback and the inherent benefit to the organisation. Essentially, this could be interpreted as 
the return on investment. The Local Health District Executive and senior managers that 
composed the focus group were naturally cautious about extrapolating findings from this study 
to determine meaningful practical implications. It was queried as to what further studies, both 
in size and scope, would be required in order to conclusively adopt the study’s fundamentals 
objective of feedback provision from incident reports. Interestingly, some focus group 
participants debated how the provision of feedback should be activated. If the reporting staff 
member did not err in their involvement of an incident then there is no learning opportunity for 
both the individual and organisation. As suggested by a focus group participant, the provision of 
feedback in this instance is providing reassurance to an individual that they were not at fault. It 
is argued that the provision of feedback should not be contingent on an error made by the 
reporting staff member. Furthermore, ongoing professional development can arise out of such 
incident reporting feedback mechanisms. Conversely, recurrent incidents reported by the same 
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staff member for the same incident can raise concerns about the staff member’s performance 
and risk to patient care, which could potentially warrant separate interventions that would 
address any performance issues. Regardless, it is maintained that an investment by the 
reporting staff member should be complimented by an investment from the organisation in the 
form of feedback. Again, this fosters a collaborative environment to determine appropriate 
prevention of incidents. Should the feedback mechanism be implemented across the Local 
Health District or NSW Health system there would need to be an established method for 
documenting the provision of feedback. Ideally, this would occur within IIMS, either in the 
notes section or in a newly created section specifically designed for feedback provision.  
 
The focus group discussion afforded a meaningful critique of the preliminary findings and 
recommendations. The practical implications of the latter were discussed in detail and 
suggestions made were used to refine the recommendations, to ensure widespread 
applicability for a large, metropolitan Local Health District. Whilst comments were made on 
strategies to enhance staff participation the focus remained on constructing a larger replication 
study that would test the practical implementation of the study on a broader scale. A 
comparison between the recommendations derived from the experimental phase of the study 
and the focus group discussion demonstrate consistent themes. For example, it is established 
that a larger, replication study with a focus on medical officer engagement is warranted. This 
can be achieved by recruiting a medical officer as a feedback specialist, which may also achieve 
the recommendation to have the feedback specialist be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week. Additionally, a consistent theme was to have a more autonomous approach to data 
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collection, via a self-initiated verbal query process and enabling the electronic completion of 
the pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaires. The only difference between the 
preliminary recommendations and the recommendations made following the focus group 
discussion is to incorporate incident reporting learning tools into existing educational and 
mentorship programs. It is acknowledged that this was not a consideration of the research 
study; however, for the purposes of consistency and organisational-wide implementation, a 
synthesisation of these elements can prove valuable.  
 
The revised recommendations are: 
i) Conduct a larger replication study at a larger Hospital and across multiple specialties. 
ii) Ensure the larger replication study has a larger representation of medical staff, via 
recruitment of a medical officer to perform the role of the feedback specialist (in 
addition to nursing-based feedback specialists). 
iii) Recruit multiple senior nurses to perform the duties of the feedback specialist to ensure 
24 / 7 coverage of the feedback specialist role, to support the provision of short cycle 
feedback particularly during after-hours and weekends.  
iv) Incorporate educational tools into existing in-charge nurse and mentorship programs, to 
ensure a consistent approach to the provision of feedback by the feedback specialist. 
v) Expand the verbal query process to include self-initiated responses. 
vi) Deliver the pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaires in an electronic 
format (in addition to a written format), utilising existing login credentials of computer-
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using staff. The implementation of this recommendation requires further involvement 
with the Local Health District’s Information Management and Technology Division.  
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CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS 
 
Summary of the Findings 
 
The observation of single loop learning via the provision of short cycle formative feedback to an 
incident reporter, based upon the details of an incident report, demonstrated that such a 
feedback system can produce organisational learning. Staff morale and the perception of 
incident reporting systems utility improved, evidenced by a comparison between pre-
intervention and post-intervention questionnaires. Additionally, results from the main study 
and focus group discussion supported the belief that double loop, triple loop and vicarious 
learning were also present. Double loop learning was evidenced during the focus group 
discussion in which participants examined whether incident reporting practices supported 
learning opportunities. Triple loop learning was observed by focus group participants learning 
how staff members of the organisation could learn from incident reporting systems. Vicarious 
learning was evidenced by the results of the study group participants’ post-intervention 
questionnaire, which demonstrated skill improvement for participants who may not have 
received short cycle feedback directly. The results of the research study, specifically the 
derivation of different types of learning, demonstrated the capacity of the feedback 
intervention system to produce organisational learning.  
 
It was initially theorised that the provision of feedback following a self-identified incident report 
would lead to an improvement in incident reporting rates, as well as a decrease in the 
submission of anonymous incidents. Whilst the study ward showed a decrease in anonymous 
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incidents during the intervention phase of the study, the results for increased incidents and 
increased self-identified incidents fluctuated throughout the duration of the study; hence, due 
to these equivocal results it was underdetermined whether there was an improvement incident 
reporting rates. 
 
The verbal query phases of the study were used to determine the presence and magnitude 
regarding incident underreporting rates. The study ward showed a 12% and 25% 
underreporting rate ([number of incidents reported vs. number of incidents reported] / number 
of incidents observed) during phase 2 and phase 3, respectively. Since the underreporting rate 
increased throughout the study it was determined that a decrease in actual incidents was not 
evident. It is noted that there was a negligible result for the study ward in phase 4, which was 
partially attributed to a decrease in verbal query responses. Additionally, there were minimal 
verbal query responses throughout phases 2, 3 and 4 for the control ward. As such, a decrease 
in actual incidents was not present in the study.  
 
A reduction in the severity of incidents was anticipated due to the improvements in clinical 
practices, derived from the provision of short cycle feedback. There was a decrease in the 
severity of incidents for the study ward during and following the feedback intervention phase, 
evident by a reduction in the average actual SAC rating from incidents submitted into IIMS. This 
is consistent with the initial theory that single loop learning would translate into tangible 
competency improvements, leading to a reduction in serious incidents. However, it is noted 
that the control ward also demonstrated a reduction in the severity of incidents during the 
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latter phases of the study. It is unknown whether such a reduction was coincidental considering 
that there was no feedback intervention present on the control ward. Throughout the study 
period, it was observed that 66% of incidents reported in both the study and control wards did 
not have an actual SAC rating. Therefore, non-compliance regarding entry of an actual SAC 
rating limited the conclusion that the short cycle feedback intervention reduced the severity of 
incidents.  
 
Contribution to Theory 
 
This section will explore the comparisons between the research study and the literature, 
specifically in relation to organisational learning theories and incident reporting systems, in 
order to demonstrate the contribution to theory made by the present study. 
 
Comparisons with Organisational Learning Theories 
 
Previous theory and research into organisational learning has indicated that providing short 
cycle feedback in an incident reporting system could facilitate organisational learning. This 
study found that providing short cycle feedback did facilitate organisational learning, 
specifically by facilitating single-loop learning. However, the study also demonstrated that 
providing short cycle feedback also facilitated organisational learning by facilitating double-loop 
learning, triple-loop learning and vicarious learning. The focus group identified learning 
outcomes, which explored the organisation’s learning infrastructure and the relationship to 
incident reporting systems. Additionally, vicarious learning within the study ward was 
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evidenced by the post-intervention questionnaire. This substantiates that participants were not 
required to be in direct receipt of short cycle feedback in order to benefit from the associated 
single-loop learning, as knowledge acquisition was achieved via observation of a learning 
outcome (Miner & Mezias 1996). This highlights the importance of social interaction amongst 
organisational members to support an organisational learning culture (Michailova & Sidorova 
2011). Common barriers to reporting were overcome due to a reinvigoration of incident 
reporting utility, in the form of personalised feedback within a short timeframe. Whilst it was 
expected that single-loop learning could be achieved by short cycle feedback, this system 
emphatically demonstrated that other forms of learning were achieved; thus, illustrating that 
short cycle feedback has a greater ability for organisational learning than originally anticipated. 
This study empirically demonstrated that short cycle feedback facilitated additional forms of 
organisational learning; thus, illustrating that short cycle feedback can make a greater 
contribution to organisational learning than originally anticipated. 
 
Organisational learning was evidenced by participants engaging in behavioural change as a 
result of receiving short cycle feedback. The provision of short cycle feedback was not 
previously experienced by participants and does not feature as a common operational initiative 
on the ward beyond this research study. Participants were able to observe the provision of 
short cycle feedback, which altered pre-existing incident reporting behaviour and motivated 
participants to report an incident to qualify for receipt of short cycle feedback. This was 
evidenced by a positive change in participants’ responses to survey items regarding the utility 
of incident reporting in the pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaires. Participants 
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perceived that incident reporting did not have any utility, which would benefit the individual 
following them taking the time to enter an incident, on top of their existing workload demands. 
Such incident reporting barriers are consistent with the literature (Lawton & Parker 2002; 
Mahajan 2010). Thus, this barrier was overcome once utility in the incident reporting system 
was restored. The transformation of feedback into single-loop learning proved that incident 
reporting barriers could be overcome, leading to improved incident reporting practices, in 
addition to fostering an environment that facilitates organisational learning. Additionally, as 
described by Reason (2005; 2012), the necessity to develop greater risk awareness by 
professionals (or frontline healthcare workers, in the context of the research study) will lead to 
an enhanced ability to detect and recover from errors. This is a defining characteristic of a high 
risk organisation, which is to ensure heightened awareness of risk exposure (Reason 2012).  
 
Double-loop learning was primarily featured during the focus group component of the study, 
whereby new values, ideas and expectations regarding incident reporting systems were 
explored. The short cycle feedback system positively influenced the behaviours, attitudes and 
perceptions of participants in relation to incident reporting – an example of double-loop 
learning as individual’s values regarding incident reporting was changed. Furthermore, such 
positive changes in participants’ perception of incident reporting can potentially lead to 
improvements in incident reporting rates (Anderson et al. 2013), which would enhance the 
knowledge base of incident reporting systems (Wang & Ahmed 2003). The study’s parameters 
that guided the provision of short cycle feedback were critiqued in order to determine that 
feedback provided is consistently beneficial for the individual and the organisation. The focus 
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group were unanimous in their agreement that feedback is a valuable tool to stimulate a 
learning environment – an assertion consistent with the literature (Crommelinck & Anseel 
2013). It is through this analysis of the values and norms that govern incident reporting systems 
that formulate new concepts that can enhance organisational learning (Kim 1993). As explored 
by Reason (2012), an organisation must foster a reporting culture in order to become a learning 
culture. This was evident during the focus group discussions, whereby participants considered 
what adjustments were required to encourage incident reporting, which would lead to greater 
learning opportunities. This complements other works by Reason (1990) that defences of an 
organisation will mitigate the conditions in which latent failures, embedded within 
organisational systems, will reveal themselves. As such, cultivating a learning environment, 
achieved by systems and principles that facilitate incident reporting, will ensure robust 
defences to both serious incidents and near misses; thus, minimising organisational risk.  
 
Focus group critiques and scrutiny of the preliminary findings of the research study satisfied the 
definition of triple-loop learning. This is evidenced by the organisation, represented by focus 
group participants, learning how effective was short cycle feedback in facilitating continuous 
improvement and how it could enhance organisational learning capabilities in the future. Focus 
group participants demonstrated their engagement in triple-loop learning via critical discussion 
of the factors they perceived were facilitating or preventing short cycle feedback from 
producing organisational learning. One example was the debate among focus group members 
about whether the 72 hour timeframe for providing short cycle feedback might prevent or 
facilitate learning. The 72 hour timeframe that defined the short cycle was critiqued by focus 
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group participants, with majority querying at what point single-loop learning deteriorates due 
to delays in the provision of feedback. However, it is suggested that study participants were 
appreciative to receive feedback at all – a reflection of the organisational environment and 
evidence that further work is required to support organisational learning. This is supported by 
Reason (1990) who stated that enhancements to system safety cannot be acted upon if not 
delivered in a timely manner. Although, it is acknowledged that this invokes the subjectivity of 
what is timely, according to those participants in receipt of such feedback. Although, there was 
no findings to suggest that the individual-level learning effect was compromised for those study 
participants that did not receive feedback within 72 hours, compared to their counterparts that 
did. This was evidenced by the voluntary acknowledgement from focus group recipients that 
they would incorporate the advice received from the feedback specialist; regardless of the 
timeframe in which the feedback was provided. Although, this may have been a result of the 
“feedback starved” environment in which the participants worked in. Thus, there is potential 
for participants to become accustomed to receiving feedback within a set timeframe. As such, 
Shaw and Fairhurst (2008) explored the expectation by the Generation Y workforce for 
immediate feedback, which can influence potential recruitment and retention strategies. 
Similarly, participants’ perception of short cycle feedback utility could diminish should feedback 
timeframes not be adhered to; hence, a commitment by the organisation to provide short cycle 
feedback is essential. It is argued by that the presence of feedback at all is a more accurate 
determinant of participant satisfaction than timeliness of feedback provided; however, this is 
contingent on an environment that is devoid of any feedback-loop, as was evident within this 
research study. Conversely, once a feedback mechanism is established, participants could 
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become accustomed and thus transfer their expectation (and satisfaction) on feedback 
timeliness, which is influenced by the demand for feedback.  
 
Table 29: Summary of organisational learning definitions, in relation to the research study 
Term Definition Reference Example 
Single Loop 
Learning 
Single loop learners look 
only to the immediately 
preceding actions for an 
explanation and the 
lesson  
Reason, Carthey & de 
Leval 2001 
Relocating mobility-
compromised patients 
closer to the nurses’ 
station to prevent falls  
Double Loop 
Learning 
Recognising that incident 
reporting leads to 
feedback; changing 
behaviour rather than 
outcome  
Smith & Elliot 2007 
Incentivising incident 
reporting for users, 
respective of a mandate 
of feedback provision 
Triple Loop 
Learning Learning how to learn Argyris & Schon 1978 
Observation by the 
focus group participants  
regarding the 
organisation’s ability to 
learn how the 
organisation’s agents 
learn is determined by 
the effective promotion 
of learning 
opportunities 
 
Comparisons with Incident Reporting Systems 
 
The previously reported perception of incident reporting as a meaningless process (Braithwaite 
et al. 2010) was consistent with the findings of this study. This is evidenced by the 
dissatisfaction of staff in relation to their perceived lack of utility regarding incident reporting, 
documented via the pre-intervention questionnaire. The severity of incidents decreased during 
the feedback intervention phase of the study, compared to preceding phases; a finding 
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supported by Franklin et al. (2007), who stated that the utilisation of incident reports for 
training purposes can reduce error rates.   
 
The impact of the study on patient safety interventions can improve the utilisation of incident 
reporting systems by frontline staff. By delivering expeditious feedback to frontline staff, these 
staff will be equipped with the information required to generate improvements in patient 
safety (Clarke et al. 2010). Feedback delivered in a formative nature can facilitate a learning 
environment, essential to fostering the training of staff, particularly junior clinicians (Lake & 
Landau 2007). The use of incident reporting systems as a learning tool can enhance the clinical 
practice of staff, improving patient care and safety (McCulloch et al. 2009). Performance 
improvements as a result of lessons derived from incident reporting is believed to reduce the 
number of incidents of adverse events and near misses. A reduction in incident frequency, 
particularly of incidents that are adverse yet preventable, can potentially eliminate avoidable 
extensions of hospital length of stays (Pham et al. 2010). One example being feedback provided 
to study participants regarding the management of high risk falls patients. There were several 
occasions when the feedback specialist provided education on strategies to minimise falls in 
high risk patients, such as more frequent toileting and locating the patient closer to the nurses’ 
station. Thus, the proposed study can provide useful at a NSW Ministry of Health level, as 
resources into the promotion of incident reporting can be reallocated to enhance the timeliness 
of feedback provision, which can result in patient safety improvements.  
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The outcome of enhanced incident reporting utilisation can result in greater “error wisdom” 
(Reason 2004) of users. This can be an incentive for greater compliance with incident reporting 
as users will acquire risk recognition skills, which can safeguard their direct involvement with 
either serious incidents or near misses (Reason 2002). Thus, the IIMS incident reporting system 
used in NSW Health must provide sufficient information for users to address system 
deficiencies, in order to achieve institutional resilience (Reason, Carthey & de Leval 2001). 
Respectively, the system-wide accessibility of IIMS has widespread learning capabilities across 
the system (Tucker & Edmondson 2003). Although, consistent with other incident reporting 
systems within healthcare (Tucker & Edmondson 2003) frontline healthcare workers are often 
conditioned to implement ‘workarounds’ and short-term fixes, rather than strategies to prevent 
incident recurrence. Whilst this may avoid or even delay serious incidents from occurring this 
may also artificially inflate the organisation’s confidence in their own safeguards – similar to 
catastrophic incidents in NASA (Madsen & Desai 2010) and oil rig disasters (Collinson 1999). It is 
encouraging that the formative approach with feedback provision is consistent with similar 
incident reporting systems that encourage positive reinforcement. Mayer et al. (2011) 
demonstrates that such an approach to improve hand hygiene compliance, complemented by a 
frequent audit and feedback technique, can facilitate positive behaviour changes within staff. It 
is noted that the willingness of staff can be supported by intuitive and pragmatic incident 
reporting systems; however, this can be jeopardised if an overwhelming amount of time and 
effort is required – as indicated by Naessens et al. (2010), with reference to the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement’s Global Trigger Tool. The Global Trigger Tool is detailed, at the cost of 
being time-intensive, yet can provide significant systematic review, especially when guided by 
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clinical ‘triggers’ that initiate such as review (de Wet & Bowie 2009). Furthermore, this raises 
the possibility of the Global Trigger Tool, or similar, being used to investigate the likelihood of 
errors that remain undetected and escape reporting. This supports Reason’s (1990) view that 
latent failures exist within a system and combine with local triggering events to breach the 
organisation’s defences. It remains clear that the organisation must be conscious of the time 
invested in learning mechanisms to ensure lessons yielded are effective for the organisation 
and the individuals within it. The burden of time remains a common barrier to learning from 
incident reports, which is prominent in time-poor healthcare workers (Vincent, Taylor-Adams & 
Stanhope, 1998). The short cycle feedback intervention of the research study has demonstrated 
consistencies with other learning mechanisms found in the literature whilst attempting to act 
upon such lessons in a timely and effective manner (Reason 1990; Donaldson 2000).   
 
Limitations of the Study and Opportunities for Future Research 
 
The study took place within the general medical and surgical wards of a major metropolitan 
hospital. The findings from this study and the new insights it provides into organisational 
learning facilitated through incident reporting may also be useful to non-Healthcare 
organisations that use incident reporting. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this study’s 
contribution to the literature would be strengthened by a larger replication study, ideally across 
all specialities within a general hospital setting. This would determine whether incident 
reporting facilities organisational learning in the same ways and through the same processes 
when other types of incidents are reported. Furthermore, the achievement of such 
generalisability would cultivate knowledge sharing across specialties, which could overcome 
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professional boundaries that are perceived as barriers to organisational learning (Waring et al. 
2013). Therefore, future studies should expand this study to encompass all specialties, in order 
to promote inter-specialty learning within an organisation.  
 
Casual and agency staff were excluded from participating in this study due to the ethical 
challenges respective of the organisational context in which such staff perform their duties. 
These types of staff are commonly rostered to work in response to permanent staff on 
unplanned leave. Furthermore, in specific reference to nursing within the operational setting of 
the study hospital, casual and agency nursing staff are required to work in any ward throughout 
the hospital. Therefore, this posed challenges with ensuring the appropriate consent process 
was conducted. It was not feasible for this researcher to seek consent from all casual and 
agency staff to provision if these staff members were allocated to the study wards during the 
course of the study and if were willing to participate. Notwithstanding these ethical 
implications, the inclusion of casual and agency staff in future studies would afford insight into 
different perceptions of incident reporting and learning. These staff members’ reduced 
presence within the operational setting, in contrast to their permanent full-time and 
permanent part-time counterparts, is likely to result in unique barriers to incident reporting 
(Bhattacharya 2012). Additionally, casual and agency staff members’ limited availability could 
potentially inhibit the timely provision of feedback by the feedback specialist, which may 
diminish the learning effects that arise from an incident report (Lam et al. 2011). Asides from 
the achievement of single-loop learning via the feedback specialist, other forms of learning such 
as vicarious learning would be influenced by the frequency of a staff member’s presence within 
P a g e | 177 of 245 
the ward setting; a direct result of their employment type. There is value in exploring the 
perceptions of casual and agency staff in relation to incident reporting as it is anticipated that 
specific educational initiatives must be designed specifically for the casual workforce, to avoid 
lost organisational learning opportunities. 
 
It is noted that towards the end of phase 4 the researcher discovered that the drop-box in the 
control ward for verbal query forms was removed. The Clinical Support Officer and Nursing Unit 
Manager were unaware of this. The Clinical Support Officer advised that there had not been 
any further verbal query forms placed in the drop-box following the most recent collection of 
forms; however, this could not be verified. The drop-box could not be found. An alternative 
arrangement was put in place for all verbal query forms, recorded by the Clinical Support 
Officer, to be provided to the researcher upon the end of each business day. Additionally, all 
verbal query forms completed outside of business hours (hence, in the absence of the Clinical 
Support Officer) were to be retained by the nurse in-charge and placed in the personal drop 
box of the Nursing Unit Manager (located within the control ward), for collation by the 
researcher on the following business day. Despite these alternative arrangements, no further 
verbal query forms were received for the control ward.  
 
Whilst this study encompassed non-clinical staff there was only 1 occurrence in which feedback 
was provided to a non-clinical staff member by the feedback specialist. It is noted that this non-
clinical staff member was responsible for managing patient complaints and had a clinical 
background. Furthermore, in this instance, the feedback focused on the clinical care that led to 
P a g e | 178 of 245 
the patient’s complaint. In contrast, the hotel / support services staff (i.e. cleaners, ward 
orderlies) and administration staff (i.e. ward clerks and clinical support officers) who 
participated in the study did not report an incident. It is acknowledged that this could be due to 
no incidents of a non-clinical nature occurring during the feedback phase of the study; 
however, another possible explanation is that non-clinical staff are unfamiliar with incident 
reporting system requirements, including what constitutes a reportable incident. Such a notion 
emphasises that incident reporting systems are perceived to have a predominant clinical focus 
(Anderson et al. 2013), which may ostracise non-clinical staff and stifle learning opportunities. 
Additionally, non-clinical staff typically report incidents of a non-clinical nature (i.e. damaged 
equipment, personal injury), due to their limited direct interaction with patients and their 
limited knowledge in clinical functions. This suggests that non-clinical staff may not be able to 
link their works tasks with patient care. For example, a cleaner’s performance has implications 
on infection control, which can mitigate the risk of a hospital acquired infection by a patient. 
Hence, a limited comprehension by non-clinical staff regarding the impact of their work tasks 
on patient care may inhibit their reporting behaviour, particularly for clinical incidents. The 
conclusions drawn from this study are limited when applied to non-clinical staff and future 
research would benefit from exploring incident reporting behaviours and the effect of short 
cycle feedback on such staff exclusively.  
 
The study was performed in a major metropolitan public hospital within the context of the NSW 
public health system. Transferability to other jurisdictions (i.e. interstate, nationally and 
internationally) and levels of healthcare (i.e. primary, community, tertiary, quaternary) was not 
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explored as this was not the study’s scope or objective; however, the conclusion that short 
cycle feedback has a greater impact on organisational learning than originally believed suggests 
that there is merit in replicating the study in other contexts to examine whether the 
relationships between incident reporting and organisational learning found here are also borne 
out in other environments. Particularly for international contexts, it is acknowledged that 
different incident reporting systems are governed by policies and procedures, specific to that 
jurisdiction’s requirements. Reporting mechanisms and behaviours may differ across varying 
jurisdictions, which may alter the findings of the study. Hence, further studies in jurisdictions, 
other than the context of the NSW public health system, may require adjustments to maximise 
relevance and applicability of such a study’s findings. It is established that incident reporting 
systems are embedded across international healthcare settings (Crommelinck & Anseel 2013), 
which supports the generalisability of this study in relation to feedback mechanisms within an 
incident reporting system.  
 
There is value in expanding the study to incorporate multiple sites in order to mitigate any bias 
that may arise from unique incident reporting behaviours and perceptions from a single study 
site. This was not explored in this study as the study design focused only on a single study site. 
The culture of the study hospital may have unique cultural characteristics that can influence 
participants connected to the study setting, such as a strong patient safety reputation that is 
dependent on positive incident reporting behaviours. Per the focus group session detailed in 
the previous chapter, it was unanimously agreed by focus group participants that future studies 
encompassing multiple sites would be beneficial to determine disparity regarding incident 
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reporting behaviours. One outcome of such a future study could be that remedial strategies 
may be formulated to enhance knowledge sharing across multiple sites despite their 
geographical locations. This would facilitate organisational learning respective of the 
organisational context of the NSW public health system, namely multiple hospital sites within a 
single Local Health District. Furthermore, such strategies to overcome geographical barriers 
would be valuable for rural health services and community health settings.  
 
The incorporation of organisational learning into everyday practice was not verified with the 
recipients of short cycle feedback, due to the study design. Whilst staff satisfaction was 
measured via the post-intervention questionnaire the recipients of short cycle feedback were 
not explicitly asked whether they adjusted their practices as a result of the feedback they 
received. However, the design of the questionnaires preserved the participant’s confidentiality 
(via an alias), which eliminated the ability to distinguish whether a participant received short 
cycle feedback or not. There is value in confirming whether specific changes to practices were 
maintained, which could have explored the sustainability of single-loop learning. Hence, it is 
viable that a follow-up study can explore whether operational practices were changed, and 
furthermore, whether such practices reverted to pre-short cycle feedback. This coincides with 
the literature in which organisational learning is not a solitary event (Baker et al. 2013), but 
requires continuous improvement and evaluation processes to ensure learning opportunities 
are maximised (Yang 2007). Additionally, future studies can explore what attributes an 
organisation and its agents require to not only achieve organisational learning, but to retain it 
(Lam et al. 2011).  
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 Results from the verbal query process, particularly for the control ward, were limited due to a 
low response rate. A lack of staff participation hindered the amount of data available for 
analysis. The underreporting rate for the study ward was demonstrated in the first 2 months of 
the study; however, the third month of the study produced lower response rates due to the 
absence of the primary data collector. Similarly, lack of engagement, ownership and 
understanding regarding the verbal query process in the control ward was believed to have 
been the cause for a minimal response rate in the first month of the study and no responses in 
the subsequent 2 months. Additionally, it was discovered by the researcher that the secure 
collection box within the control ward, used to collate the verbal query responses, was 
misplaced during the third consecutive month of the verbal query phase. This was not advised 
to the researcher by the data collectors on the control ward, which further suggested that 
participants were either unclear on the verbal querying process or their initial interest 
diminished over the course of the study period. In contrast, a perceived intrusiveness and 
disruptiveness of the verbal querying process by staff could explain the lack of participation. 
Respectively, the results of the post-intervention questionnaire demonstrate that 50% of staff 
(N = 28) either answered ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ when asked if they felt the verbal querying 
process was disruptive. The mode in which the number of incidents observed during the course 
of the shift was conducted verbally as it was believed that a written alternative completed and 
submitted by a staff member at the end of their shift would have produced a low response rate. 
However, since the verbal querying was initiated by the data collector, as opposed to the 
responding staff member, this may have contributed to the perceived disruption, despite the 
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data collectors being advised by the researcher to withhold the verbal querying process when 
participating staff members were conducting clinical tasks. Therefore, consideration should be 
given to providing staff members with a written alternative compared to the verbal querying 
process, or both options being conducted simultaneously to maximise staff participation. 
Additionally, an electronic mode of data collection may encourage greater staff participation, as 
suggested by the focus group. Hence, it is recommended that future studies should expand the 
verbal querying phase to include self-initiated written and electronic modes of data collection. 
 
The paper-based format of the questionnaires may have limited comparisons between an 
individual’s pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaires, due to the requirement of 
the participant to recall their alias. It is accepted that a limitation of the study was that some 
participants were unable to recall the alias they used for the pre-intervention questionnaire 
when completing the post-intervention questionnaire. Aliases initially featured in the pre-
intervention questionnaire were either not replicated in the post-intervention questionnaire or 
a similar alternative was provided. It can be explained that some participants may have 
completed the pre-intervention questionnaire and not the post-intervention questionnaire; 
however, memory recall regarding aliases employed may have been compromised due to the 3 
month period between both questionnaires. 
 
The post-intervention questionnaire was unable to determine whether a participant received 
feedback directly from the feedback specialist. In hindsight, it would have been beneficial to 
include such a question, in order to determine whether the feedback recipient had completed a 
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post-intervention questionnaire. Additionally, this question would have provided further insight 
into the prevalence of vicarious learning, as a participant may not have received feedback 
directly from the feedback specialist; however, a participant could have achieved vicarious 
learning from observing the feedback specialist. As featured in this study, participants 
completed a question regarding their satisfaction with the feedback specialist; however, the 
number of participants that completed this question exceeded the number of participants that 
received feedback directly from the feedback specialist during the feedback intervention phase 
of the study. Furthermore, the post-intervention questionnaire could have included a free-text 
question regarding the participant’s individual experience with the feedback specialist. This 
may have provided further insight into the delivery of short cycle feedback by the feedback 
specialist. Similarly, a question regarding whether any lessons learnt were incorporated into 
day-to-day practices would have specifically determine whether such lessons were practical and 
employed. This question would have measured the utility of lessons learnt, delivered via the 
direct provision of short cycle feedback or via other methods of learning (i.e. vicarious learning, 
double-loop learning, triple-loop learning). It is suggested that the post-intervention question 
was designed without the benefit of the findings produced by this study; specifically, that short 
cycle feedback has more educational capabilities than initially thought. Hence, it is 
recommended that future studies expand the post-intervention questionnaire to measure the 
presence of the different forms of learning observed in this study, as well as determining 
whether lessons learnt were incorporated into everyday practice.  
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In the context of this study there are mandatory reporting requirements for specific clinical 
incidents. Pressure ulcers and falls were the 2 most types of reporting incidents, which it is 
argued by this researcher as a direct result of their mandatory reporting requirement. 
Reframing such a mandatory reporting requirement could reduce the number of reported 
incidents regarding pressure ulcers and falls, which would have implications on the 
organisational learning associated with such incidents (Kim 1993). The impact of such incident 
reporting values supports the presence of double-loop learning throughout this study (Argyris & 
Schon 1978). Additionally, the focus group participants noted that the study design would 
initiate the provision of feedback to a staff member that reported a pressure ulcer or fall but 
may not have actually been directly involved in the patient’s care. In practice, an elderly patient 
may have been admitted to hospital from a nursing home with a pressure ulcer. Therefore, due 
to the mandatory reporting requirements, a staff member within the hospital setting that 
observes the pressure ulcer is required to report this into the incident reporting system. The 
focus group agreed that this reporting staff member would receive feedback from the feedback 
specialist, due to having made an incident report, but may not benefit from the single-loop 
learning from such feedback. As the reporting staff member had no direct influence on the 
pressure ulcer, the focus group debated the provision of feedback and its utility, under this 
circumstance. Hence, a replication study must stipulate the assumption and values that initiate 
the provision of short cycle feedback to ensure the utility of such feedback is valid. 
 
The presence of vicarious learning may have been featured during the feedback intervention 
phase of this study; however, the post-intervention feedback questionnaire did not explicitly 
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explore the prevalence of vicarious learning and the associated contribution to overall 
organisational learning. In hindsight, a replication study should include specific questions to 
participants that determine whether vicarious learning was present and whether emergent 
lessons were applied to the observing staff member’s day-to-day practices. Additionally, the 
lessons derived from short cycle feedback could be promulgated throughout the operational 
environment. In practice, it is likely that a senior member of staff, such as the Nursing Unit 
Manager would have the authority and resources to communicate lessons amongst ward staff. 
This can replicate the vicarious learning process, enabling a positive change in clinical practice 
by staff members that may not have been directly involved in the incident in which such lessons 
were derived.  
 
Practical Implications for Hospitals / Health Services 
 
The implications for practice affect different components of the organisation: medical, clinical, 
managerial, and regulatory. Based upon healthcare professional experience, it is interpreted 
that the differentiation between medical and clinical is that the former focuses solely on 
doctors; whereas the latter incorporates all staffing disciplines, such as doctors, nurses, allied 
health and clinical support staff.  
 
Medical 
 
A practical implication for future research would be to use a medical staff member as the 
feedback specialist. Medical staff engagement is a significant challenge for healthcare 
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organisations that may implement a similar study that explores organisational learning. Whilst 
the medical fraternity typically possess the highest clinical knowledge compared to other 
healthcare disciplines it is important for doctors to recognise latent errors and become error-
wise (Reason 2012) in order to prevent such latent errors from developing into catastrophic 
errors that cause patient harm. The challenge of medical staff engagement plagued this 
research study, as proven by the literature (Reason 2000), despite this researcher’s efforts to 
meet individually with senior clinicians, in the hope that such seniority would filter throughout 
the medical hierarchy. Consequently, the transferability of findings from this research study to 
the medical profession may be limited; however, this does not suggest that doctors are 
opposed to receiving feedback arising from incidents, whereas this demonstrates that medical 
staff are not regular users of incident reporting systems. Therefore, this suggests that criteria to 
providing feedback to a doctor may need to be expanded beyond completing an incident 
report, such as evidence of a doctor’s involvement with an incident, without having the doctor 
submit an incident themselves. In support of enhancing medical engagement the focus group 
participants determined that an additional feedback specialist from a medical background 
would encourage participation by medical staff in future studies. Anderson et al. (2013) states 
that professional barriers, primarily medicine, were overcome when feedback was exchanged 
amongst medical colleagues. Whilst not featured within this study, an obvious risk of a nursing 
feedback specialist providing feedback to a medical staff member is that the feedback can be 
dismissed on the grounds that the recipient may have a more thorough technical understanding 
of the clinical factors surrounding an incident (Waring et al. 2013); therefore, diminishing the 
substance of any learning opportunity afforded by the nursing feedback specialist. The 
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observation by medical staff regarding feedback provision to colleagues or other clinical 
disciplines may encourage incident reporting amongst the medical fraternity. This may afford 
alternative perspectives on reported incidents from a workforce typically infamous for 
underreporting (Mahajan 2010). 
 
Clinical 
 
The research findings have several practical implications for hospitals and health services. 
Whilst formative feedback overcomes incident reporting barriers (Mahajan 2010) healthcare 
organisations wishing to implement short cycle feedback into incident reporting should 
consider whether the Nursing Unit Manager is the appropriate position to provide feedback to 
the reporting staff member. This was considered as part of the study design, resulting in a 
senior nurse, other than the Nursing Unit Manager, providing the feedback. In a practical, 
everyday setting, the nursing staff report directly to the Nursing Unit Manager; hence, 
recipients of feedback may interpret this in a punitive manner, which may deter incident 
reporting (Collinson 1999), as the feedback is being provided from a position of authority. 
Therefore, healthcare organisations must determine who it is appropriate to have act as the 
feedback specialist. Consideration must be made to whether a staff member should occupy a 
feedback specialist role based upon their authority or their experience. There are 2 particular 
advantages which could result from allocating such a role based on experience. One is that an 
experienced staff member possesses sufficient knowledge to determine gaps in clinical 
practices that can be improved via formative feedback. Additionally, the experience of the 
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feedback specialist can translate to perceived respect by the feedback recipient, enabling 
acceptance of feedback delivered as it originates from a credible source (Waring et al. 2013). In 
a typical acute healthcare setting, a Clinical Nurse Educator can undertake a feedback specialist 
role. This is a senior nursing role that requires a high-level of education and communication 
skills, which are qualities befitting of the feedback specialist.  However, the feedback specialist 
must encourage a collaborative learning environment, in order to prompt the incident reporter 
to develop solutions themselves (Tucker & Edmondson 2003), rather than a prescriptive lecture 
style. 
 
Managerial 
 
The feedback intervention can modify management practices particularly in relation to 
enhanced responsibilities regarding feedback provision to reporting staff members. 
Additionally, management may be required to adjust operational practices dependent on the 
type of feedback provided, particularly once patterns emerge at a departmental level. Feedback 
can be transferred into formalised educational programs that have implications for clinical 
practice. Furthermore, such programs have the potential to be customised according to the 
feedback provided within a particular ward or specialty. The utility of these programs becomes 
enhanced due to improved specificity of training, in response to actual events (and practice 
deficiencies).  
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Organisations wishing to implement short cycle feedback should also consider how many 
specialists are engaged to provide it. During the course of the intervention phase, the feedback 
specialist was required to administer short cycle feedback on 9 separate occasions. As 
mentioned in previous sections, the feedback specialist was able to adhere to the 72 hour short 
cycle period for 4 out of 9 occasions. Day-to-day work tasks of the feedback specialist, staff 
rosters and absenteeism hindered the administration of feedback within the 72 hour short 
cycle period. If this study were to be replicated on a larger scale (i.e. whole of Hospital 
approach) then it would be necessary to engage multiple feedback specialists, to improve the 
likelihood that feedback could be delivered within the 72 hour short cycle period without being 
impacted by the aforementioned factors. One advantage could be that multiple feedback 
specialists could provide coverage for each other, should this responsibility be in addition to 
demands of the substantive position; evident in this study as the feedback specialist undertook 
the responsibility of delivering feedback in addition to normal day-to-day work tasks. 
Additionally, as indicated previously, an enhancement of feedback specialists should include 
staff from varying clinical backgrounds (i.e. medical, allied health) to overcome any professional 
barriers. Employing multiple feedback specialists could also help to ensure that more staff 
members receive feedback and opportunities to learn. This study demonstrated that the 
feedback specialist was unable to provide feedback to some staff members as they were 
rostered on the weekend; as such, the 72 hour short cycle period lapsed by the time the 
feedback specialist next had an opportunity to meet with the staff member, which was typically 
the first business day of the following week. Weekend and after-hours coverage would support 
future studies, particularly if replicated in a larger organisation and across multiple specialities.  
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 Organisations looking to implement short cycle feedback for incident reporting, particularly 
calculating the magnitude of underreporting, should also give consideration to providing staff 
members with a written alternative compared to the verbal query process, or both options 
being conducted simultaneously to maximise staff participation. Additionally, an electronic 
mode of data collection may encourage greater staff participation, as suggested by the focus 
group. These initiatives may help to address the factors which limited participation in the 
feedback provision in this study, such as achieving the set timeframe between incident 
reporting and feedback provision. Furthermore, timely feedback was challenging due to 
rotational rosters of staff members, which limited face-to-face feedback provision by the 
feedback specialist. A mode of feedback provision could be selected by participants at the 
commencement of the study, which may facilitate information exchange between the feedback 
specialist and the staff member. 
 
Organisations wishing to implement and evaluate short cycle feedback in incident reporting 
should also consider making the pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaires 
available electronically. The focus group participants suggested that electronic questionnaires 
may be more appealing to study participants, which can lead to an increase in participation. 
Electronic questionnaires could overcome the issue of alias memory recall by automatically 
restoring an alias upon completion of the post-intervention questionnaire. A participant’s alias 
can be linked to the individual’s login credentials when accessing the electronic questionnaire. 
A focus group participant suggested that such credentials could be linked with the same 
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credentials a staff member would use to access computer systems as part of their day-to-day 
tasks. However, it is acknowledged that this may only be applicable to clinical staff, compared 
to non-clinical staff such as cleaners and ward orderlies. An electronic questionnaire could also 
prevent the unlikely occurrence of multiple participants employing the same alias, with the 
system ‘blocking out’ any attempts of using an alias that has already been entered. 
Comparisons at an individual participant level can be achieved only in the event that the same 
alias is used for both the pre-intervention and post-intervention questionnaire. Electronic 
questionnaires could enhance such individual participant level comparative data by eliminating 
the necessity for participants to recall aliases, which could become problematic if a longer study 
period was employed. It is recommended that future studies ensure questionnaires are made 
available in electronic form, which could enhance participation, eliminate memory recall issues 
regarding a participant’s alias and facilitate comparative analysis between the pre-intervention 
and post-intervention questionnaires at an individual participant level.  
 
A practical challenge for management is ensuring the appropriate level of management 
assumes control over any improvements identified via discussions between the feedback 
specialist and reporting staff member. Lessons learnt from incident reports may benefit from 
the categorisation of incidents according to what level of management can facilitate 
implementation of patient safety lessons. Such an approach is similar to the London Protocol 
(Taylor-Adams & Vincent 2001), which is to ensure systems thinking and solution ownership, as 
well as promoting a positive safety culture. It must be noted that solutions that incident 
reporting staff members identify must not be sanitised by line management, who may do so to 
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avoid any diminishment in power status or failures in their own management responsibilities 
(Carroll 1998). Hence, all levels of management must be held accountable in relation to 
promoting lessons learnt from incident reports (Reason 2000). Senior management would be 
required when lessons learnt can be transferred to broader areas of an organisation, which may 
also feature a deeper analysis of the conditions that result in errors (Reason, Carthey & de Leval 
2001) Such management accountability must be recorded in an auditable and documentable 
format. For example, a feedback tab could be incorporated into the existing IIMS reporting 
system, which could ensure either a feedback specialist and / or responsible manager 
document the provision of feedback and any improvements arising for implementation. 
 
Regulatory 
 
To accurately measure the severity of an incident it is recommended that staff members are 
provided with further training to assign appropriate SAC ratings. The provision of short cycle 
feedback was believed to culminate in improved clinical practices that benefits patient safety, 
suggested by a minor decrease in incident severity. This study showed that the entry of actual 
SAC ratings into incident reporting systems was lacking.  Additionally, the interpretation of SAC 
ratings between a reporting staff member and manager / supervisor does not correlate. The 
feedback intervention can encourage greater risk awareness and assessment; thus enabling 
improved accuracy with SAC ratings, which could lead to appropriate changes in operational 
practice, respective of severity.  
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As described in Chapter 1, the Clinical Excellence Commission (CEC) is the agency responsible 
for the overall governance of IIMS, within NSW Health. As such, a mandate to provide feedback 
to the reporting staff member must be coordinated by the CEC. The CEC would have to make 
changes to the IIMS system to facilitate the recording of feedback provision, which could be the 
addition of a feedback tab to the IIMS system, as previously described. Such a system-wide 
mandate could encourage vicarious learning amongst healthcare organisations within the 
system, such as NSW Health. Potential lessons could range from superficial changes in daily 
practice and changing learning behaviours; examples of single loop and double loop learning, 
respectively. Regulatory entities must be cautioned that organisations may not be compelled to 
accept lessons via vicarious learning due to absence of urgency and direct experiences of 
incidents, particularly those that are considered a disaster (Smith & Elliot 2007). Madsen & 
Desai (2010) described the “problemistic search” that organisations undertake in response to a 
disaster. Whilst disasters may be limited to a single hospital, a system-wide search is typically 
undertaken to ensure such a disaster cannot be replicated in other facilities across the system. 
It is suggested that a similar approach to scanning for latent errors or near-miss incidents may 
ensure constant awareness to error traps, which is a feature of high-reliability organisations 
(Reason 2012). Recent experiences from incidents hold greater than value than older 
experiences (Madsen & Desai 2010). Respectively, near-miss incidents are far more plentiful 
and frequent than incidents with catastrophic outcomes, which ensures lessons learnt are valid 
and current. As such, it is recommended that regulatory entities consider the sharing of 
documented feedback occurrences, within an incident reporting system such as IIMS, to 
facilitate widespread learning (Tucker & Edmondson 2003). Therefore, IIMS has the capacity to 
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act as a repository for practical improvements that have arisen from incidents, which could be 
transferable.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The fundamental premise of this research study was that short cycle feedback could facilitate 
single loop learning. Furthermore, the study explored whether such learning could produce 
continuous improvement evidenced by increased reporting rates, decreased actual incidents 
(reduction in underreporting) and decreased severity of incidents. A change in reporting 
behaviours and attitudes was evidenced by the pre-intervention and post-intervention 
questionnaires, with the latter substantiating that vicarious learning was present within the 
study ward, during the intervention phase. The implementation of the short cycle feedback 
system positively influenced the attitudes, perceptions and behaviours of participants, 
evidenced by the comparison between the pre-intervention and post-intervention 
questionnaires. The formative and collaborative approach between the participant and 
feedback specialist enabled the former to be engaged when determining how to transfer the 
newly acquired knowledge into a practical context (Franco & Almeida 2011). 
 
The focus group emphasised the double-loop and triple-loop learning components of the 
research study. Feedback from the focus group illustrated double-loop learning; for example, 
focus group participants queried whether the current incident reporting systems supported 
learning opportunities for incident reporters, which emphasised the importance of aligning 
incident reporting practices with the values of the organisation. Hence, it was acknowledged 
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that the learning potential of the organisation is not yet achieved. In order to accomplish 
organisational learning, the lessons derived from incident reporting systems must be 
disseminated across the organisation (Yang 2007). The focus group maintained it was necessary 
to conduct a larger replication study to determine the principles of this study could be 
duplicated on a larger scale to which it was originally conducted. Conversely, the focus group 
acknowledged the capabilities of short cycle feedback system in relation to triple-loop learning. 
The organisation’s ability to learn how the organisation’s agents learn is determined by the 
effective promotion of learning opportunities. The focus group accepted that incident reporting 
encompasses great potential to produce learning opportunities for the organisation and that 
the short cycle feedback system overcame barriers to incident reporting utility for this purpose.  
 
This research study demonstrated that short cycle feedback produces single-loop learning, 
which results in improved clinical practices that contributes to enhanced patient treatment and 
outcomes. Additionally, the learning outcomes facilitated by the short cycle feedback system 
can reduce adverse outcome recurrence and improve patient safety. Single-loop learning was 
the primary theoretical principle that supported organisational learning via short cycle 
feedback. Double-loop learning, triple-loop learning and vicarious learning were all derived 
from short cycle feedback. Thus, this research advanced the theory about learning facilitated by 
short cycle feedback, which is concluded to be far more valuable for facilitating learning than 
what had previously been theorised.  
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